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Cini: European Union Politics 2e

Chapter 07

Intergovernmentalism is not always liberal

Because of the huge impact of Andrew Moravcsik's work, liberal intergovernmentalism (IL) almost becomes a synonym of intergovernmentalism for most students of European integration. What is often overlooked is the IL's liberalist revision of intergovernmentalism.

According to IL, successive rounds of integration negotiations can be studied as a three-stage process: national preference formation, inter-state bargaining and institutional choice. The liberal elements of IL are specifically reflected at the first stage where national preferences are regarded as shaped by the economic interests of producer groups (Moravcsik, 1993) or, in a revised version, decided through contention among domestic political groups based on material incentives and/or grounded in ideas (Moravcsik, 1998). In other words, the interests of states are not exogenously given (as assumed by classic intergovernmentalism), but are endogenously defined through liberal channels of preference formation – that is, democratic contestation among domestic economic and political groups.

While IL has attracted numerous critics in the past decade, very few questioned the liberalist revision of intergovernmentalism. But when such critics do arise, they tend to hit the 'weakest link' of IL. For example, in his analysis of the British negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty, Forster (1998) shows that the British government actually imposed its view on domestic producer groups rather than the other way around. This was partly because of the lack of public awareness of the issues involved in the Maastricht Treaty, and partly due to the close nature of intergovernmental conference (IGC) policy-making (ibid: 358). Based on rich empirical evidence, the analysis challenges the liberalist reading of national preference formation in the EU.

Such critical studies are important, not least because they cast doubt on a dominant theoretical approach of European integration. By claiming that intergovernmentalism is not always liberal, they also raise a normative question about the indirect democratic linkage provided by national governments in the EU. In a recent article, Moravcsik (2002: 611) claims that the 'EU employs two robust [democratic] mechanisms: direct accountability via the EP and indirect accountability via elected national officials.' The argument founders if EP elections are second-order and intergovernmentalism is not (always) liberal.

Web Links

Andrew Moravcsik's homepage
www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/

Wikipedia on Liberal Intergovernmentalism
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberal_intergovernmentalism

Further Learning Resources

Forster, Anthony (1998), ' Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty: A Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 347-68.

Peterson, John and Bomberg, Elizabeth (1999), Decision-Making in the European Union, London: MacMillian.

Puchala, Donald J. (1999), 'Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article', Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 317-31.

Wallace, Helen; Caporaso, James A.; Scharpf, Fritz W and Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), 'Review Section Symposium: The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 155-79.

Wiener, Antje and Diez, Thomas (eds.) (2004), European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.