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Question 1

In what ways might it be possible for theory to inform a definition of intelligence?

a) Intelligence refers to the process of defining a nations needs, to the collection, and analysis of information. The theory of cybernetics can be usefully applied to the intelligence process. The theory of cybernetics assumes that the intelligence process is but part of the flow of information which then acts as feedback to maximize a states efficiency in achieving its foreign policy goals.

b) Intelligence is an operational activity of information used in the policy community. Intelligence is the enactment of collected information and is understood primarily as information in "movement." The theory of cybernetics shows how decision makers steer their ship through the waters (of international politics). Information can only be regarded as intelligence once it has entered the policy domain.

c) Intelligence refers to the clandestine collection of information and to the collection of information for the expressed intent of keeping other states from obtaining it. The term intelligence so conceived is part of game-theory: the process by which subversive activities are highly secretive and involves strategically outwitting the opponent in the information stakes

d) Intelligence refers to the process by which information is collected: the people and institutions and the activities which do it. Intelligence therefore is regarded as a relatively stable activity. State security is an impermeable concern of the national interest which has always required institutional support. Security is closely interrelated with state realism as an unchanging security requirement that will remain so regardless of domestic political fluctuations.

Question 2

What are the general organizational features of most nations' intelligence communities?

a) Generally most large and globally active nations have intelligence agencies that serve to coordinate the intelligence community (IC), collect information, and support the military. However only the US, UK, and Russia can claim to be truly globally active in operation. The nature of the IC will vary from nation to nation, the form taken being dependent on the legal-political culture and the bureaucratic style of the nation.

b) Intelligence organization and operations are clandestine. The IC was created and controlled by a very small number of state elites and it remains common operational practice to collect information against citizens or branches of government. The lack of legislative oversight and operation under executive supervision has been the distinguishing mark from other governmental institutions and state services.

c) Intelligence activities carried out during the Cold War left an institutional legacy that has persisted under the transition to post-communist nationhood. Most nations have global intelligence infrastructures formatted on the legal-bureaucratic structures of the triangular Cold war Superpowers.

d) Intelligence infrastructure was established in the early to mid-twentieth century, with an overarching supervisory body to coordinate the operations and needs of the IC. However, the intelligence framework was a separate institutional body to the military establishment, designed to check its power and provide oversight to its activities.

Question 3

What is techint intelligence collection?

a) Techint is the oldest intelligence collection discipline, spies having used the technique for centuries. The methods used by spies have changed over the centuries but the goal has remained fairly static: to gain advantage over an opponent by accessing secrets by deploying embedded operatives to intercept information vital to the target states interest

b) Technical intelligence refers to the collection of information regarding a potential, or actual, opponent's weapons system. However it later came to refer to intelligence collected from the interception of electric communication signals through electronic devices

c) Techint requires that linguistic skills and cultural knowledge of a target country be deployed to a country to which an operative is assigned. Intelligence collectors are normally embedded into a foreign nation's diplomatic service to recruit locals and access or leak information An intelligence officers' techint operation method is to exchange information in a manner that will not compromise the person that is providing it.

d) Techint intelligence refers to the collection of information specifically regarding a country's weapons system and conventional and nuclear arsenal capability. Irrefutable sourced techint information only became possible with the deployment of the aero plane. Aerial reconnaissance was utilized by the military to take photographs of an adversary's military capacities and systems sites.

Question 4

What can we understand by the intelligence cycle or process and difficulties that may occur within?

a) Most intelligence failures occur in the analysis stage. Analysts may be overwhelmed by too much information, or information insufficiencies and they may have prejudices that cause them to emphasize information and neglect others. They may fall victim to "groupthink" or form analysis to the decision-makers' agenda. They may even err on the side of caution. A proliferation of agencies within the IC contributes to the problem.

b) "Stovepiping" may occur in which collection of collectors or analysts select "fitting" information to the decision maker directly and this circumvents the critical analytic process.

c) Processing and collecting failures occur in the intelligence cycle. Breakdowns often resulting from a failure to correlate and coordinate between agencies and sub-agencies, occur at virtually every stage.

d) All of the Above.

Question 5

In what ways did the Cold War impact on the relationship between intelligence and security?

a) During World War Two extensive sigint cooperation existed between the UK and the US in which formal and informal exchanges of personnel became consecrated in the Brusa Agreement May 1943 and latterly in the UKUSA Agreement. However, intelligence cooperation broke down following a series of crises, a result of the Soviet penetration into British intelligence services and the Suez Crisis in 1956.

b) Aerial overhead imagery played a critical role in obtaining hard intelligence about Soviet military developments with U2 spy over flights. The era of "eyes in the skies" and photographic satellites gave both sides of the iron curtain the ability to monitor weapon deployments and arsenal and to verify treaty compliance, which was to become a source of stability.

c) The development of the first American satellite across Soviet territory in August 1960 resulted in a technology gap in which the Soviets had to play catch up. The technology developed during the period of the "eyes in the sky" enabled a number of images from orbiting the planet or geosynchronous surveillance above the territory to be utilized by military strategists. The "technological race" perpetuated Superpower competition and delayed the signing of non-proliferation treaties.

d) World War Two intelligence collection techniques had a heavy reliance on human espionage. However, in the Cold War human espionage was primarily ideologically motivated. For this reason there were a high number of instances of defection from British, American, and West German citizens which led to a crisis of information. Lack of reliable information, particularly following the uncovering of the "atomic spies" and "Cambridge five" led to state-centric organized activities in which humint intelligence was marginalized from the collection agenda.

Question 6

What impact have legal and ethical issues had on the intelligence community?

a) Customary international law has affirmed the legality of international collection through the insertion of a verification clause which states that no state that is party to the agreement will interfere with national technology means of verification.

b) Domestic laws of the collecting do not accept liability fro intelligence collection. The intelligence community has a supra-legal status with minimum legislative oversight. The intelligence apparatus is separate from the infrastructure of government which constitutes an anomaly that cannot be reconciled in contemporary liberal democratic states

c) International law that governs state interactions in the international system cannot be reconciled with espionage. Foreign intelligence collection constitutes arbitrary intervention into the territory of a sovereign state. States engaging in subversive actions overseas have effectively broken the inviolability principle.

d) Customary international law is essentially ambiguous regarding the subject of legality of external intelligence activities. Discussions of the ethics either justify action in terms of the relationship between means and ends (to national security), or to the anarchical international environment (as a necessary feature in the absence of international sources of security).

Question 7

Can Covert Actions (CA) be justifiable?

a) The "Essentiality" principle argues that CA is justifiable when the desired goal of the action is essential to national security. CA is not considered a routine operational activity but exceptional, requiring that the essentiality of the action be validated by both the executive and the parliamentary institutions. Related to this is the notion of "Last Resort," in that resort to CA is the only viable means of attaining the national security interest

b) Approval procedures for CA must be clearly stipulated which requires written approval. CA is the most intrusive and potentially dangerous of government foreign policy tools and therefore authorization should not be done by oral command, low level or field operatives. Popular support must be able to stand in the light of public awareness

c) The "Commensurability" principle contends that CA is justifiable if the degree of force, intrusiveness, and deception used in a CA is commensurate with the nature of the threat. Equally the means to CA must be feasible.

d) All of the Above

Question 8

In what ways has the relationship between security and intelligence progressed in the post-9/11 world?

a) The resources directed to intelligence services and counter-terrorism operations has vastly increased and in a more open manner. In some cases this meant that the amount of resources given was more than agencies requested, however Taylor and Goldman argues that for political reasons in the contemporary climate politicians can not afford to be seen as cheap (2004: 421).

b) Allegations of the Iraqi intelligence failings resulted in the "privatization "of the intelligence communities' activities. Increased elite oversight has been extended but public transparency over the relationship between activities, resource allocation and national security has been diminished.

c) The proliferation in western intelligence communities' activities against Iraq after UN inspectors were forced out in 1998 reached a peak post-9/11. Public awareness of information failing policy resulted in a decline in popular support which led to measures to increase legislative oversight, the diversion of intelligence resources to external democratization projects

d) Inquiries into the intelligence communities' information failings in the build up to the war established a link between the intelligence process and efficacy of inter-agency cooperation. Reform of the intelligence community has reduced the scope of bureaucracy to enhance external cooperation and internal coordination

Question 9

What have been the most significant developments in the evolving intelligence process in contemporary international society?

a) The military historian (John Keegan: 2004: 28) argues that intelligence can win wars, requiring a combination of techint and sigint collection disciplines which can provide strategists with valuable information about weapon deployments, personnel movement, communication and transport locations.

b) There is some equivocation over the extent to which intelligence can be used to make gains The question is to what extent largely defensive intelligence activities can be seen as provocative to the other side. Intelligence may therefore create a security dilemma if defensive actions are interpreted as confirmation of hostile intent.

c) Extra-normal activities such as assassinations and covert actions have become "normalized" procedural activities in external operations involving a diversion of resources away from traditional techint intelligence collection. The utility of operations is the rapidly and cleanly effected positive change without recourse to war and particularly against anti-democratic forces which can threaten international stability.

d) Raw, unprocessed data can be fed directly to decision-makers to make rapid and reliable decisions based on hard information obtained particularly by photint technology

Question 10

What theories can help to explain what went wrong with Iraq?

a) The "intelligence conspiracy theory" in which British and American intelligence agencies had determined to go to war and relayed false information to decision-makers about the extent of Iraqi weapons capacity.

b) The defense intelligence conspiracy theory" contends that defense related intelligence agencies in both countries falsified evidence so that the military could be deployed to Iraq. Evidence exists of defense agencies deliberate reliance on questionable sources and regime defectors that were not put through the intelligence cycle, a process r4eferred to as "cherry picking" (the provision of unanalyzed information)

c) The "Group-think theory" asserts that intelligence analysts working on the issue of Iraq's WMD capabilities and possible deployment of weapons and manufacturing sites, evaluated and discussed available evidence and came to accept interpretations making it difficult to defect from the prevailing opinion.

d) None of the above. The bureaucratic pressure theory seems the most viable argument in which recurring appeals to find intelligence to support policy cause analysts to interpret evidence in a way more friendly to supervisors interacting with senior decision-makers

Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Chapter 14.

Chapter 14

Instructions