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Question 1

Why, if at all, has the Western use of coercive diplomacy increased since the end of the Cold War?

a) Coercive diplomacy has been proven a successful policy tool and integral to conflict management in the non-western world: the prevention or reversal of acts of aggression and (support for) terrorism and to end WMD programs. The successes of the past policy initiatives in the post-9/11 community has reinforced the trend toward coercive diplomacy by increasing American political will to counter mass casualty terrorism in failing states.

b) The favorable geo-political environments characterized by an overwhelmingly western military superiority and a low risk of hostile great power intervention, has generated pressures on, as well as incentives for, western policy makers to promote their policy agenda and manage armed conflicts from weak states and failing states.

c) The demise of the ideological bi-polar division of international society in the Cold War, rather than resulting in a reduction of hostilities, has left an unstable legacy where a policy of force and mass retaliation continues to pose a very real threat. Risk of uncontrollable escalation still remains but in a different form: mass casualty terrorism, contagion from failing states and non-state actors seeking to acquire WMD. Escalation to nuclear war remains a real possibility in the policy community.

d) The hostile geo-political environment characterized by the growing Asian-Pacific challenge to Western military superiority engendered an increased risk of greater of hostile great power intervention which has generated pressures on western policy makers to maintain policies reflective of the new strategic challenge and the preparation of potential threats to their hemisphere or avenues of economic activities.

Question 2

What distinguishes coercive diplomacy from military force?

a) Compellence is another term for coercive diplomacy, but covering a narrower set of criteria: compellence covers those threats aimed at initiating adversary action. A threat to coerce a state to give up part of its territory would count as coercive diplomacy because it follows the actions in situations where it proactively initiates action before reactive diplomacy is taken.

b) Coercive diplomacy constitutes the threats of limited force to induce adversary's incentive to comply with the coercer's demands. It is an influence strategy that is intended to obtain compliance: the use of force to defeat an opponent first does not count. It leaves an element of choice with the target to comply, or to continue.

c) It is the reactive nature of the threat that relates coercive diplomacy to its sister strategy of deterrence which involves the use of threats to influence adversaries not to take actions. The use of threats and limited force and inducements is taken by the deterrence coercer resulting in compliance.

d) Coercive diplomacy is employed to use force but to limit its effects on the international community. Coercive diplomacy is an aggressive strategy that is intended to obtain compliance through defeat. It does not leave an element of choice with the target, the target either being forced to comply or engage in conflict. It seeks to control by imposing compliance by depriving any form of negotiation or concession.

Question 3

In what ways can a distinction be made between limited force and full scale force?

a) The distinction between limited force and full scale force is the second process of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy only fails if the coercer fails to achieve its defined goals and fails to defeat its adversary in the second stage.

b) Generally the distinction between brute and limited force is negligible. Resort to air or sea power constitutes an equal coercive capacity to a conventional ground offensive. Military action in the end result always has resulted from a shift from the diplomatic to the military sphere of international action.

c) The distinction between limited force and brute force is important because of amount of force that is used to attain the coercer's interests. The amount of force is variable dependent on the degree required to induce compliance absolutely.

d) The distinction between limited force and full-scale war is crucial because resort to brute force means that diplomacy has failed. The distinction is not based on the amount of force or the type but on the purpose that the use of force seeks to accomplish and the element of choice left to the adversary: limited force is a bargaining tool.

Question 4

What significance did Schelling have for an understanding of the necessary conditions for compellence success?

a) Threats must be uniformly conveyed: the threat issues must be the maximum possible level and demand immediate response to make the cost of non-compliance unbearable. Giving the adversary scope to respond will undermine the cost and give the impression of inconsistency in the coercers threats

b) Schelling was primarily interested in discerning the condition influencing the use of compellence; he did not try to formulae a specific policy framework.

c) The conditions for success derived from Schelling heavily influenced game theory offers no conditions for compellence success on the adversary's side. Schelling fails to include the conditions that the adversary needs to be assured of the prevention of escalatory demands resulting from compliance.

d) The conflict between a coercer and a policy target must be perceived in zero-sum terms. The presence of a common interest in avoiding full-scale war is an undermining presence for the successful completion of an act of coercion: the coercer's threat must be accepted as credible. The target must be persuaded that it had more to lose by not engaging in bargaining whilst the coercer must believe that they have more to gain by forcible action.

Question 5

According to George and Simons what factors influence the outcomes of an act of coercive diplomacy?

a) George and Simon's framework provides the contextual variables that should be used initially to decide whether coercive diplomacy is a viable strategy in a given crisis.

b) Conditions favoring success as significant to producing a result favorable to the coercers interests and intent include asymmetry of motivation, a sense of urgency, a fear of unacceptable escalation.

c) The success variables only are considered to enter the decision-making process n the second stage if the analysis of the contextual variables suggests that a coercive diplomacy strategy may work.

d) All of the above. George and Simon distinguish between contextual variables and conditions favoring success, and the idea that they should be used by decision makers at different stages in the policy making process.

Question 6

In what ways does the Ideal Policy framework explain previous understandings of the necessary conditions for successful coercive diplomacy actions?

a) In light of the difficulties western democracies have - sustaining popular support in conflicts not threatening their vital interests - opponents will regard western threats to fight a prolonged war in such a scenario as a bluff. In practice this means that the coercer must be militarily superior and capable of denying their opponent the ability to realize their agenda and impose costs that directly threaten their interests.

b) To maximize credibility a threat of quick defeat backed by the required military capability is insufficient. A deadline of compliance must accompany it. It follows that a failure to set a deadline for compliance will be interrelated as evidence that the coercer lacks the will to implement the threat.

c) Assurance against new demands must be included to enhance the prospects of success. The incentive to comply will be significantly reduced if fears are justifiably present

d) All of the above. To make non-compliance too costly the coercer must threaten to defeat the adversary to deny him his objectives quickly and with little costs. The threat is designed to accomplish two things: fear of unacceptable escalation; to make the threat credible.

Question 7

In what ways does the Ideal Policy framework provide an analytical framework for practitioners' success?

a) The Ideal Policy framework provides the analytical tools for understanding the contextual factors influencing the use of coercive diplomacy, for example why a policy maker takes the decision to, or not to, implement the Ideal Policy

b) The Ideal Policy framework focuses on the use of coercive diplomacy to counter aggression. The Ideal Policy explains and predicts outcomes with a minimum of success conditions on the basis of the coercer's actions only

c) The Ideal Policy provides an expansive framework, firstly for the examination of a maximum number of probable causal conditions and secondly, to make the conditions applicable to the contextual factors relating to the use of coercive diplomacy.

d) The Ideal Policy framework recognizes that to make non-compliance too costly, the coercer must threaten to defeat the adversary or to deny the targets objectives. The condition for success is pivotal on the coercer's threat of force.

Question 8

In what ways is defining a coercive diplomacy success problematic?

a) Isolation of the effect that the threat of force or the limited use of force, in a given case is dependent on the sufficiency of the "stick" for success. The question to ask is whether the stick employed was sufficient to produce compliance

b) Success is an independent function from the amount of coercion required to produce compliance. Ideally, coercion should be required to solve all disputes. If the threshold from persuasion to coercion is crossed, the degree of success is equated to the production intended outcome: to stop or undo an action

c) In protracted diplomatic affairs involving a series of inconclusive exchanges which results in tactical/temporary successes followed by new acts of non-compliance, the production of the intended outcome (compliance and ceasing of actions) is regarded as a success from a policy goal perspective

d) Coercive diplomacy success resulting from the use of threats and sanctions (inducements may, but need not, be employed) are classified as cheap successes whereas successes resulting from the use of limited force count as costly ones. Compliance can only be considered a success if the outcome is lasting/strategic

Question 9

Why is coercive diplomacy hard? What are the inherent difficulties?

a) Perpetual, psychological and emotional factors are precluded from the adversary's calculations. In no-win situations therefore the adversary might calculate that temporary compliance is the best strategic option to buy time.

b) Coercive diplomacy leaves too much room for compromise. Actors engaging in such behavior are unlikely to perceive their vital interests as threatened and regard issues as zero-sum because they are aware that force will be used. As a consequence coercive diplomacy can lead to lengthy resolution discussions

c) The success ultimately rests on perceptual, psychological and emotional factors that give rise to the risk that misperception or miscalculation will defeat even a well-executed strategy meeting all the requirements for success.

d) The political scope for offering inducements can become unlimited. The problem becomes particularly underlined when the risk of terrorism, WMD or equal military capability comes into play. Inducements can appear to look like concessionary politics and blur the line of what constitutes a success defined as the fear of inescapable escalation.

Question 10

What are the practical problems associated with applying coercive diplomacy in the west?

a) Different natures of the adversaries complicate the use of western coercion. Their tendency to rely on irregular or asymmetric military strategies which makes it hard to threaten or even defeat their opponent's military strategy. Those actors deny forces the ability to win quickly with little cost

b) Increased verification capabilities brought in with the technological and communication revolution has resulted in a practical difficulty for practitioners, enabling the verification of tactical/temporary and strategic/lasting - only the latter of which constituting a compliance success. The capacity to verify processes have highlighted instances of non-compliance following inconclusive coercive diplomacy exchanges

c) Coalitional coercive diplomacy is the only credible means for western democracies to gain the sincerity required to make a threat of force real in the mind of the adversary. However past efforts of coalitional building have proved to be extremely limited. Disagreements over the means and coordination of the policy often results in splits and consequently states are reluctant to employ it. Where it has been employed it collapses under the weight of its own inadequacy.

d) All of the above

Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Chapter 13.

Chapter 13

Instructions