Description

Mele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issue in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will - one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will.

Features

• A must-read for anyone interested in the debate on free will
• Offers solutions to problems posed by luck in the discussion of free will
• Examines influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data

Reviews

"The style of the book is detailed and rigorous.... For those working within the Free Will debate the book is recommended and makes a valuable contribution."--David Wall, Metapsychology Online Reviews

"The book is well-written and meticulously argued, and positions are carefully defined and presented. Mele's writing is a model of analytical exposition. And as always, Mele is the master of the philosophical thought experiment, and manages to make convincing positions where others have feared to tread (or indeed would have never thought it were possible to tread)."--Saul Smilansky, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Product Details

240 pages; 5 1/2 X 8 1/4; ISBN13: 978-0-19-537439-1ISBN10: 0-19-537439-8

About the Author(s)