Islamic radicalism and militancy, which is deeply intertwined with politics in the Middle East region, has been on the rise since at least the 1970s, although the essential background to these developments can be traced back much further. For present purposes it must suffice to note that both Zionist and Arab nationalist movements have been exceptionally important since the late nineteenth century although with respect to the latter, religious elements had less importance in earlier stages partly because Arab nationalism was initially directed against the Ottoman Empire, itself a Muslim entity (see Cassels, 1996, p. 233).

The current Middle East geopolitical landscape has also been shaped by the outcomes of the First and Second World Wars; colonialism; and the competing claims of Palestinian and Jewish groups to territory. These claims have acquired an increasing religiosity over the years, in turn fuelling the emergence of extremist, politically driven fundamentalism in communities. Islamic fundamentalism in the contemporary period, however, is marked not simply by opposition to the state of Israel as a Jewish entity, but to 'the West' more generally. Cassels (1996, p. 236) writes that pan-Islamic ideology represents an extreme form of anti-colonialism manifest in an anti-Westernism that has targeted pro-Western regimes in the Middle East.

It was in a more explicit Cold War theatre, however, that Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization emerged. Afghanistan, a country with a long history of political instability as well as strategic significance for the Soviet Union, had become a battleground for competing factions within the country over the years from the early 1970s. In 1973 a coup d'etat toppled the Afghan monarchy, and a revolutionary party took power. While the Soviets supported the new Marxist-inspired government, the US, along with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China, the UK, and other disparate countries, generally supported an insurrection led by the Islamic fundamentalists known as the Mujahideen (for details see www.friendskorner.com/forum/f170/cnn-documentary-soviet-afghan-war-video-72814/), whose name means 'strugglers', also related to the word jihad  or 'holy struggle' (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1603178.stm). The Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979; it seems that the Americans had begun sending arms to the rebels some months earlier (see, for example, www.spiritus-temporis.com/soviet-invasion-of-afghanistan/the-soviet-invasion.html).

Initially energized by and partially united in opposition to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, any coherence the Mujahideen possessed largely dissipated after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 (for further details on this war see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan). Violent conflict between contending factions as well as with the embattled central government continued until the strongest of the resistance factions, the Taliban (see http://fireglo.wordpress.com/2008/08/06/dispatches-beneath-the-veil-documentary-review-link/), gained control in 1996, imposing a highly controversial and uncompromising version of Islamic rule. Afghanistan thereafter became a haven for Al Qaeda. This grouping was originally formed in Afghanistan during the struggle against the Soviets, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1670089.stm), but for a time its main base was in Sudan. It included foreigners who wanted to fight the Soviets, as well as Afghans. Among these was Osama bin Laden (born 1957), the son of a wealthy Saudi Arabian businessman who joined the Afghan resistance in 1979 (for fuller biography see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/155236.stm). Apart from his private wealth, bin Laden was eloquent, well educated, and fanatically devoted to his interpretation of Islamic religion. These factors made him a natural leader for fundamentalists.

From the US viewpoint, the story of Al Qaeda illustrates the necessity of understanding the motivation of potential allies before offering them support. People like bin Laden hated the Soviet Union, where the official ideology was opposed to all religions, and fellow believers had been subjected to sporadic persecution on a level which they never had to face in liberal democracies (for details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_the_Soviet_Union). However, ostensibly Christian countries like the US were not much better; indeed, for devout Muslims they could be regarded as even worse, since it could be argued that their leaders appealed to religious values when it suited them, while in practice they condoned 'immoral' practices. Successful resistance to the Soviet Union - the 'godless' superpower - in Afghanistan only served to convince bin Laden and his allies that they could destroy the Soviet Union's chief rival, the USA. This conviction could only be strengthened by the humiliation of the US during the Iranian revolution of 1979 (for details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Revolution#Hostage_Crisis).

While it is difficult to assign specific objectives to an 'organization' as disparate as Al Qaeda, it certainly wanted to remove Western political and cultural influences from countries where Islam had been historically strong, with Saudi Arabia serving as its chief target. Bin Laden himself had been born in Saudi Arabia; but the country's chief importance lay in the fact that the holy sites of Mecca (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecca) and Medina (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Medina) were located in the country. Bin Laden's campaigns against Western interests can be traced back to 1991, when the Saudi government agreed to allow US troops into the country in preparation for the Gulf War (for details, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War) designed to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  For some, ideologues associated with Al Qaeda, seizing control of Saudi Arabia was only part of the strategic goal; the ultimate aim was to extend Islamic rule throughout the world. In hindsight, Western policy-makers might have drawn the conclusion that support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan had been a major strategic error, on the view that even if the Soviet Union had ultimately won the conflict it would have been severely weakened by the struggle, even without US support for the Islamic fundamentalists who led the resistance.

In 1996, bin Laden moved to Afghanistan from where he planned attacks on two US embassies in East Africa in 1998 (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/7/newsid_3131000/3131709.stm) and a US Navy vessel in Yemen in 2000 (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_4252000/4252400.stm). The most spectacular attacks, and those with the most far-reaching consequences, were obviously those of September 11, 2001 which sparked what President George W Bush quickly dubbed the 'war on terror'. Bin Laden's supporters had already made one attack on the highly-symbolic World Trade Center, in 1993 (for details see http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/26/newsid_2516000/2516469.stm). The second, successful attempt, coinciding with an assault on the Pentagon and (apparently) a planned attack on the White House itself, can be accounted a serious mistake by Al Qaeda. The world united behind US attempts to eradicate Al Qaeda, and lost all sympathy with the attempt to resist Russia in Chechnya – a struggle in which Bin Laden's supporters were also closely involved (for the Chechen War see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2000/chechnya/default.stm). Some argue, indeed, that 9/11 should be seen as the beginning of the end for fundamentalist Islamic terror, which was still capable of 'spectaculars' like the Bali bombings (2002, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/asia_pacific/2002/bali/), and the attacks on the transport systems of Madrid (2004; see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_pictures/3503882.stm), and London (2005, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/html/default.stm). Yet while terrorists no doubt rejoiced at these events, the attacks were aimed at very 'soft' targets. The inability to capture bin Laden has helped to perpetuate his image in the Islamic world as a man who can defy the power of the West; but over time it has become increasingly difficult for him to address his followers, even via audio recordings. Ultimately, if and when the US can disentangle itself from the effects of its decisions in the aftermath of 9/11, and can concentrate its resources on combating the real threat to Western civilization, the threat from Al Qaeda should recede, even if it is too optimistic to hope that it will entirely disappear.

For a radically different interpretation of Al Qaeda, see http://noolmusic.com/myspace_videos/the_power_of_nightmares.php

Reference:
Cassels, Alan, Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World, Routledge, 1996.