Box 4.5: Climate change and justice

Cosmopolitan theories of justice seek to impose a duty on individuals and states to either act positively to end injustices in the world or to, at the very least, refrain from acting so as to cause harm. Both practices feature in the politics of climate change. This issue continues to inspire impassioned debate, between those who deny that human activity is responsible for adverse effects on the world's climate (see, for example, www.channel4.com/science/microsites/G/great_global_warming_swindle/index.html), and those, including politicians like the former US Vice-President (and joint Nobel Prize winner) Al Gore (for Gore's views see www.youtube.com/watch?v=FED4LBmharA), who believe that urgent action is necessary.

For the present purpose, we take the prevalent view within the scientific community, namely that global climate change is a threat to humanity and is largely (if not entirely) the product of human activity. What are the consequences to our understanding of global justice? Cosmopolitans (see page 109 for details of their position) insist that rich industrialized countries should desist from continuing to burn fossil fuels at the current rate. Equally, since these countries are held responsible for climate change, they are also obliged, it is argued by cosmopolitans, to assist those states in the developing world which have not been responsible for causing climate change but are least able to deal with its consequences.

The problem of climate change involves two aspects of justice discussed in this book: procedural and distributive justice (see pages 104-5 for a discussion). In terms of procedural justice, the identity of key decision-makers is crucial. Will developing countries have a significant say in decisions about the problem of climate change, or will negotiations be monopolized by the major industrialised nations? Distributive justice demands that the resulting burdens should be shared equitably, but not equally, since strict equality of sacrifice in order to prevent further damage to the environment would actually affect the developing nations more severely. Indeed, the impact of climate change on poor countries is likely to widen existing global economic inequalities, since (for example) flooding or drought will have a more serious impact where resources are already scarce.

Campaigners for global justice argue that 'the polluters must pay' for the consequences of their actions. A further complication is the question of justice for future generations. In theory, it seems odd to talk of an obligation owed to individuals who do not yet exist. Yet many people do feel a sense of responsibility towards their children which extends to decisions such as providing them with a good education and a degree of financial security; and some make preparations even before their children are born. Even if the full effects of climate change will not be felt for many decades, the same sense of obligation should persuade the adults of today to rein in their desire to consume in a way which fosters environmental damage.

To some extent, principles of distributive justice were embodied in the Kyoto Protocol (for details see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol). This was negotiated in 1997 as an amendment to the International Framework Convention on Climate Change (IFCCC), which had been adopted at the Rio 'earth summit' of 1992. Under the terms of the Protocol, all the signatory countries accepted a shared responsibility for action against climate change; but the responsibilities were characterised as 'common but differentiated'. In practice, this approach meant that developed countries were expected to cut their emissions of six specified 'greenhouse gases', so that in 2012 their emissions should be 5.2 per cent below the level of 1990. No similar obligation was placed on developing nations. Developing countries which invested in climate-friendly technologies would generate 'carbon credits', which could be bought by other nations struggling to meet their own targets. This complex system could also operate within individual countries, so that one firm which was unable to cut its emissions now had the option of buying credits from more efficient firms.

Thus a new global market was created, which effectively subsidised countries and firms which opted for 'clean' development. It was an ingenious idea, promising to use the mechanisms of the global market to reduce the damaging emissions which had been generated by the demands of the same market. However, from the outset it was possible to identify flaws in the scheme. For example, if a developing country built a coal-fired power plant using technology which was 'clean' by previous standards, it would receive carbon credits. Yet the fact remains that even the 'cleanest' energy produced from coal is much 'dirtier' than, say, energy generated by nuclear power. Thus, arguably, developing countries could be given a financial reward for generating energy from non-renewable, heavily-polluting fuels, providing them with an incentive to step up their existing plant-building programmes. In 2007, it was reported that China was building new coal-fired power stations at the rate of two per week (on this subject see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6769743.stm).

From this perspective, it would not be unduly cynical to characterize carbon trading as a device dreamed up by developed nations as a way of buying themselves a cleaner conscience at the expense of a dirtier global environment. It was a mechanism which could make it look as if a particular developed country was taking effective action to cut emissions, when in reality it was merely using its economic wealth to create an illusion. The problem underlines the issue of procedural justice; if Kyoto had been drawn up by the poorest countries which have yet to industrialize, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have eschewed such loopholes for the rich. By the same token, of course, such an agreement would have failed to win the assent of the very nations whose co-operation is required if emissions are to be reduced.

Such considerations introduce familiar approaches to the study of international relations. From the 'realist' perspective (for a discussion see pages 349-54), the Kyoto negotiations could only be seen as a venue for hard bargaining between self-interested nations. By 2008, 181 nations (plus the European Union (EU)) had signed up to the Protocol. While some countries have undoubtedly tried to prioritize the future of the human race (and the UK's record is as good as any, see for example www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/alexander-climate-change.asp), others have appraised the Kyoto agreement primarily as a deal which might affect their self-interest one way or another. For example, Russia signed up in 2004, thus securing the key condition of Kyoto that the signatories should represent countries which caused at least 55 per cent of global emissions. However, it was widely rumoured that the Russian decision was prompted by a promise from the EU of support for its bid to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (on this story see www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46416-2004May21.html). Furthermore, the conditions of the Protocol suited Russia admirably; 1990 was the base-line for cuts in emissions, and since those last days of the Soviet Union Russia's economy had contracted considerably. As a result, Russia could continue to increase its polluting activities and still look as though it was satisfying the spirit and the letter of Kyoto.

In its attitude to Kyoto, the US government also acted in accordance with 'realist' theory. The country signed the Protocol, but crucially this decision was not ratified by Congress; and the election of President George W Bush in 2000 brought to the White House an ally of Texan oil producers who had limited interest in the idea of reducing emissions (on the alleged influence of energy companies on Bush, see for example www.guardian.co.uk/news/2005/jun/08/usnews.climatechange). Although Russia's adhesion meant that the Protocol could come into operation in 2005 – and another reluctant country, Australia, subsequently signed up – the absence of the US was a serious blow. In 2005, indeed, Bush began work on a separate deal with countries like China and Canada (whose emissions had increased considerably since 1990 – see www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article548812.ece).

Thus it can be argued that the scepticism of those who regard climate change from the perspective of cosmopolitan justice have largely been borne out. Equally, Kyoto can be seen as a useful step in the campaign to make the world wake up to the threat of climate change, and that even if it featured enforced compromises it has at least created a sense that most (if not all) countries are committed to taking the problem seriously in future negotiations. In such talks, it might be more difficult for national governments to adopt a 'realist' approach, in the face of demands from public opinion which is anxious about the prospects for future generations.

For a student campaign on this subject, see www.climatejustice.org.uk

Further reading:
Brian Barry, "Justice Between Generations'. In P.M.S Hacker and J. Raz (eds), Law, Morality and Society, Oxford University Press, 1977.

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Oxford University Press, Online Resource Centre, Box 4.5: Climate change and justice.

Box 4.5: Climate change and justice