Jackson & Sørensen: Introduction to International Relations 3e
Chapter 06
Social Constructivism
The transatlantic relationship has cooled down after 9-11. Immediately after the attack, the US responded with strong multilateralism, stepping up diplomatic efforts to create a coalition against terrorism. But US policies quickly became much more unilateral, perhaps culminating with the National Security Strategy of September 2002 that endorsed the need for pre-emptive action. How should we diagnose the transatlantic relationship; if there is a crisis, how deep is it?
The transatlantic relationship would appear to be a choice subject for social constructivist analysis, but to our knowledge very few constructivists have pondered the subject. An early contribution by Peter Van Ham argued that cultural differences between Europe and the US would mean that 'ultimately, NATO will not be able to last'1. If one extrapolates the Wendtian analysis of the end of the Cold War, a similar conclusion would appear to emerge: Just as Gorbachev's New Thinking dramatically re-assessed the US-Soviet relationship and thus 'unilaterally and almost overnight'2 terminated the Cold War, so the unilateral moves by the US in the wake of 9-11 have led to new discord between the US and Europe. President Bush's notions of 'preventive war' and 'regime change by force' are 'not considered legitimate means of international politics in Europe'3. There are other disputes over arms control, international human rights, and the environment. From a social constructivist view—and drawing a parallel to Gorbachev—one might say that President Bush has ended the friendly relationship to Europe almost overnight and that Europe is—if not an 'enemy'—then at least a 'rival', spelling the end of transatlantic 'collective identity', the concept used by Wendt to describe friendly anarchies.
Assignments:
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Try to design a constructivist analysis of the transatlantic relationship. Would it follow the outline indicated above?
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Consider the following objection to the constructivist analysis outlined above: there are other ideas in play between Europe and the US than those raised by recent disputes; the consequence is that residing on the level of shared ideas makes it difficult to decide whether 'collective identity' remains in place or not. The 'other ideas' are the core values that unite Europe and the US, even in spite of present disagreements: the support for liberal democracy, for open market economies, for civil and political liberties. In other words, Europe and the US preserve collective identity on the level of fundamental values. At the same time, they disagree on the best and most appropriate ways of promoting those values. Those disagreements are surely connected to different perceptions of national interest. That is to say, on the level of shared ideas, there is evidence that the US and Europe are 'friends' as well as 'rivals', to some extent even 'enemies'. On the level of inter-state discourse alone, one cannot easily determine whether or not this is a friendly anarchy. Discuss.
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A second objection to the constructivist analysis might be the following: The transatlantic relationship is more than the ideas or the thinking about it. The transatlantic relationship cannot be reduced to the shared ideas about it. As indicated earlier, it is also economic and political integration and common institutions. Without further investigation of those aspects of the relationship, any overall evaluation of it would be incomplete. Discuss.
References
1 Peter Van Ham, 'Security and Culture, or, Why NATO Won't Last', Security Dialogue, 32:4, 2001, 393-406.
2 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1999, 375.
3 Thomas Risse, 'Beyond Iraq: The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community', Die Friedens-Warte, 78, 2003, 175.


