Box 13.3: Political culture and the collapse of Soviet Communism

It is indisputable that Russia has enjoyed less success than most states in East and Central Europe in managing the transition to democracy since 1991. Yet in autumn 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed with surprisingly little resistance and loss of life, given the size of the secret service (the KGB), and the armed forces. In addition, the Soviet state had indoctrinated its citizens over more than seven decades. But only three people died while challenging the authority of the plotters who attempted to depose President Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991 (for details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/19/newsid_2499000/2499453.stm). This outcome led to general euphoria about the possibilities for a smooth and relatively painless political transition. Yet by the time the World Values Survey was carried out in Russia in 2000, only 3 per cent of respondents rated the current political system as 'good' or 'very good' – the lowest figure for any country in the world. (Inglehart et al, 2004: E111A) So why did this disillusionment take place and to what extent can Russia's political culture be blamed?

The central role of political culture is suggested by the fact that Russia had never had a full, functioning democracy. 74 years of communist rule had been preceded by a dozen years of limited parliamentary democracy under the last Tsar (Nikolas II; see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_II_of_Russia) and centuries of autocracy. There was no national democratic tradition on which reformers could draw. Various foreign commentators have identified differences between Russian and West European political culture, focusing in particular upon the greater Russian predilection for various forms of collectivism – whether inspired by teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church or by communism – as opposed to individualism. And, in addition, the collapse of the Soviet Union took the new leaders, including the eccentric Boris Yeltsin (see www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article1694632.ece; www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5FIoocja4k) almost by surprise. They had no plans for a democratic transition and had to improvise as they went along. This could also be ascribed to the lingering effects of communist political culture, which had hampered the development of a healthy civil society (on this subject, see pages 276-83). Few newly created political parties turned into viable national institutions – the strongest remained the Russian Communist Party which managed to retain a great deal of its Soviet assets and support. Most were only active in Moscow. The lack of a democratic political culture of give and take was exemplified by the events of 1993 when the parliament defied the President, and in the end the army was authorized to intervene and shell the parliament building (for this incident see www.youtube.com/watch?v=N9evPBH52Fs). President Yeltsin himself was not very preoccupied by the need to establish robust political institutions – apart from his own office of the presidency. He was suspicious of potential rivals and often went out of his way to undermine them.

On the other hand, a great many other things also went wrong in the transition. The programme of economic reforms initially led to a dramatic fall in economic output – greater than the effect of the Great Depression on the US. Massive inflation in 1992-3 wiped out the savings of large numbers of people and then, just as the economy was beginning to recover, another financial crisis hit savings again in 1998. Russia was also affected by a mounting security crisis after the mid-1990s, which led to major terrorist acts in Chechnya and elsewhere, that provoked brutal military responses (for coverage see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/2000/chechnya/default.stm). This compounded the anxieties originally caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of large swathes of territory in former republics that Russians had got used to thinking of as 'theirs'. The very survival of Russia itself seemed in doubt. And whilst there was significant financial help through institutions like the World Bank (for details see www.worldbank.org) and the IMF (for details, see www.investopedia.com/articles/03/030703.asp), the Europeans did not offer the carrot of possible EU membership to encourage persistence with economic and political reforms, as it did for the newly-liberated states of Eastern and Central Europe.

Under those circumstances, it is easy to understand Russia's difficulties in making a successful political transition. Clearly political values played a part, both in terms of the persisting effects of earlier political socialization, as well as the lack of preparation for post-communism. Yet it could be argued that the combined effects of the financial crashes in undermining the regime's legitimacy and internal terrorism all played at least as big a role, if not bigger. Fish explained the failure to democratize through three variables: too much oil (see, for example www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/documentaries/profile/abramovich.shtml), too little economic liberalization (despite efforts which began under Gorbachev) and too weak a national legislature.(Fish, 2005: 247) At most, earlier political traditions might have contributed to the weakness of the legislature, but even here they were not the only factor. So Russian political culture contributed both in terms of the attitudes of whole sections of society, but it would be wrong to ascribe to it overwhelming significance. And the difficulty is compounded when the level of analysis is transferred to individual political leaders. President Yeltsin was clearly a product of the communist system and its reliance upon ideological indoctrination. This was illustrated by his difficulties in designing a post-communist regime. Yet Yeltsin, more than any other political figure, brought down communism in the USSR. He was a product of communist political culture, and yet even in late middle age he moved decisively against it.

An alternative view of Russia's recent difficulties is possible. While accepting that Mikhail Gorbachev's economic reforms (known as 'perestroika', see www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/Perestroika.html) did not succeed in creating a culture in which 'healthy' free market practices could thrive, one can still attribute much of the blame for subsequent developments to the Western ideologues who descended upon Russia en masse after Yeltsin had toppled Gorbachev in 1991. These people tried to graft US-style capitalist practices onto a society which had been taught to distrust the profit motive. As a result, those few Russians who were attuned to the ways of the market found themselves in a uniquely advantageous position to exploit their knowledge and outlook. These individuals (subsequently known as 'oligarchs'; see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3927523.stm) became stupendously rich, while the average Russian had to struggle even harder to make ends meet. In this atmosphere, it was hardly surprising that the old dominance of Marxist ideology under the Soviet Union was quickly replaced by the preponderant influence of individuals who, in the south of Italy, would have been regarded as representatives of a 'Mafia'.

This was a context which seemed to suit Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin). Having served two terms as President, Putin stood down in May 2008 as the Russian constitution dictated. Almost immediately, however, Putin was nominated by his nominal successor, Dmitry Medvedev, as prime minister. From this post, Putin was seemingly able to dominate Russian policy, and to exploit a predictable revival of nationalist feelings (for nationalism, see pages 127-9) which have been spurred on by a feeling that the country has been humiliated since the Soviet Union ceased to exist as the world's only rival to the US. To many Western observers, Putin's effortless assertion and retention of power, despite scandals like the murder of the exiled dissident Alexander Litvenenko (for details see www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/death-of-a-dissident-moscows-murky-assassins-450530.html), prove that Russian political culture lags far behind other European states in its acceptance of liberal democratic values.

Further reading:
Fish, M. Steven, Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Inglehart, Ronald, Michael Basanez, Jaime Diez-Medrano, Loak Halman and Ruud Luijkx, Human Beliefs and Values, Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, 2004.

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Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Box 13.3: Political culture and the collapse of Soviet Communism.

Box 13.3: Political culture and the collapse of Soviet Communism