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Question 1

In what ways is there a need to establish the nature and consequences of insecurity in the developing World?

a) Empirically there is a need to understand why virtually all wars and major political violence since 1945 continues to take place in a developing world and why the majority originates from internal rather than external sources. Between 20-30 million have lost their lives in more than one hundred intra-state wars and there are 20 - 40 wars ongoing in any given year.

b) Conceptually there is a need to find appropriate theories and concepts that accommodate the unique character of the security situation in the developing world; intra-state war, communal violence, poverty, famine, weapons proliferation, crime, political instability, socio-economic breakdown and state collapse.

c) From a normative perspective there are clear humanitarian imperatives to resolve the lack of security; 90 per cent of victims of intra-state violence are civilians, half a million are killed by light weapons, 40,000 a year die from hunger and poverty whilst tens of millions die from disease, chronic poverty and inadequate health, education, employment and environment.

d) All of the above. There is a profound disjuncture between security in developed nations and the kind of security in the world's "zones of instability". From a global perspective insecurity is more of a norm than security is. However, globalization essentially means that these forms of insecurity cannot be contained within increasingly porous national borders.

Question 2

In what ways can we understand the primary structural characteristics that constitute a weak state?

a) The most important characteristics of weak states are their frequent inability to establish and maintain a monopoly of control over the instruments of violence. Even within states with well developed coercive power they do not always retain absolute loyalty and are faced with a real possibility of military intervention. Whilst armed forces are ill equipped, poorly managed and prone to factional divisions, social actors are powerful enough to resist governance. Therefore, monopoly over the instruments of violence is largely remit.

b) Weak states possess high levels of social-political cohesion which is correlated to the hegemonic enforcement idea of the regime which becomes accepted to the point of being legitimized as the social norm.

c) Weak states have a monopoly on the instruments of violence and have the coercive capability to force compliance even when social actors attempt to resist. The regimes lack popular legitimacy, the integrity of the regime's survival is consolidated by power resulting in the naturalization of violence within society.

d) Weak states do not utilize coercive capabilities in normal policy having a strong infrastructural power. State institutions typically have a developed bureaucracy which legitimizes the regime's ability to rule. Paradoxically, however, the more a weak state exercises its coercive power the more it reinforces its infrastructural power but reduces its ability to rule.

Question 3

What is the security dilemma facing weak states?

a) The inability of the state to provide stability creates a situation wherein each component of society competes to preserve its well being thereby engendering insecurity. The condition is self-perpetuating - a semi-permanent situation of emergent anarchy because measures to secure the regime will provoke greater resistance.

b) The weak state insecurity dilemma is primarily an external condition creating a situation for the weak state similar to structural anarchy wherein a weak state creates insecurity in the region when taking measures to improve its own regional standing.

c) The weak state insecurity dilemma emerges out of competition between each component of society to preserve and protect the longevity of their well being and interests. However, the ruling elite remain separate from the social sphere of contestation producing a policy dilemma; use of the monopoly of instruments of violence to restore order will reduce the regime's infrastructural core.

d) Weak state insecurity dilemmas are borne out of a lack of political and institutional centering with a monopoly of force. However, the engagement of armed forces to strengthen institutions may stop this process. Inability to foster "stateness" is reversed by the use of violence. Social disquiet is a semi-permanent situation of emergent but not developed anarchy.

Question 4

In what ways can weak states be internally challenged?

a) The progressive erosion of state institutions and processes and increasing lawlessness and the eventual collapse of government can create a power vacuum in which the ruling elite becomes a faction in the struggle to fill the void. In addition they may also face the threat of military intervention.

b) Weak states face serious threats from strongmen, individuals or groups who exercise a degree of coercive and/or infrastructural power, or from warlords who enforce absolutist rule in areas under their control primarily for the purpose of pursuing illegal commerce. Both challenge the state often violently when their demands are not placated.

c) Weak states face challenges from various social groups who, due to a large part of pre-existing divisions and the inability of the state to provide adequate welfare in conjunction with excessive coercion, may be forced mobilize politically or militarily to protect their interests.

d) All of the above.

Question 5

What internal security policy options are available to elites?

a) Elites create negative inducements for non support of the regime. Redistribution as a means of denial to the power structure in the form of "elite disenfranchisement" which may include diversion of resources, disarmament and denial of access to commercial activity routes.

b) Lacking infrastructural capacity and wider social legitimacy, weak state elites are often forced to rely on coercive power. However, a key dilemma is that the instruments of violence can be a threat to the regime requiring the deliberate undermining of armed forces.

c) Elites attempt to foster a new politics of identity in which ethnic consciousness is superseded by ideologies orientated around the myth of the regime.

d) Weak states have cultivated international sponsorship and have initiated processes of democratic reform so as to gain popular legitimacy internally whilst bolstering its international legitimacy externally.

Question 6

In what ways may weak states be challenged externally?

a) Powerful states may employ diplomatic pressures to ensure that weak states comply with international norms. This may involve economic sanctions and withholding weaponry deals which undermines the state's ability to pay or supply the army which increases the risk of army disaffection and possible coups.

b) Weak states are threatened by the proliferation of small arms which can be used in a challenge to the authority of the state. Small and light weapons are purchasable through legal and illegal channels and are prevalent in regions with warlords, criminals and private militias.

c) Weak states cannot remain isolated from processes of globalization. Increasingly porous borders lead to migration and immigration. In order to compete in a globalized market weak states look to secure financial-credit assistance or aid from international institutions. However, these processes undermine the hegemonic idea of the state and societal identity is blurred which makes it difficult for the state to sustain its ideological appeal.

d) All of the above.

Question 7

What external strategies do elites employ?

a) An increasingly popular means of bolstering regime security has been the expulsion of foreign workers and non ethnic nationals and restricting borders to refugees and migrants.

b) Weak states seek to avoid alliances with powerful states because alliances and assistance frequently are conditional on democratization and risk penalties if they are not met.

c) An increasingly prevalent strategy among weak states has been the employment of private military or security companies and foreign mercenaries as force multipliers to secure the weak state from internal threats.

d) Weak states may sometimes militarily engage in action to bolster their regional position and to mobilize internal support against the construction of an imagined external threat. This frequently coincides with economic or social crises as a policy of distraction.

Question 8

How can the origins of weak state insecurity be explained?

a) Weak state insecurity in a historical framework of analysis represents an abnormal state in the long term state-building process. Bloody and violent conflict between social forces is not consistent with the presence of the centralizing force with the capacity to attain monopoly of control over violence.

b) The utility of explaining weak state insecurity with a comparison to the historical conditions of state consolidation in Europe does not stand in the contemporary context of global society because of the pervasion of international norms to prevent violent conflict from manifesting in the consolidation process.

c) The contemporary state-building condition is constrained by the shortened time-frame operating within the established guidelines of international norms, a particular problematic rule of which is sovereignty. Thus, unlike some European entities which could not complete the state-building process and were absorbed into more viable units, weak states will remain quasi entities.

d) Weak state insecurity originated from the denial of sovereignty as the norm and the corresponding extension of the right to inviolability of statehood. Without protection under international laws the possibility of its national status being revoked and its territory being subsumed into another state threatens the consolidation of the state-building process.

Question 9

What impact did the end of the Cold War have on warlord politics?

a) Within the context of state collapse elites deliberately engender disorder for the pursuit of commercial activities and the exploitation of neo-liberal globalized shadow markets which would not otherwise be permissible in normal conditions. Warlord politics represented a new form of regime security forced upon weak state elites.

b) Warlord politics represented the entrenchment of traditional patterns of redistributive networks within society but maintained by alternative political sources. Assistance derived from superpowers was superseded by US hegemonic endorsement at the end of the Cold War.

c) Warlord politics in response to the rapid global changes inaugurated by the end of the Cold War and by globalization was a temporary aberration in the normal function of the state and was reflective of the immediate need to secure infrastructural survival.

d) Warlord politics was a new phenomenon which represented the opportunistic exploitation of hollowed out state institutions and fragmented armed forces. Commercial activities accumulated in a shadow economy facilitated by the end of the Cold War, not of strategic design.

Question 10

Is the weak state security dilemma an inescapable condition?

a) The Global War on Terror has had a positive effect on the state-building project. The fight against terrorism has redirected international attention and resources towards eradicating insecurities as part of the recognition of the multi level factors facilitating the emergence of terrorism. Specifically this involves the controlling of the proliferation of arms.

b) The problems of weak state insecurity have taken a low priority on the international agenda and solutions have not moved beyond the context of liberal multi party democracy and free market capitalism. The problem thus far is that no one case of enforced neo-liberalism, either through conditionalities, regime change, peace-building, has succeeded in transforming a weak state into a strong state.

c) The failure of liberal reform has highlighted the increasing viability of the option of alternative forms of political organization beyond the state. Sub-state organizations are a practical solution to dealing with regions with endemic problems of weapons and poverty, whilst regional organization is a sustainable structural form in Africa and Latin America.

d) Weak states have embarked on a protracted and difficult process to attain effective status. Long term security strategies have resulted in the adoption of measures to counteract the worst of the effects including the establishment of multi parties, economic liberalization and membership of the international community.

Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Chapter 09.

Chapter 09

Instructions