Chapter 23

From permissive consensus to unintended politicisation

In the early years of European integration public opinion was not considered an important factor. Most integration theorists at the time, especially those subscribing to neofunctionalism, argued that voters had been passively endorsing the integration project. The 'permissive consensus' of the public, in turn, left politicians and elites relatively free to pursue their goals in the integration process (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Opinion polls also show that public support for the EU was well above 50% in the 1970s and experienced a further surge of Euro-enthusiasm in the 1980s. Whatever the reasons behind this, the public had been backing European integration for more or less four decades.

The sudden decline of public support in the early 1990s coincided with two important changes in Europe. First, the West-East confrontation ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and most eastern European countries adopting western liberal democratic values. The external justification for western European integration was thus muted. Second, the integration project itself took a big stride by agreeing upon the Maastricht Treaty. This ambitious document aims to extend European integration to foreign and security policies on the one hand, and to immigration and asylum issues on the other. As a result, the internal logic of European integration has changed substantially. Arguably, these two systemic transformations contributed much to the downturn of public support.

The 'permissive consensus' was finally eroded during the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. Danish voters rejected the Treaty by 52.08% 'no' votes, with a turnout of 82.90% in June 1992. Three months later the French approved the Treaty only by 51.05% 'yes' votes. Ever since then, public opinion on European integration has been subject to unintended politicisation of populist politicians and interest groups. Depending on perceived issues at stake, public support for the integration project has become extremely volatile. In 2001 Irish voters vetoed the Nice Treaty largely because of the perceived threat to Irish neutrality (Garry et al. 2005). Recently the French rejected the Constitutional Treaty in order to defend the notion of a 'social Europe' (Watkins 2005). Until an overarching issue re-catches public imagination of Europe, public opinion on European integration will probably remain instable and vulnerable to unexpected politicisation.

Web Links

Eurobarometer surveys of the European Commission
europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm

YouGov opinion surveys on Europe
www.yougov.com/archives/archivesMain.asp?jID=2&sID=5&rID=5&wID=0&uID

European social surveys
www.europeansocialsurvey.org/

Further Learning Resources

Garry, John; Marsh, Michael and Sinnott, Richard (2005), '"Second Order" Versus "Issue Voting" Effects in EU Referendums: Evidence from the Irish Nice Treaty Referendums'. European Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 223-42.

Hug, Simon (2002), Voices of Europe: Citizens, Referendums, and European Integration, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Lindberg , Leon N. and Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds.) (1970), Europe's World-Be Policy: Patterns of Change in the European Community, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Watkins, Susan (2005), 'Continental Tremors', New Left Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 5-21.

Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Chapter 23.

Chapter 23

From permissive consensus to unintended politicisation