Actus reus
[Latin: a guilty act] The prohibited conduct or behaviour that the law seeks to prevent. Although commonly referred to as the “guilty act” this is rather simplistic, as the actus reus includes all the aspects of the crime except the accused's mental state (see mens rea).

ASBO
Anti-Social Behaviour Order: a court order that prohibits the defendant from doing anything described in the order. Under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 , an ASBO may be imposed on an individual providing that the person has acted in an anti-social manner, that is to say, in a manner likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as himself, and that such an order is necessary to protect relevant persons from further anti-social acts by him. ASBOs may be imposed either as an alternative to criminal prosecution or following a conviction in criminal proceedings.

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Balance of probabilities
The standard of proof in civil cases requiring only the slightest tip of the balance to decide who wins the case. (Compare the standard of proof in criminal cases requiring the prosecution to prove its case ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.)

Battery
The intentional or reckless application of physical force to another person. Common battery is a criminal offence (punishable with a fine and/or six months' imprisonment) as well as a tort, even if no actual harm results. The consent of the victim is a defence to common battery. If actual harm does result, however, the consent of the victim will provide a defence only when the injury is inflicted for good reason (e.g. in the course of a sport or medical treatment). Consent has been rejected as a defence where actual harm was inflicted in the course of consensual sado-masochistic activities (AG's Reference (No 6 of 1980)[ 1981 ] 2 All ER 1057).

Breach of statutory duty
Breach of a duty imposed on some person or body by a statute. The person or body in breach of the statutory duty is liable to any criminal penalty imposed by the statute, but may also be liable to pay damages to the person injured by the breach if he belongs to the class for whose protection the statute was passed. Not all statutory duties give rise to civil actions for breach. If the statute does not deal with the matter expressly, the courts must decide whether or not Parliament intended to confer civil remedies. Many actions for breach of statutory duty arise out of statutes dealing with safety at work (X v Bedfordshire CC [ 1995 ] 2 AC 633 (HL)).

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Cestui qui trust
[Norman French, from cestui à que trust, he for whom is the trust] Formerly, a beneficiary under a trust.

Claimant
A person applying for relief against another person in an action, suit, petition, or any other form of court proceeding. Before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999, a claimant was called a plaintiff. Compare defendant .

Common law
The part of English law based on rules developed by the royal courts during the first three centuries after the Norman Conquest (1066) as a system applicable to the whole country, as opposed to local customs. The Normans did not attempt to make new law for the country or to impose French law on it; they were mainly concerned with establishing a strong central administration and safeguarding the royal revenues, and it was through machinery devised for these purposes that the common law developed. Royal representatives were sent on tours of the shires to check on the conduct of local affairs generally, and this involved their participating in the work of local courts. At the same time there split off from the body of advisers surrounding the king (the curia regis) the first permanent royal court – the Court of Exchequer , sitting at Westminster to hear disputes concerning the revenues. Under Henry II (reigned 1154 – 89 ), to whom the development of the common law is principally due, the royal representatives were sent out on a regular basis (their tours being known as circuits) and their functions began to be exclusively judicial. Known as justiciae errantes (wandering justices), they took over the work of the local courts. In the same period there appeared at Westminster a second permanent royal court, the Court of Common Pleas. These two steps mark the real origins of the common law. The judges of the Court of Common Pleas so successfully superimposed a single system on the multiplicity of local customs that, as early as the end of the 12th century, reference is found in court records to the custom of the kingdom. In this process they were joined by the judges of the Court of Exchequer, which began to exercise jurisdiction in many cases involving disputes between subjects rather than the royal revenues, and by those of a third royal court that gradually emerged – the Court of King's Bench (see Court of Queen's Bench ). The common law was subsequently supplemented by equity,but it remained separately administered by the three courts of common law until they and the Court of Chancery (all of them sitting in Westminster Hall until rehoused in the Strand in 1872) were replaced by the High Court of Justice under the Judicature Acts 1873 – 75.

2. Rules of law developed by the courts as opposed to those created by statute.

3. A general system of law deriving exclusively from court decisions.

contributory negligence
A person's carelessness for his own safety or interests, which contributes materially to damage suffered by him as a result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of another person or persons. Thus careless driving, knowingly travelling with a drunken driver, and failure to wear a seat belt are common forms of contributory negligence in highway accidents. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 granted a general power to apportion damages. The effect of contributory negligence is to reduce the claimant's damages by an amount that the court thinks just and equitable. The defence is most common in actions for negligence, but can be pleaded in some other torts, e.g. nuisance, rule in Rylands v Fletcher, breach of statutory duty, or under the Animals Act 1971 (see animals). Contributory negligence may also be a defence to some actions for breach of contract. It is not a defence to conversion or intentional trespass to goods (Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 ).

counsel
1.  n. A barrister, or barristers collectively.

2.  v. In criminal law, to encourage or advise a principal in the commission of an offence. Counselling is one form of accessory liability in criminal law (see also aid and abet; procure). An accessory may be held liable for having counselled the principal's offence, irrespective of whether the accessory's counselling was causally related to the principal's offence (R v Calhaen [ 1985 ] QB 808).

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defendant
A person against whom court proceedings are brought. Compare claimant.

De jure
[Latin] As a matter of legal right. See recognition .

Duty of care
The legal obligation to take reasonable care to avoid causing damage. There is no liability in tort for negligence unless the act or omission that causes damage is a breach of a duty of care owed to the claimant. There is a duty to take care in most situations in which one can reasonably foresee that one's actions may cause physical damage to the person or property of others (see neighbour principle). The duty is owed to those people likely to be affected by the conduct in question. Thus doctors owe a duty of care to their patients (Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583 (QB)) and users of the highway have a duty of care to all other road users (Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691). However, there is no general duty to prevent other persons causing damage or to rescue persons or property in danger. Liability for careless words is more limited than liability for careless acts (see negligent misstatement) and there is no general duty not to cause economic loss or psychiatric injury. The existence and scope of the duty of care will depend upon all the circumstances of the case and the relationship between the parties. The courts have developed a three tier test to determine whether a duty of care exists (Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL)). Most duties of care are the result of judicial decisions; however, some are contained in statutes, such as the Occupier's Liability Act 1957 (see occupier's liability).

Equitable
1. Recognized by or in accordance with the rules of equity: applied to distinguish certain concepts used in both common or statute law and in equity. For example, assignments and mortgages can be either legal or equitable.

2. Describing a right or concept recognized by the Court of Chancery.

3. Just, fair, and reasonable. For example, a document may have two meanings, one strict and the other (the equitable construction) more benevolent.

Equity
1. That part of English law originally administered by the Lord Chancellor and later by the Court of Chancery, as distinct from that administered by the courts of common law. The common law did not recognize certain concepts (e.g. uses and trusts) and its remedies were limited in scope and flexibility, since it relied primarily on the remedy of damages. In the Middle Ages litigants were entitled to petition the king, who relied on the advice of his Chancellor, commonly an ecclesiastic (“the keeper of the king's conscience”), to do justice in each case. By the 15th century, petitions were referred directly to the Chancellor, who dealt with cases on a flexible basis: he was more concerned with the fair result than with rigid principles of law (hence the jurist John Selden's jibe that “equity varied with the length of the Chancellor's foot”). Moreover, if a defendant refused to comply with the Chancellor's order, he would be imprisoned for contempt of the order until he chose to comply (see in personam). In the 17th century conflict arose between the common-law judges and the Chancellor as to who should prevail; James I resolved the dispute in favour of the Chancellor. General principles began to emerge, and by the early 19th century the Court of Chancery was more organized and its jurisdiction, once flexible, had ossified into a body of precedent with fixed principles. The Court of Chancery had varying types of jurisdiction (see auxiliary jurisdiction; concurrent jurisdiction; exclusive jurisdiction) and many of its general principles were stated in the form of maxims of equity; equity had (and still has) certain doctrines (see election; conversion; reconversion; performance of contract; satisfaction). Under the Judicature Acts 1873 – 75, with the establishment of the High Court of Justice to administer both common law and equity, the Court of Chancery was abolished (though much of its work is still carried out by the Chancery Division). The Judicature Acts also provided that in cases in which there was a conflict between the rules of law and equity, the rules of equity should prevail. The main areas of equitable jurisdiction now include trusts, equitable interests over property, relief against forfeiture and penalties, and equitable remedies. Equity is thus a regulated scheme of legal principles, but new developments are still possible (“equity is not past the age of child-bearing”): recent examples of its creativity include the freezing injunction and the search order.

2. An equitable right or claim, especially an equitable interest, or equity of redemption, or mere equity.

3. A share in a limited company.

European Directive
Community legislation is in the form of regulations, directives, and decisions. Directives are addressed to one or more member states and require them to achieve (by amending national law if necessary) specified results. They are not directly applicable – they do not create enforceable Community rights in member states until the state has legislated in accordance with the directive: the domestic statute then creates the rights for the citizens of that country. A directive cannot therefore impose legal obligations on individuals or private bodies, but by its direct effect it confers rights on individuals against the state and state bodies, even before it has been implemented by changes to national law, by decisions of the European court.

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Fiduciary
[from Latin: fiducia, trust]
1.  A person, such as a trustee, who holds a position of trust or confidence with respect to someone else and who is therefore obliged to act solely for that person's benefit.

2.  In a position of trust or confidence. Fiduciary relationships include those between trustees and their beneficiaries, company promoters and directors and their shareholders, solicitors and their clients, and guardians and their wards.

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Gross negligence
A high degree of negligence, manifested in behaviour substantially worse than that to be expected of the average reasonable man. The distinction between negligence and gross negligence can be important in criminal law, notably in cases of gross negligence manslaughter. Here, in the words of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R8, “in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.” Bateman was a doctor who negligently supervised the labour of a woman giving birth with the result that she died. A defendant may therefore be guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence if: (1) the defendant owed the victim a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the breach of duty caused the death of the victim; and (4) the jury decides that the breach is serious enough to be characterized as gross negligence and thus a crime (R v Adomako [ 1995 ] 1 AC 171 (HL)).

Guardian ad litem
A guardian ad litem is the former name for a litigation friend responsible for the conduct of legal proceedings on behalf of someone else (typically, a minor).

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Injunction
n. A remedy in the form of a court order addressed to a particular person that either prohibits him from doing or continuing to do a certain act (a prohibitory injunction) or orders him to carry out a certain act (a mandatory injunction). The remedy is discretionary and will be granted only if the court considers it just and convenient to do so; it will not be granted if damages would be a sufficient remedy.

Injunctions are often needed urgently. A temporary injunction (an interim injunction) may therefore be granted at a special hearing pending the outcome of the main hearing of the case. If it is granted, the claimant must undertake to compensate the defendant for any damage he has suffered by the grant of the injunction if the defendant is successful in the main action. If judgment is given for the claimant in the main action, a perpetual injunction may be granted. A person who fails to abide by the terms of an injunction may be guilty of contempt of court. See also freezing injunction; quia timet.

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Judicial review

1. The principal means by which the High Court exercises supervision over public authorities in accordance with the doctrine of ultra vires. The power of the High Court to exercise judicial review is often referred to as its supervisory jurisdiction. The mechanism for seeking judicial review is by making a claim under the procedure provided for in Rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules. Claims are made to the Administrative Division of the High Court. The common law grounds on which judicial review may be granted were defined in the case Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [ 1985 ] AC 374 (HL) as illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. In terms of the Human Rights Act 1998, judicial review may also be used to challenge action by public authorities that is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. If the claim for a judicial review is successful, the court may grant a quashing order, mandatory order, prohibiting order, declaration, or injunction; it may also award damages in certain circumstances.

2. 2. In European Union law, the European Court of Justice has a judicial review function provided for under Article 230 of the EC Treaty. In terms of this provision, community acts (i.e. legally binding acts of the community institutions) are challengeable by means of judicial review on the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, or infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application or misuse of powers. Action can be brought by an institution of the EU, a member state, or (in certain limited circumstances) an individual.

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Legal aid
A scheme under the Legal Aid Act 1988 whereby the payment of legal costs was made out of public funds for those unable to meet the costs themselves, provided that the person qualified under the financial and merits tests laid down under the scheme. There were separate provisions for civil and criminal cases. Civil legal aid had two components: legal advice and assistance (sometimes known as the green form scheme) and legal aid. Under the former, payment was made to qualified lawyers under the scheme who provided legal advice and help preliminary to litigation. Under legal aid, payment was made for the provision of legal advice and assistance at all stages of litigation, including appeals. In criminal cases, the court determined whether or not legal aid was granted and made a legal aid order if it considered legal aid desirable in the interest of justice.

The legal aid scheme was replaced in April 2000 by the Community Legal Service. Under this new scheme of legal aid and assistance, the green form scheme was replaced by the legal help scheme and legal aid was replaced by full representation; there are, in addition, intermediate levels of service.

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Mens rea
[Latin: a guilty mind] The state of mind that the prosecution must prove a defendant to have had at the time of committing a crime in order to secure a conviction. Mens rea varies from crime to crime; it is either defined in the statute creating the crime or established by precedent. Common examples of mens rea are intention to bring about a particular consequence, recklessness as to whether such consequences may come about (R v Cunningham [ 1957 ] 2 QB 396), and (for a few crimes). Some crimes require knowledge of certain circumstances as part of the mens rea (for example, the crime of receiving stolen goods requires the knowledge that they were stolen). Some crimes require no mens rea; these are known as crimes of strict liability. Whenever mens rea is required, the prosecution must prove that it existed at the same time as the actus reusof the crime (coincidence of actus reus and mens rea: R v Le Brun [ 1992 ] QB 61). A defendant cannot plead ignorance of the law, nor is a good motive a defence. He may, however, bring evidence to show that he had no mens rea for the crime he is charged with; alternatively, he may admit that he had mens rea, but raise a general defence (e.g. duress) or a particular defence allowed in relation to the crime.

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novus actus interveniens
Latin: a new intervening act (or cause)] An act or event that breaks the causal connection between a wrong or crime committed by the defendant and subsequent happenings and therefore relieves the defendant from responsibility for these happenings. In tort the chain of causation may be broken by the claimant (McKew v Holland [ 1969 ] 3 A11 ER 1621 (HL)), natural events (Carslogie Steamship Co Ltd v Royal Norwegian Government [ 1952 ] AC 292 (HL)), or a third party (Knightley v Johns [ 1982 ] 1 WLR 349 (CA)).

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Plaintiff
See Claimaint ------- A person applying for relief against another person in an action, suit, petition, or any other form of court proceeding. Before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999, a claimant was called a plaintiff. Compare defendant.

precedent
A judgment or decision of a court, normally recorded in a law report, used as an authority for reaching the same decision in subsequent cases. In English law, judgments and decisions can represent authoritative precedent (which is generally binding and must be followed) or persuasive precedent (which need not be followed). It is that part of the judgment that represents the legal reasoning (or ratio decidendi ) of a case that is binding, but only if the legal reasoning is from a superior court and, in general, from the same court in an earlier case. Accordingly, ratio decidendis of the House of Lords are binding upon the Court of Appeal and all lower courts and are normally followed by the House of Lords itself. The ratio decidendis of the Court of Appeal are binding on all lower courts and, subject to some exceptions, on the Court of Appeal itself. Ratio decidendis of the High Court are binding on inferior courts, but not on itself. The ratio decidendis of inferior courts do not create any binding precedent.

pure economic loss
The courts distinguish between financial or economic loss resulting from physical damage, which is generally recoverable, and pure economic loss, which does not result from personal injury or damage to property (Spartan Steel & Alloys v Martin & Co (Contractors) Ltd [ 1972 ] QB 27 (CA)). For pure economic loss the courts impose a much more limited duty of care.

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res ipsa loquitur
[Latin: the thing speaks for itself] A principle often applied in the tort of negligence. If an accident has occurred of a kind that usually only happens if someone has been negligent, and the state of affairs that produced the accident was under the control of the defendant, it may be presumed in the absence of evidence that the accident was caused by the defendant's negligence (Scott v London and St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 Hurl. & C. 596).

restitution
n. The return of property to the owner or person entitled to possession. If one person has unjustifiably received either property or money from another, he has an obligation to restore it to the rightful owner in order that he should not be unjustly enriched or retain an unjustified advantage. This obligation exists when, for example, goods or money have been transferred under compulsion (duress), under mistake, or under a transaction that fails because of illegality, lack of formality, or for any other reason or when the person who has taken the property has acquired a benefit through his actions without justification.

In certain circumstances the courts may make a restitution order in respect of property. Under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, if someone is convicted of any offence relating to stolen goods the court may order that the stolen goods or their proceeds should be restored to the person entitled to recover them. The court will only exercise this power, however, in clear cases that do not involve disputed questions of fact or law. Under the Police (Property) Act 1897, magistrates' courts are empowered to make a restitution order in favour of a person who is apparently the owner of property that has been obtained by the police in connection with any crime, even when no charge can be brought or the goods are seized under a search warrant. If the owner cannot be found, the court may make any order it thinks fit (usually an order for sale by auction). The police have no power to retain property lawfully seized merely because they think the court will probably make a restitution order.

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specific performance
A court order to a person to fulfil his obligations under a contract. For example, when contracts have been exchanged for the sale of a house, the court may order a reluctant seller to complete the sale. The remedy is a discretionary one and is not available in certain cases; for example, for the enforcement of a contract of employment or when the payment of damages would be a sufficient remedy.

Strict liability

1. (in criminal law) Liability for a crime that is imposed without the necessity of proving mens rea with respect to one or more of the elements of the crime. There are few crimes of strict liability at common law but such crimes are often created by statute, particularly to control or regulate daily activities; examples include offences relating to the production and marketing of food and offences relating to road traffic. The usual penalty for crimes of strict liability is a fine. Most crimes of strict liability do, however, require mens rea in respect of at least some of the elements of the crime. In some cases statute provides for strict liability, but then allows a defence if the accused can prove (see burden of proof ) that he had no reason to know of or suspect certain facts, so that, in effect, the crime becomes one of negligence. Insanity or non-insane automatism is a defence to all crimes, including crimes of strict liability.

2. 2.  (in tort) Liability for a wrong that is imposed without the claimant having to prove that the defendant was at fault. Strict liability is exceptional in the law of tort, but is imposed for torts involving dangerous animals (see animals ) and dangerous things (the rule in Rylands v Fletcher ), conversion, defamation, products liability, and some cases of breach of statutory duty. It is no defence in these torts that the defendant took reasonable care to prevent damage, but various other defences are admitted.

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Tort
[Old French: harm, wrong; from Latin tortus, twisted or crooked] A wrongful act or omission for which damages can be obtained in a civil court by the person wronged, other than a wrong that is only a breach of contract. The law of tort is mainly concerned with providing compensation for personal injury and property damage caused by negligence. It also protects other interests, however, such as reputation (see defamation), personal freedom (see assault; false imprisonment), title to property (see conversion; trespass), enjoyment of property (see nuisance), and commercial interests (see intimidation; conspiracy; passing off). It must usually be shown that the wrong was done intentionally or negligently, but there are some torts of strict liability. Most torts are actionable only if they have caused damage, but torts whose main function is to protect rights rather than to compensate for damage (such as trespass) are actionable without proof of damage. The person principally liable is the one who committed the tort (the tortfeasor) but under the rules of vicarious liability one may be liable for a tort committed by another person. The main remedy for a tort is an action for damages, but in some cases an injunction can be obtained to prevent repetition of the injury. Other remedies are self-help and orders for specific restitution of property.

Some torts are also breaches of contract. Negligent driving by a taxi-driver that causes injury to his passenger is both the tort of negligence and breach of the contract to carry the passenger safely to his destination. The passenger may sue either in tort or for breach of contract, or both. Many torts are also crimes. Assault is both a crime and a tort. Dangerous driving is a crime and may give rise to an action in tort if it causes injury to another person. The crime is prosecuted by agents of the state in the name of the Crown. It is left to the injured person to seek compensation from the wrongdoer by means of an action in tort.

trespass to the person
Trespass to the person may be intentional or negligent, but since negligent physical injuries are remedied by an action for negligence, the action for trespass to the person is only brought for direct and intentional acts, in the form of actions for assault, battery, and false imprisonment.

trustee
n. A person having a nominal title to property that he holds for the benefit of one or more others, the beneficiaries (see trust ). Trustees may be individuals or corporate bodies (see trust corporation ) and can include such specialists as judicial trustees, custodian trustees, and the Public Trustee. A trustee must show a high standard of care towards his beneficiaries, and must not allow his interests to conflict with those of his beneficiaries. He is not entitled to profit from the trust, although a professional trustee is authorized to receive remuneration for his services under part V of the Trustee Act 2000 in the absence of any other express entitlement. It is not unusual for remuneration of trustees to be authorized by the trust instrument itself. Other legislation permits the payment of fees to Public Trustees, judicial trustees, and custodian trustees. Trustees may refuse their office, retire, or resign, but they remain liable for acts carried out during their trusteeship. The power to appoint replacement trustees is usually given either to the beneficiaries or to the remaining trustees; in default the court will appoint replacement trustees. Trustees have a wide range of powers and duties, including a duty to act equally between the beneficiaries and a power to advance money to them (see advancement ). In the exercise of their duties they are answerable to the court.

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uberimmae fides
[Latin: of the utmost good faith] Describing a class of contracts in which one party has a preliminary duty to disclose material facts relevant to the subject matter to the other party. Nondisclosure makes the contract voidable (see voidable contract ). Examples of this class are insurance contracts, in which knowledge of many material facts is confined to the party seeking insurance.

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vicarious liability
(vicarious responsibility) Legal liability imposed on one person for torts or crimes committed by another (usually an employee but sometimes an independent contractor or agent), although the person made vicariously liable is not personally at fault. An employer is vicariously liable for torts committed by his employees when he has authorized or ratified them or when the tort was committed in the course of the employees' work. Thus negligent driving by someone employed as a driver is a tort committed in the course of his employment, but if the driver were to assault a passing pedestrian for motives of private revenge, the assault would not be connected with his job and his employer would not be liable. The test is whether the tort is so closely connected with the employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employer vicariously liable (Lister v Hesley Hall [ 2002 ] 1 AC 215 (HL)). Employers have been found vicariously liable for bullying in the workplace (Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas's NHS Trust [ 2006 ] UKHL 34, [ 2006 ] IRLR 695) and for the stabbing of a guest by a bouncer outside a nightclub (Mattis v Pollock (t/a Flamingo's Nightclub) [ 2003 ] EWCA Civ 887, [ 2003 ] ICR 335). The purpose of the doctrine of vicarious liability is to ensure that an employer pays the costs of damage caused by his business operations. His vicarious liability, however, is in addition to the liability of the employee, who remains personally liable for his own torts. The person injured by the tort may sue either or both of them, but will generally prefer to sue the employer.

Vicarious criminal liability may effectively be imposed by statute on an employer for certain offences committed by an employee in relation to his employment. Thus it has been held that an employer is guilty of selling unfit food under the Food Act 1984 when his employee does the physical act of selling (the employee is also guilty, though in practice is rarely prosecuted). Likewise, an employer may be guilty of supplying goods under a false trade description when it is his employee who actually delivers them. For an offence that normally requires mens rea, an employer will only be vicariously liable if the offence relates to licensing laws. For example, if a licensee has delegated the entire management of his licensed premises to another person, and that person has committed the offence with the necessary mens rea, the licensee will be vicariously liable.

Vicarious liability for crimes may be imposed in certain other circumstances. The registered owner of a vehicle, for example, is expressly made liable by statute for fixed-penalty and excess parking charges, even if the fault for the offence was not his. If the offence is a regulatory offence of strict liability, the courts often also impose vicarious liability if the offence is defined in the statute in a way that makes this possible.

volenti non fit injuria
[Latin: no wrong is done to one who consents] The defence that the claimant consented to the injury or (more usually) to the risk of being injured. Knowledge of the risk of injury is not sufficient; there must also be (even if only by implication) full and free consent to bear the risk (Simms v Leigh Rugby Football Club Ltd [ 1969 ] 2 All ER 923). A claimant who has assumed the risk of injury has no action if the injury occurs. The scope of the defence is limited by statute in cases involving business liability and public and private transport.

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