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Kavanagh et al: British Politics 5e

Labour and the renewal of Britain's nuclear deterrent

As 2006 drew to a close, the Labour Government took a decision which generally occurs once a generation. On December 6 th the government published a White Paper which proposed to renew Britain's nuclear deterrent by replacing the current generation of Britain's Vanguard class submarines and by undertaking to participate in the US programme to extend the life of the Trident D-5 missile system.

It was another Labour government, that led by Clement Attlee, which had taken the initial decision to join the nuclear club when it approved the construction of British atomic weapons in 1947. Both Labour and Conservative governments thereafter preserved Britain's status as a nuclear power, approving the construction of hydrogen bombs in 1954, negotiating the purchase of US Polaris missiles in 1962, upgrading Polaris via the 'Chevaline' programme during the 1970s and finally negotiating the purchase of the current Trident missile system in 1982.

When the initial decision to acquire Trident was taken during the 1980s, the Labour Party opposed it, being committed to a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament. That a Labour government should be proposing to renew Britain's nuclear deterrent at the beginning of the 21 st century is further evidence, as if any were needed, of the profound ideological transformation of the party.

The 2006 decision was striking for other reasons however. Firstly, and most obviously, this was the first occasion upon which a fundamental decision about Britain's nuclear deterrent has been taken outside the context of the 'Cold War'. The White Paper nevertheless argues that the very uncertainty of a post-Cold War world still necessitates the preservation of a nuclear deterrent.

Secondly, this manner in which this decision has been taken highlights a further contrast with the past. For example, the 1947 decision was taken in secret by a Cabinet Committee and the 'Chevaline' programme was only publicly revealed five years after it has been approved in 1980. The decision taken at the end of 2006 in contrast had been advertised in advance in Labour's 2005 manifesto, endorsed by the Chancellor in June, discussed at Cabinet, outlined in a Prime Ministerial statement on the White Paper to the House of Commons. In addition, MPs have been promised a parliamentary vote on the issue in early 2007.

What is less clear, at this moment, is whether this decision will meet with the same degree of contention and protest that accompanied earlier fundamental decisions about Britain's nuclear deterrent. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament is a pale shadow of the organisation which opposed Polaris and Trident and the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (with varying degrees of misgiving) have endorsed the decision. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister strove to recognise the legitimacy of critics of replacement. It will be interesting to see, how Labour MPs divide on the issue in the House of Commons, and whether they choose to support the outgoing Prime Minister or endorse the misgivings of figures such as Charles Clarke and David Blunkett who have already marked their opposition to the decision.

Critical thinking questions

1) Critically assess the case made by the Labour government for the renewal of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.

2) Monitor newspaper coverage of the issue of renewal of Britain's nuclear deterrent in the run up to the House of Commons vote on the White Paper. How does coverage differ between newspapers and what influence do you think the coverage has?

3) Do you think that the decision will prove as contentious as earlier decisions about Britain's nuclear deterrent?