The 'war on terror' was initiated by the attacks of 11 September 2001 ('9/11') on landmark targets in New York and Washington DC (see http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=xDh_pvv1tUM) . At the time of writing, two warzones are currently occupied by the US and allies – Afghanistan and Iraq – as part of the 'war on terror'. Afghanistan was the base for the leader of the group responsible for planning and carrying out the 9/11 attacks. But how did Iraq come to be part of the 'war on terror'?

The following are well established:

1. Al Qaeda operatives, most of whom were Saudi nationals (none were Iraqi) were responsible for the 9/11 attacks in the US in 2000. Their leader, Osama bin Laden (also a Saudi national) was based in Afghanistan which was governed by the Taliban (for details see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/144382.stm);
2. Saddam Hussein (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein), erstwhile President of Iraq, had no connection with Afghanistan, Al Qaeda or the Taliban. While hostile to the US (although previously an ally), he was a secularist and actually repressed religious fundamentalism in Iraq.
3. No weapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq (see www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/).
4. The presence of terrorists in Iraq following the US-led invasion (as evidenced by a relentless campaign of suicide bombing by various factions) is due almost solely to the 'war on terror' itself.

Despite the lack of evidence linking Iraq to the 9/11 attacks, a widespread belief developed, at least among the US public, that Iraq, along with Afghanistan, was the source of the 9/11 attacks. A Washington Post poll taken almost two years after the attacks, and around six months after the invasion of Iraq, found that about 70 per cent of Americans believed there was a link between 9/11 and Iraq. How did that link get into people's minds? One answer is provided in the same newspaper report which quotes President George W. Bush on establishing a connection without explicitly telling falsehoods:

'If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and unacceptable risks. The attacks of September the 11th, 2001, showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction.' (March 2003)

'The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 .... The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. … No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more. … We have not forgotten the victims of September the 11th …' (May 2003, after declaring major combat in Iraq at an end, Washington Post, 6 September 2003).

This suggests that the power of the Presidential office in the US, supported by a largely conservative and uncritical media, succeeded in purveying a particular metanarrative (for definition, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_narrative) about terrorism which was used to justify the war in Iraq despite the lack of evidence (either at the time, or subsequently).

In contrast, support for the war in the UK has always been weaker although former Prime Minister Tony Blair used similar rhetoric on many occasions. This may be attributed to greater scepticism about the link with 9/11; a more critical press; a more critical attitude towards political leaders generally, nurtured by a stronger system of government and opposition; and a less nationalistic political world view among the public at large. From a postmodern perspective (for further details see pages 379-83), we might conclude that the power/knowledge nexus, which supports successful metanarratives, is not as strong in the UK as it is in the US.

If the above analysis is accepted, the question remains: why did the US and the UK use 9/11 as a pretext for removing Saddam Hussein's regime? One possible answer is a stark illustration of the importance of individuals (and families) in significant global events. Some commentators had criticized President George H. Bush for leaving Saddam Hussein in office after the US-led coalition forces had forced the Iraqi army to abandon its assault on Kuwait during the first Gulf War of 1991 (see www.indepthinfo.com/iraq/). For the Bush family, then, Iraq could be seen as a piece of 'unfinished business'. In addition, since the first Gulf War, thousands of Iraqis had suffered and died at Saddam's hands, so there was a strong humanitarian reason for contemplating a decisive move against the regime. The facile victory of the coalition in the first Gulf War emboldened American 'neo-conservatives' (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoconservative) to devise grandiose plans for the use of US military power to redraw the map of the Middle East in a way which would underpin their country's existing dominance for decades to come. Neo-conservatives, whose ideas were broadly shared by President Bush, tended to presume that ordinary Iraqis would welcome US occupation; sincerely believing that America's brand of democracy was the best route to happiness and prosperity, they did not imagine that the toppling of Saddam would leave a power vacuum in which terrorist elements could thrive.

Finally, Iraq possessed rich oil reserves. Bush and Blair could protest that oil was an insignificant factor in the war, since in a Saddam-free future the bulk of the revenues from oil would benefit the Iraqi people. However, this ignored the fact that the competition to extract the oil in future was likely to be led by Western companies, and that the provision of other services in a post-war Iraq would give other US and UK firms a tempting source of profit. A more important consideration, perhaps, was that an Iraq which was closely allied to the US would be a reliable source of oil. In the mid-1970s, Western economies had been shaken by the ability of Middle Eastern states to curtail the supply of oil in order to drive up its price (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_oil_crisis). If a major supplier like Iraq could be relied upon to step up production to meet any shortage, such threats would be far less effective in future. A liberal-democratic Iraq could even allow the US to look again at its embarrassing relationship with another oil-rich state, Saudi Arabia. In the new situation, the Saudis would come under increasing pressure to reform their own illiberal regime or risk losing the friendship of the US.

As it was, the neo-conservative 'metanarrative' linking Iraq to the events of 9/11 proved to be a comprehensive failure. The outcome, though, might still leave the US in a dominant position in Iraq, and in control of its oil reserves. It would be most unlikely, though, that this could be justified in the kind of moral language which typified Bush's speeches after 9/11. More likely, it would be explained in terms of America's self-interest, lending support to the realist approach to International Relations (for a discussion of realism see pages 349-54).