

22

The future of US foreign policy

Anatol Lieven

Chapter contents

Introduction	434
The ideological roots of US foreign policy	435
Strengths and weaknesses of the USA	437
The US political order and foreign policy	439
Future foreign policies	441
Catastrophic scenarios	447
Conclusion	448

Introduction

This chapter analyses and portrays possible futures for US foreign policy in terms of the interests and ideology of the US elites (and to a lesser extent the population at large); the structures of US political life; the real or perceived national interests of the USA; and future developments on the world stage.

On this basis, it suggests that now that the rougher edges have been knocked off Republican foreign policy, there will not be a really major change in US global strategy whichever party comes to power, since both share the same essential ideology and class interests. The 'global war on terror' will continue to be defined in much the same terms, and serious attempts at reconciliation with key parts of the Muslim world will not be attempted.

Instead, this chapter argues that as a result of the disaster in Iraq and the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan, US foreign policy will become more cautious when it comes to radical actions and especially major interventions, but without necessarily becoming wiser. Interventionism will be replaced by drift, until some major global crisis occurs to upset the entire present international order.

The analysis of possible futures of US foreign policy set out in this chapter will be based on a combination of elements from two different traditions in international relations analysis: the realist tradition, which focuses above all on state interests and the relative power of states; and what in German is called the *Primat der Innenpolitik*, the predominant influence of domestic policy on foreign policy. Domestic policy in this sense is defined not just as domestic political agendas and ambitions, but the constitutional, political, economic, social, and ideological structures of the domestic political order.

Realism dictates that many US 'vital national interests' must at present be regarded as givens, even though historians of the future may see them as not really in the interest of the great majority of Americans. This is because they are defined as vital, unchangeable interests by the great majority of the US political classes, the security establishment, and

the media, and have sunk deeply into the public unconscious in the course of several decades of their constant reiteration by the elites. I argue here that the leaderships of the Republican and Democratic parties are to a great extent drawn from the same US establishment, share the same basic class interests, are subject to the same domestic pressures on key issues, and are shaped by the same nationalist and imperialist ideology, in somewhat different forms.

This being so, it is likely that future US foreign policy will share the same basic contours whether the Republicans or Democrats form the administration at the time. In addition—from a realist perspective—all US administrations will face certain irreducible constraints and imperatives stemming from US external interests, the international balance of power, and the extent of US power or the lack of it.

This US power in turn, to be assessed accurately, has to be judged not in absolute terms—total US military spending, the numbers of US aircraft carriers and warplanes, the size of the US economy, and so on—but in terms of the US power that can actually be mobilized domestically behind a given objective, and applied locally, to a particular place or issues, relative to the power that other states can bring to bear on the same place or issue.

Viewed in these terms, US foreign policy for the foreseeable future will be chiefly defined by two desires: the desire of the US political elites, and a large part of US public opinion in general, for the USA to play a hegemonic role on the world stage; and their equally profound desire, as individuals, not personally to pay or fight to maintain this role.

This creates a severe mismatch between American ambitions and the American power actually to achieve them. The problems stemming from this mismatch are likely to be made considerably worse by two additional factors. The first is the rise of rivals to US power in certain key parts of the world, notably China, Russia, and to a lesser extent India and Iran.

The second is sharpening geopolitical competition over access to vital and increasingly scarce natural

resources. At present this refers above all to oil, but if the economic rise of China and India continues, and concerns about oil and global warming continue to fuel the diversion of grain to ethanol production, within a generation the world may also be facing shortages of grain.

In these circumstances, it would seem obvious for the USA to seek to redraw its priorities (or at least choose between them) and reduce its commitments in certain parts of the world that are not in fact central to US vital interests—the strategy pursued by Britain in the generation before 1914. However, this is not easy for any empire; and for reasons that this essay will explore, it is especially difficult for the United States.¹

Belief in America's mission to lead the world towards freedom, democracy, and progress stems from an American nationalism whose roots stretch back almost 500 years, to the Protestant Reformation in England and Scotland. And for reasons which will be explored in this essay, the US political system has become so cumbersome, so snarled by powerful and even indomitable interest groups, that it may no longer even be capable of making clear decisions that offend any significant domestic lobby. The USA might then come to resemble France under Louis XV and Louis XVI—a country whose immense latent strengths simply could not be mobilized behind an effective foreign policy, without revolutionary domestic change.

The ideological roots of US foreign policy

The great majority of Americans do not believe that they have or should have an empire. At the same time, however, a sense of America's mission to bring democracy, freedom, and progress to the rest of the world is deeply rooted in American culture, and deeply entwined with American civic nationalism. It is connected to a widespread sense of the innate goodness of America's actions on the world stage, and of the US military in particular.

This is a key link between the ideological bases of American civic nationalism (based on general belief in the values of what has been called 'the American Creed') and American imperialism. Insofar as they can use this rhetoric in support of their plans, the imperialists have a tremendous means of seduction as far as many Americans are concerned. This is America's version of the missions of the great civilizational empires of the past: of the duties of Rome and imperial China—as seen by their rulers, elites, and intellectuals—to spread their civilizations to the barbarians beyond their borders; of the Spanish to Christianize the New World; of the *missions civilisatrices* of the nineteenth-century European empires; of the Soviet Union to bring the light of communism to the rest of humanity.

In the words of Russell Nye, 'All nations . . . have long agreed that they are chosen peoples; the idea of

special destiny is as old as nationalism itself. However, no nation in modern history has been quite so consistently dominated as the United States by the belief that it has a particular mission in the world' (Nye 1966, quoted in Cobb 1998: 4). So powerful is this form of nationalism, and so continuously reinforced by the media, popular culture in general, much of the school system, many of the churches, and the rhetoric of politicians, that it survived what should have been the searing lessons of Vietnam, and will probably survive what ought to be the equally searing lessons of Iraq. It has played a key part in the rhetoric of the Bush administration in the 'global war on terror'. As the opening statement of the National Security Strategy of 2006 reads:

“The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. These nonnegotiable demands of human dignity are protected most securely in democracies. The United States Government will work to advance human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals . . . To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy. (National Security Strategy 2006)”

It also however profoundly influences most of the leadership and established intelligentsia of the Democratic Party, including those who call themselves ‘liberal internationalists’. This is apparent for example in the Princeton National Security Project, a blueprint for the US administration that takes power in 2009, but is directed principally at the Democrats, and co-chaired by an aspirant for senior office, Professor Ann-Marie Slaughter. This project adopted an originally neo-conservative idea for a global coalition of democracies led by the USA—with no regard to the effects of this on relations with China, Russia, and so on, or indeed for what this alliance would actually do, other than validate US claims to global leadership.

Lines written by C. Vann Woodward during the Vietnam War are no less valid today:

“The characteristic American adjustment to the current foreign and domestic enigmas that confound our national myths has not been to abandon the myths but to reaffirm them. Solutions are sought along traditional lines . . . Whatever the differences and enmities that divide advocates and opponents (and they are admittedly formidable), both sides seem predominantly unshaken in their adherence to one or another or all of the common national myths. (Woodward 1969: 218)”

Louis Hartz wrote of the American Creed’s ‘compulsive nationalism’ and the ‘fixed, dogmatic liberalism of a liberal way of life’ (Hartz 1955: 9, 15, 175, 225–37). According to Samuel Huntington,

“It is possible to speak of a body of political ideas that constitutes ‘Americanism’ in a sense in which one can never speak of ‘Britishism’, ‘Frenchism’, ‘Germanism’, or ‘Japaneseism’. Americanism in this sense is comparable to other ideologies and religions . . . To reject the central ideas of that doctrine is to be un-American . . . This identification of nationality with political Creed or values makes the United States virtually unique. (Huntington 1981: 2–3, 25)”

One result of this ideological conformity is to make it much more difficult for most Americans to imagine America as a country among others, or an ‘international community’ that includes America as a member rather than a hegemon.² It thereby contributes to

the shortage of true internationalists in the USA, and indeed to an absence of real debate on key underlying principles of foreign policy.

In the areas of foreign relations and security, a capacity for really open debate on underlying principles has also been discouraged by the close links between government, particular university departments, think tanks, and journalists working in this field. Paradoxically, the American system of political appointments, whereby a president chooses some 4,000 officials from outside the civil service, has worked if anything to limit the advice coming to government. Rather than opening the bureaucracy, it has tended to bureaucratize those sections of academia with a role in the foreign policy debate.

Because they are divided into two political tribes, these para-bureaucrats retain a capacity to criticize specific policies of particular administrations. With very few exceptions, however, like most bureaucrats they lack completely an ability to distance themselves from the myths of the state system which supports them.

As a result of this complex of factors, in the view of Andrew Bacevich, the basic American consensus on foreign policy ‘is so deep-seated that its terms have become all but self-evident, its premises asserted rather than demonstrated’. As a result, much of the public and media debate on international issues within the USA is no more than ‘political theatre’ (Bacevich 2002: 9, 33).

The effects of this ideology and this conformism are twofold. Overall, it is extremely difficult within the US establishment to question whether the USA actually needs to remain the sole global superpower, with all the immense costs and risks that this involves. In specific regions and on specific issues, it makes it much more difficult to propose reasonable compromises with local great powers, because this can always be presented as ‘appeasement’ and ‘betraying American values’. As the examples of Colonel Bacevich and others show, it is of course possible to put forward these ideas in the USA—but the general result is to be excluded from the establishment, and to a great extent from the mainstream media.

Strengths and weaknesses of the USA

At first sight, a really radical shift in US global strategy, and the radical diminution of US commitments, might hardly seem necessary. The United States obviously possesses tremendous latent strength, as both the world's largest economy and the world's greatest military power by far. When it chooses to use its economic weight, the USA can play a decisive role in the management and resolution of international economic crises, as demonstrated repeatedly in the past two decades.

The Chinese economy is gradually eroding the economic lead of the USA, but even if steep Chinese growth continues, it will be a long time before China can match US military technology, especially at sea and in the air. The US military's power to suppress insurgencies and rebuild states has been shown to be extremely limited; but its capacity to project force around the world, and to defeat other armies in the field, remains unparalleled.

Most importantly of all, while the US Navy and Air Force's capacity to inflict catastrophic damage on infrastructure targets is irrelevant to the fight against terrorist and guerrilla enemies, it is a very important latent means of pressure on organized states, as was shown by the Kosovo air campaign of 1989. In contemplating any military confrontation with the USA, the Chinese leadership for example would have to be influenced by the tens of billions of dollars they had spent on the Three Gorges dam—and the consciousness that it could all be knocked to pieces by American missiles.

The problem for the USA then is not its absolute strength, but the twin questions of how to bring that strength to bear on particular issues, and even more importantly, how to persuade the American political classes and population actually to mobilize that strength for foreign policy goals.

The contrast between a desire for imperial glory and an unwillingness to pay or fight for empire is not new in Western history. The British and French empires were conquered very much on the cheap, often largely by native auxiliaries recruited and paid

for by the colonies themselves. The outrageous cost (by previous imperial standards) of the Boer War brought about a major revulsion of public feeling in Britain.

Until the First World War, the British always rejected conscription. Concern about the deaths of British conscript soldiers in colonial wars was one reason for the speed with which the British Empire was wound up in the 1950s. The French did have conscription, but this was legitimized to the French public as necessary to fight in Europe, in the defence of France itself. Hence the creation of the Foreign Legion, explicitly for imperial campaigns.

The suggestion that the USA lacks the power to conduct a successful strategy of world hegemony may therefore seem absurd in the face of US military spending that as of 2007 probably exceeds the rest of the planet put together, based on a US economy which remains by some distance the largest on earth. However, military and geopolitical power and influence are not abstract things. In the end, all true power is local, and relative: that is to say, it is power that can actually be brought to bear on a particular place or a particular issue, relative to the power that can be brought to bear on the same place and issue by another power or powers.

Moreover, in concentrating on US military spending, on US high technology, and on the number of US aircraft carriers, warplanes, and tanks, military analysts have too often forgotten an older, but still extremely important measure of military strength: the number of 'bayonets' an army possesses: in other words, the number of its fighting infantry. This too is an old dilemma for Western empires, as Kipling noted in his poem 'Frontier Arithmetic'. Of British troops deployed in India, he wrote, 'the troopships bring them one by one | at vast expense of time and steam | to catch the Afridi where they run . . .'

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, while conquering a territory may well require comparatively few troops, holding it afterwards, protecting a client government in the face of local revolt,

and ensuring basic local stability, require very large numbers indeed—numbers which probably cannot be generated in the long term, or for multiple such operations, without a resort to conscription. In April 2007, a senior retired general, Barry McCaffrey, warned publicly that the US military was now so overstretched that if faced with a successful North Korean invasion of South Korea it could have to resort to an early use of nuclear weapons (Robberson 2007).

As of 2007, the option of conscription is categorically rejected by the Bush administration, both political parties, and the overwhelming majority of US politicians and the US public. It is just conceivable that it might be agreed to in the public hysteria following a massive new terrorist attack on the USA or the large-scale disruption of oil supplies to the USA; but if so, in the long run anxieties and protests about conscript losses would probably restrain and even end future imperial operations, not enable them.

The number of casualties suffered by the US military in Iraq and Afghanistan is not high by historical standards—though one should be careful to note that as of the spring of 2007, not only had more than 3,600 US servicemen been killed, but more than 24,000 had been wounded. Recent advances in medical technology mean that many of these wounded who in previous wars would have died can now be saved. They are however in many cases disabled, and have to retire from the military. Moreover, extensive disabilities have as great or even greater effects on morale and recruitment as do deaths in action.

As several leading generals and military experts have warned, over time, this level of casualties is therefore incompatible with the maintenance of a volunteer army. This is all the more so since unlike in the nineteenth century, even ordinary soldiers have to be able to master quite complicated military technologies. They also of course have to be able to understand not just orders but manuals in English. This fact, as much as political considerations, renders highly questionable the strategy advocated by Max Boot and others, of recruiting increasing numbers of soldiers from the impoverished masses of Mexico and Central America in return for both pay and US citizenship for themselves and their families.

These constraints make it almost impossible to imagine the USA being able to generate the forces that would be able to defeat and occupy Iran or Pakistan, for example—which in turn places obvious limits on the degree of pressure and influence Washington can exert over those countries. In the past, empires have sought to circumvent such constraints by eschewing outright conquest in favour of punitive expeditions, intended not to replace or rule over another state, or even necessarily to replace a government, but rather to inflict sufficient damage to force the government, country, or people concerned to bow to the will of the imperial power on specific issues; at the milder end of this range of options, the strategy known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’.

This was the strategy that the British Empire generally adopted towards Afghanistan and the Pashtun tribes of the Afghan frontier after the crushing British defeat of 1842. On a larger scale, this punitive strategy was essentially the military approach of the British and other Western imperial powers towards China in the nineteenth century; since, unlike the Russians and Japanese, they did not believe that it was possible for them actually to incorporate large parts of China into their empires. Some aspects of the Western military campaigns in China were ‘punitive’ in the sense of extracting financial compensation. Others, like the infamous destruction of the Summer Palace near Peking in 1860, were directly and crudely punitive in terms of deliberate destruction and vandalism.

This strategy has indeed sometimes been adopted by the USA in recent decades, including the bombardment of Libyan government buildings and military positions in 1988, and the Clinton administration’s repeated attacks on Iraq in the 1990s (Peters 2006). US economic sanctions against various countries, a strategy beloved of the US Congress in particular, can also be seen as a non-military version of the punitive approach.

However, as these examples demonstrate, there are many problems with the punitive approach to the exertion of US power. In the case of Libya, the US attack did not deter—and may have provoked—the Lockerbie terrorist attack. Sanctions did have an

**CONTROVERSIES 22.1**

In March 2006 Professors John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Stephen Walt (Harvard) published an essay in the *London Review of Books* entitled 'The Israel Lobby', strongly criticizing the role of that lobby in shaping US policy towards the Middle East and suppressing free debate of the issue in the USA. Although their essay was unexceptionable by European standards, and

certainly not anti-Semitic, the authors were subjected to a storm of criticism in the USA. However, in a sign that the atmosphere of debate may be very gradually changing, leading journals like *Foreign Policy* did actually invite them to debate their work, rather than—as would have generally been the case in the past—either ignoring it or printing only their critics.

effect, but took a generation to work. They have not worked at all in the cases of Cuba, Syria, or as yet Iran; partly, it has been argued, because by reducing international economic contacts and the usual workings of the market, they actually strengthen the power of ruling elites which control access to key economic resources and goods. In the case of Iraq, a mixture of US economic sanctions and intermittent bombardment had no effect in either taming or bringing down the Ba'athist regime, and their failure helped lead in the end to US invasion, with disastrous consequences for the USA, and much more for Iraq.

The rise of international terrorism as a threat has greatly increased interest in punitive strategies, but has also made them much more problematical. Punitive action always brought with it the risk that rather than coercing the state concerned, it would lead to its collapse. This indeed was the eventual result, in 1911, of seventy years of humiliation of the Manchu Dynasty in China by the Western powers. Collapse may be followed either by the appearance of a new, even more hostile regime, or by anarchy; and either may be seen to necessitate the direct intervention and rule of the imperial power.

The US political order and foreign policy

The difficulty the USA has in mobilizing its wealth for foreign policy goals is shown most glaringly in the area of foreign aid. During the Cold War, both Democratic and Republican administrations saw aid as an absolutely critical part of US strategy in the struggle against communism. Since the end of that conflict, spending on aid has declined precipitously, and even 9/11 has led to no really significant improvement, even in most of the Muslim world.³ As of 2007, there is little sign that this will increase radically in future, given the state of US public opinion on the subject, and the deference of the Democratic Party to public prejudices.

The indifference to foreign aid has worsened in recent years because of the massive shift of resources and influence from the State Department (including USAID) to the Pentagon. This development was already visible in the 1990s, and contributed to the intense militarization of the US 'global war on terror'—rather than an adoption of the more limited

and targeted intelligence and police strategies that the European states and many US diplomats would have preferred.

This shift reflects not only administration but congressional priorities. Congress will not pay much any longer to build up countries like Pakistan which may emerge as economic competitors of the USA in particular fields, as South Korea and Taiwan did during the Cold War. They will pay for the military, not only because of security paranoia or the allure of military 'pork' for their own states, but because more broadly the US military budget serves as something that, according to its free market ideology, the USA does not have: a massive, and in some areas extremely successful programme of state-subsidized industrial development, heavily slanted towards high technology.

The militarization of the structures of US foreign policy does not necessarily mean a more bellicose stance—on the contrary, the US Army and Marine

Corps have emerged as forces for relative moderation and caution in Washington. It does however naturally mean that more and more of America's significant diplomatic contacts with key states will be military to military, and that less aid will be for development and more is likely to be security related, or at best humanitarian aid administered by the US military, as after the Asian tsunami and the Pakistan earthquake.

As a result, the USA is not merely failing to project influence and goodwill, but is being heavily outspent by rival powers in certain parts of the world. Thus Chinese aid to the Philippines (a former US colony) in 2006 was four times that of the United States. Even after the rise in Russian gas prices at the start of 2006, Russian annual energy subsidies to Ukraine exceed many times over US aid to that country. In several parts of Latin America, a strategic combination of the oil wealth of Hugo Chávez's regime in Venezuela and the numerous, highly trained medical and engineering cadres of communist Cuba are greatly overshadowing limited US aid to the region; indeed, Cuba did more to help Pakistan after its 2005 earthquake than did the USA. As Colonel Larry Wilkerson, former chief of staff of the State Department, remarked in 2007, 'People are beginning to like Cuban public diplomacy and despise ours.'⁴

This is also true of US aid to the Middle East as part of the war on terror. The Millennium Challenge Account is a good idea in principle, but is hopelessly under-funded. As of 2006, only \$1.5 billion in new aid had been approved under the MCA—not sufficient to make a serious difference to even one large Muslim country. As to the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) Congress appropriated just \$75 million (half of what President Bush requested) under this programme—to help build political reform, economic reform, educational reform, and women's empowerment across the entire Greater Middle East (cf. Sharp 2005; Wittes and Yerkes 2004)!

The inability to generate more foreign aid reflects the unwillingness of US taxpayers to provide the funds, but also profound structural problems in the US political system, which make it extremely difficult to carry out any radical change of policy—even one supported by a majority of the population and the establishment—if

this is opposed by even one really powerful lobby or interest group. From this point of view, the inability to raise spending on foreign aid, the inability to end the utterly counterproductive forty-year-old embargo against Cuba, the pursuit of pointless and dangerous anti-Russian agendas, and unconditional support for Israel all find their echoes in certain domestic failures: for example, the inability to reform America's horribly costly and inefficient private health system, or to introduce restrictions on gun sales, despite the existence of large national majorities in favour of these reforms.

The power of small but determined lobbies is favoured by a number of factors: broad church political parties with little central party leadership or direction; Senators who are enabled by this and by the Constitution to act as virtually autonomous political princes in Washington politics; the need for larger and larger sums in order to fight elections, above all for television advertising; presidential elections which increasingly hinge on a small number of evenly divided states, making the votes of every lobby count. As Jack Snyder has pointed out, without strong control by administrations or party leaderships, different factions in Congress and the bureaucracy manage their differences about foreign and security policy by never confronting them. They simply pursue every expansionist agenda simultaneously (Snyder 1991).

Perhaps the single most important factor of all is the apathy of the wider public which makes it extremely difficult to mobilize large numbers of people behind any broad programme of reform. If this is impossible when it comes to gun controls—even after a series of horrors like the massacre at Virginia Technical University in April 2007—how much more difficult it would seem to get masses of Americans to demand radical shifts in policies towards foreign countries of which most know nothing. As a result, US foreign policy will for the foreseeable future be run by a mixture of an unrepresentative security elite deeply attached to its own agendas and interests (a pattern very familiar in the history of many states in the past) and particular lobby groups with no concern for the wider national interest at all. It is not just difficult to change course with such a system, it is difficult to steer any rational and coherent course at all.

Future foreign policies

On the basis of the above, we can predict with reasonable confidence that for a long time to come the basic contours of US foreign policy will remain the same, under both Republican and Democratic administrations. An unkind summary of the most likely course of US foreign policy is that in the wake of the debacle in Iraq, it will become more cautious without necessarily becoming any wiser.

For US foreign policy to change radically would require a revolutionary shift in the US domestic political and economic systems, the international balance of power, or most likely both simultaneously. In a few generations, such a revolutionary change is extremely probable, as the impact of global warming undermines many of the basic structures of international order. Long before that, it also seems probable that a really severe global economic recession will destroy many of the assumptions on which American power and the international system are now based. When this will happen is however impossible to predict with any certainty.

The rest of this chapter will therefore deal only with US policy over the next generation, not the next century. It will be based on the assumption that during that period, the world situation will continue to develop roughly along existing lines, or at least within the parameters of currently recognized alternatives—for example, either that China will continue to grow in wealth and power, until it becomes a serious global rival to the USA, or that it will suffer a severe setback from some combination of political and economic factors.

The most important features of US foreign policy are likely to remain the following:

- A continued bipartisan determination to remain the world's dominant power, though most probably stripped of the extreme unilateralism and anti-diplomacy of the Bush administration;
- A reliance above all on military structures (including at least one multilateral one, NATO) as the chief vehicles for US global power and influence;
- Continued rhetoric concerning America's role as the leader of the free world, and America's right and duty to spread 'democracy' and 'freedom'. In practice, however, Washington will remain cautious about actually putting this into practice, except in the case of real or perceived enemies;
- A continuation of the 'global war on terror', defined as a global struggle against Islamist terrorism by military means. However, unless the US mainland once again suffers a massive terrorist attack, future administrations are likely to be more cautious than the Bush administration and seek above all to avoid more wars of occupation;
- A continued effort to manage the relationship with China along basically non-confrontational lines. This however is likely to come under increasing strain from protectionist impulses in the USA, and from rivalry over access to natural resources;
- Strong underlying emotional hostility towards Russia, and a desire to diminish Russian influence wherever possible. In practice, however, this strategy is likely to be severely limited by the already mentioned constraints on America's own power, both military and economic;
- Repeated attempts to validate US global leadership through gaining the formal support of the west Europeans for US strategies, irrespective of the very limited real help that Europe can or will give to the USA on most issues;
- Indifference to Latin America, increased by growing Democratic hostility to open trade, and by growing hostility in US society to illegal immigration; continued strong mutual hostility between the USA and the Chávez administration in Venezuela;
- Growing rivalry over access to key international commodities. This will increasingly overshadow US relations with China, but over time could also lead to increased tension with India and even Europe;
- Because of US dependence on imported oil, and commitment to Israel, for a long time to come, the Greater Middle East will be the most important and dangerous subject of US foreign policy.

BOX 22.1: The central debate on US foreign policy

The central, perpetual public debate on US foreign policy is that between realism and idealism: how far US strategy should be shaped by considerations of national interest, and how far by national values. To a greater or lesser extent, this colours the public discussion on strategy towards most countries, and most issues. Among leading public figures, it ranges 'realists' of the stamp of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski against 'idealists' like Madeleine Albright and Paul Wolfowitz. These differences, it should be noted, cut across both parties.

But this debate has a very curious feature: the public discussion itself is won over and over again by the idealists: witness the statements of the leading candidates for president in 2008, all of whom have stated their belief that America must pursue its mission of spreading freedom and democracy. At the level of actual policy, on the other hand, an underlying realism overwhelmingly predominates at the expense of ideals and values.

The Bush administration's strategy in the Middle East from 2006 on is only the sharpest and most obvious example of this contrast. Phrased in overblown idealist rhetoric about spreading democracy, by 2007 it had in fact reverted to the traditional crudely realist approach of backing pro-American Sunni dictators.

This contrast does not reflect simple hypocrisy and mendacity. Rather, a generally shared American nationalism insists on America's right to lead the world towards American values. Idealism does also have certain effects on US policy, for better and worse. A good effect is that it does limit to some extent both outright American imperialism and crimes committed in the pursuit of empire, and promote cooperation with other democratic states. On the negative side, idealistic or pseudo-idealistic concerns are continually wheeled out by a range of lobbies which hope to prevent US compromise or rapprochement with particular foreign states. This has been true for example of the advocates of trade protection against China, and advocates of aggressive policies towards Russia.

As has been true in the modern history of many countries, therefore, idealism can work simultaneously to promote on the one hand international peace and progress, on the other national programmes of chauvinist superiority and ambition; and realism can promote not just the harsh expansion of national power, but peace and cooperation through diplomacy and compromise.

The middle east

To begin with the latter two points: at some point in the future, the USA will cease to be dependent on oil, whether because environmental concerns have finally begun seriously to bite, because competition with China has forced prices up to uneconomical levels, or simply because the oil itself has run out. Until this comes to pass, however, the US establishment will see vital US interests as lying in a maintenance of the open flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, at reasonable prices.

The price, and not the oil itself, is the reason for this interest. The great majority of imported US oil comes from Canada, Latin America, and Africa; but Gulf supplies are essential to world supplies and therefore to the world market price. The only alternative to dependence on the world market would be a strategy of controlling the oil at source through outright

conquest and military occupation, or some form of locked-in relationship of patronage and defence with a local government.

Such a strategy may have partly underlain the decision to invade Iraq. It was discussed by the Nixon administration with regard to the Saudi oil fields during the first oil shock of 1973, and this possibility has been raised again in neo-conservative circles in recent years. Contingency plans to this effect certainly exist in the Pentagon. Leaving aside the question of the security of Gulf supplies, it is possible that in the decades to come, geopolitical rivalry with China will lead the USA (and maybe China too) to intervene militarily in some troubled oil producer to ensure that supplies continue to flow to the USA. Nigeria has occasionally been mentioned as a future candidate in this regard.

However, the miserable example of the US occupation of Iraq, and what is likely to be the ongoing

conflict in Afghanistan, will for a considerable time to come act as a deterrent to further military occupations. More likely is continued strong military and political commitment to key oil producers, led of course by Saudi Arabia. This, and the general need to retain the support of local regimes for the US presence in the region and the struggle against Islamist terrorism, will keep US support for democracy at the level of rhetoric, at least as far as its allies are concerned.

Just as there is no sign that the USA will seriously reduce its dependence on oil in the near to medium term, so the bipartisan US political elite seems locked into support for Israel, to the exclusion of any real possibility of a genuine peace settlement with the Palestinians, the Arab world, and Iran. If the twin triumphs of the disappearance of the enemy Soviet superpower and the defeat of Iraq at the start of the 1990s could not persuade most Israelis that it was safe to make peace, then nothing will.

And if the shock of 9/11 could not persuade the present US elites that it was necessary to put real pressure on Israel for the sake of better relations with the Muslim world, then nothing will. To break the grip of the Israel lobby on the US political system would take a tremendous political upheaval, involving either a fundamental transformation of one of the two US political parties, or the replacement of one of them by a new party. This will happen one day—but most probably, not for a considerable time.

Partly in consequence, we can equally confidently predict that the USA will not achieve most of its key objectives in the Greater Middle East, whether in terms of stabilizing Iraq (already a lost cause) and Afghanistan; eliminating Islamist extremism as a serious threat; bringing about the acceptance of Israel by the Muslim states; or bringing a mixture of democracy and acceptance of US hegemony to Iran, Syria, and other states.

In part due to the Israel lobby, and its insistence that all enemies of Israel must also be enemies of the USA, it is likely that future Democratic administrations too will pursue a policy of hostility to many of the major states and forces in the Muslim world, rather than seeking serious compromises.

Moreover, when it comes to pursuing a new, 'softer', less militarized, and more flexible strategy in the 'global war on terror', the Democrats are also heavily influenced by two wider and interlinked factors: the enduring memory of how eventual Democratic opposition to the Vietnam War supposedly led to a patriotic backlash against the party which continues to this day; and the fact that many leading Democratic politicians, like Richard Holbrooke and Senator Joe Biden, are extremely hawkish in their basic attitudes.

So too are many leading Democratic foreign policy intellectuals, like Will Marshall, head of the Progressive Policy Institute (the think tank of the Democratic Leadership Council), and Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution (Kagan and O'Hanlon 2007). These views are reflected in the apparent consensus among many leading Democrats as of the spring of 2007 that the USA should not withdraw all its troops from Iraq, but should keep 20,000 or so in order to continue the fight against al-Qaeda, while somehow extricating itself from involvement in Iraq's civil war.

The ideas of being able to do both these things simultaneously in Iraq seems on the face of it absurd. Elsewhere, in the short to medium term at least the USA will not necessarily suffer any really shattering defeats as a result of this strategy, such as outright military catastrophe, an Islamist revolution, or another massive attack on the USA itself. All of these scenarios are possible and even probable at some time in the future, but it may be a long time, unless the USA itself precipitates a disaster by another military attack on a major state.

More likely however seems to be a kind of long-term holding action, in which the USA will suffer a constant drain on its manpower, resources, and international prestige, without coming under the kind of pressure that will force it from the region altogether, or draw it into a general regional war. The USA will not suffer too badly from the eventual withdrawal from Iraq, because the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni there will divide the Muslim countries of the Middle East and create a situation in which the USA can successfully play games of 'divide and rule'. Afghanistan will remain a running sore, but the

Taliban will never be able to gain strength enough to inflict really serious defeats on the US military, let alone chase them from the country. Disastrous scenarios—like a US war with Iran or intervention in Pakistan—do however exist, and will be examined briefly at the end of this section.

For the further future, one critical question for US strategy in the Middle East is whether the USA remains the only international superpower with major influence in the region, as it has been since the collapse of the Soviet Union (or even, by some estimates, since Egypt changed geopolitical sides under Anwar Sadat more than thirty years ago).

China is obviously the most likely contender for such a role, driven by thirst for oil; but India suffers the same thirst, and Russia retains a certain residual strength (especially through relations with Iran and Syria). Moscow seems to be working cautiously towards the possibility of an international gas cartel on the model of OPEC, though its ability actually to achieve this will depend on the spread of liquid natural gas technology, and a very considerable reduction in its cost as compared to the cost of fixed pipelines.

China and the far east

If China does adopt this role, it will also have a severe impact on wider relations with the USA. By twenty years from now, these will in any case be largely shaped by competition for increasingly scarce resources, including not only oil and liquid natural gas but grain and paper.

This rivalry, and pressure from within the USA (especially on the Democratic Party) for tougher protectionist measures against Chinese imports, must be set against the strong impulse in the USA for good relations with China, the roots of which have been explored earlier in this chapter. Given the very great interdependence of the US and Chinese economies, and US fears of Chinese power, this impulse is likely to survive both of these countervailing factors, and the constant irritant of Taiwan.

In the case of North Korea, the Bush administration between 2001 and 2007 conducted what amounted to a 180-degree turn towards compromise with

Pyongyang; and the key reasons for this were not only that due to the Iraq War the US military was badly overstretched, but even more importantly that the USA could in any case not conduct any successful policy vis-à-vis North Korea without the help of China.

Given the fact that militarily China appears most probably set to grow stronger and stronger over the next generation—and the possibility of a deeply provoked China backing North Korean aggression—it seems for the foreseeable future extremely unlikely that the USA would sanction a Taiwanese declaration of outright independence, or that Taiwan would make such a declaration without US sanction. Trade issues aside, hostile statements from the Democratic Party concerning China should not be taken too seriously. This is a game that both parties have played when in opposition, only pragmatically to abandon it as soon as they come to power.

By the same token, however, if US economic relations with China were to suffer really serious disruption, then latent hostilities could quickly rise to the surface. As has often been remarked, the present structure of US–Chinese economic relations creates a kind of ‘Mexican stand-off’, whereby neither side can seriously hurt the other without doing terrible damage to itself. If China seriously provokes the USA, then US protectionism will smash China’s export economy. On the other hand, if the USA seriously provokes China, then China will cease to support the dollar and the US consumer boom, bringing the domestic US economy down in ruins.

The problem for the USA is that this equation is not stable, and whatever changes in China over time, the outcome may be unfavourable for the USA. If China continues to grow as at present, then sooner or later it will produce a class of middle-class consumers so large and prosperous that its economy will no longer depend on exports to the USA. At that point, Beijing will be able to use its ownership of US bonds and support for the dollar as a massive lever of influence.

If on the other hand China’s economic growth comes to a halt as a result of some combination of domestic economic and political shocks, then equally China will no longer be able to support US finances in the same way, quite possibly leading to a deep US

recession and a radical reduction in the US population's willingness to pay the costs of global hegemony. Fortunately, key officials on both sides have so far recognized the need to preserve stable relations—a striking contrast with the rhetorical bluster and immoderate ambition that characterizes US policy towards Russia and the lands of the former Soviet Union.

Russia and the former soviet union

So deep rooted is hostility to Russia in the US establishment that it is difficult to foresee any formal and public change of course in US strategy, for example a deal with Moscow on abandoning further NATO expansion in return for greater Russian support in the Middle East. This hostility is multifaceted, and often does not present itself, or even see itself, as hostility. The first source is of course the legacy of the Cold War, reflected not only in attitudes but also in a range of institutions with built-in antagonism to Russia and instinctive support for Russia's enemies.

These include semi-official media outlets like Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe, and democracy promotion/propaganda outfits like Freedom House and the National Endowment for Democracy. Created to serve the struggle against the Soviet Union and its global communist agenda, these institutions have to a considerable extent simply continued this attitude since the end of the Cold War. This legacy naturally strongly affects older security figures like Vice-President Dick Cheney, whose entire being was shaped by the Cold War, but it has been passed down to younger generations. In any dispute involving Russia, no matter how distant, and no matter what its relationship to real US interests, their natural tendency is to take the other side.

Deliberate hostility to Russia, especially in the US Congress, is also encouraged by the role of east European and Baltic ethnic lobbies in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of Senators and Congressmen drawn from these ethnic groups, or in whose constituencies these ethnic groups are strongly represented. The disproportionate influence of ethnic and other lobbies,

due to the structure of the US political system and the apathy of the US public, has already been noted.

More unusual than this open and unremitting hostility is what might be called disappointed love, reflected in the attitudes of many US figures who genuinely see themselves as friends of Russia, like Dr Strobe Talbott, president of the Brookings Institution. This school of thought genuinely believed in the early and mid-1990s that the revolutions that had succeeded in Moscow's former satellites in eastern Europe could simply be extended to Russia itself, and that thereby Russia would at one and the same time undergo radical and successful free market reform, establish a successful democracy, and abandon its traditional ambitions for great power status to become an obedient subordinate of the USA on the international stage.

In what might be called a copulation of illusions, these beliefs were stoked by a briefly prominent collection of Russian liberal intellectuals and politicians, who succeeded in presenting themselves in the USA as the true voice of Russian democracy. Recruited into US organizations like the Brookings and the Carnegie Endowment, whether from conviction or opportunism, they told their new masters exactly what they wanted to hear, and to a considerable extent created a monopoly of 'legitimate' Russian opinion in Washington for one Russian point of view—one that was however detested by a large majority of ordinary Russians.

The combination of these factors has created a mood in the leaderships of both major parties which is very different indeed from the mood regarding China. This is to be seen in the push in 2006 for an offer of a NATO membership action plan to Ukraine, in the face of vehement Russian opposition and private threats of drastic retaliation; despite the fact that US military officials warned in private that the USA would not even be able to defend Ukraine against any future Russian aggression or internal revolution; and despite the fact that according to opinion polls, a large majority of the Ukrainian population did not even want to be part of NATO. This plan was eventually suspended, not because of opposition within the US establishment, but because of events on the ground

in Ukraine, the collapse of the pro-Western ‘Orange Coalition’, and the return to power as prime minister of the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich.

The push for Ukrainian NATO membership in the middle of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and desperate overstretch of the US military, might seem to suggest that the US establishment is capable of any folly in its relations with Russia. However, the course of events with regard to Georgia suggests that things may not be as bad as that. So far, Washington, while unconditionally backing Georgia’s position over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and training and equipping the Georgian military, has also warned Georgia not to try to resolve the Abkhaz and Ossete disputes by force.

As Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan all demonstrate in their different ways, unlike in eastern Europe, America’s allies in the former Soviet Union are mostly weak and badly divided internally, not least over the question of alignment with Russia or the West. In view of this, massive US distractions elsewhere, and what are likely to be the long-term effects of failure in Iraq and disappointment in Afghanistan on the US political psyche, it seems quite likely that while US rhetoric concerning Russia and its neighbours will remain hostile and ambitious, in practice US ambitions will in fact be scaled down. Rather than changing course in the former Soviet Union, the US ship of state will gradually run out of steam.

This may be the most the US political system can achieve, since any kind of ‘grand bargain’ with Russia (on the analogy of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s reconciliation with China) would be massively unpopular in the US political classes. The problem about such a future—as already noted with regard to US strategy towards Iran, Taiwan, and North Korea—is that the absence of an actual agreement with the rival power makes the relationship acutely vulnerable to shifts in perception or actions by third parties.

If the USA goes on preaching NATO enlargement, then the Russians will continue to be worried about this even if some wiser Russian analysts realize that the USA does not really mean it, and this will encourage Russian retaliation against US interests elsewhere. Moreover, there is always the risk that a desperate Georgian government will try to trap Washington into

giving military support by carrying out some form of military *coup de main* against South Ossetia, in the hope that faced with Russian retaliation against Georgia, the USA will come to Georgia’s aid. The USA most probably would not in fact send real military help, but nonetheless, Washington (in the shape of both party establishments) has painted itself into such a corner by its rhetorical support for Georgia that some form of harsh US response against Russia, and a deep crisis in US–Russian relations, would be inevitable.

Europe and the transatlantic relationship

Relations with Russia constitute one area of US foreign policy where the traditional transatlantic relationship with Europe continues to matter in Washington—not surprisingly, since the entire structure of transatlantic relations during the Cold War was built around the alliance against Moscow. In other areas, the real importance of relations with Europe does not necessarily correspond to the importance they are given in the language of the US media and the US political class.

In fact, economic relations and the issue of global warming aside, there is a certain degree of conscious or unconscious play-acting about certain aspects of the present—and probably future—relationship, which stem more from domestic political and even psychological needs than from objective international reality. On the European side, a mixture of factors stemming from the Second World War and Cold War continue to combine to produce a sense of dependence on the USA: memories of the self-inflicted horrors of Europe’s modern history; residual (or in the case of the east Europeans, actual) fear of Russia; and acute consciousness of Europe’s weakness and division. As long as the USA does not do something quite exceptionally wild, like invading Iraq, sullen European adherence can usually be taken for granted.

However, this does not add up to a willingness to make serious sacrifices for the sake of US strategy. With the partial exception of Britain, the military contributions of America’s European allies in Iraq

and Afghanistan have been so pathetic that one might wonder why the USA even bothered to go to the diplomatic effort of asking for them. Then again, however, it is equally true that the USA in recent years has never made a serious change of any important policy in order to win European support.

Rather, in the geopolitical and security fields (as opposed to the equally vital but at present largely separate ones of trade, international finance, and the environment), this relationship operates on both sides at the level of psychological comfort. The Europeans need America to reassure that they have not been left alone in the wild wood of international geopolitics, from which most instinctively shrink (except for the British establishment, for its own post-colonial reasons).

The Americans (with the exception of the neo-conservatives and the ultra-nationalists of the Cheney–Rumsfeld type) need the Europeans to reassure them that they are still ‘leaders of the Free World’. This is especially true in the ‘liberal internationalist’ school in the Democratic Party intellectual establishment,

which in the run-up to the 2008 elections is doing its best to convince the American political classes (and perhaps most of all themselves) that the old centrality of the democratic West to US strategy is essentially sound and that it can be extended to strategy in the Middle East—and indeed to the whole world, through the idea of a global ‘alliance of democracies’. In truth, Europe is practically worthless to the USA in the critical area of the Muslim world.

For a long time to come, therefore, US–European relations will be characterized by a version of an old Soviet joke: The Americans will pretend to listen to the Europeans, and the Europeans will pretend to work for the Americans. The transatlantic alliance will not collapse completely, but neither will it amount to anything much in real geopolitical terms. If as seems likely Afghanistan remains permanently unsettled, then sooner or later most European forces will be withdrawn, and NATO will have lost its last *raison d’être* other than hostility to Russia and job creation for otherwise unemployable military bureaucrats and staff officers.

Catastrophic scenarios

Most of the scenarios set out in this chapter have envisaged drift, overstretch, and relatively slow decline rather than disaster. However, in many areas of the international scene the potential for disaster does exist; and if in every individual case the odds are against this happening, if you add all of these possibilities together, then the chances of the USA avoiding all of them begin to seem much less promising. Yet, as noted, it seems impossible for the US establishment as at present configured to take the radical action which would be necessary to extricate the USA from any one of these potentially disastrous entanglements.

The potential disasters can be broken down into three main groups: actions by the USA itself; actions by third parties, with the USA drawn in; and global economic crisis, crippling US power and leading to the triumph of radical chauvinist and anti-American forces in key countries of the world. Of these, the greatest danger may come from what could be called the

1914 scenario: a situation in which the USA has committed itself rhetorically to some local state (Georgia, Taiwan, and above all Israel) which then carries out some highly provocative action, leading to a regional war in which the USA is forced to intervene on its behalf, just as Russia came to Serbia’s help against Austria in July–August 1914.

The chief specific possibilities are the following:

- A US attack on Iran, leading to a drastic intensification of attacks on US troops in Iraq; the ruin of any hope for the stabilization of Afghanistan; a withdrawal of European and British forces from both countries, and a radical growth in the extent and effectiveness of anti-US terrorism;
- Another major terrorist attack against the continental United States, leading to a savage and indiscriminate US response that further radicalizes much of the Muslim world. Only such an attack could lead

- the USA voluntarily to embark on the invasion of another major Muslim state (as opposed to being eventually dragged into such an invasion as a result of the unintended consequences of more limited US actions; and only such an attack could lead to an atmosphere in which the US Congress and public would be prepared to accept the reintroduction of conscription;
- The internal collapse of a major Muslim state (such as Pakistan), leading to US intervention and another disastrous war of occupation;
 - A new war between Israel and some or all of its neighbours, leading to Islamist revolution across the region;
 - A Taiwanese declaration of independence, leading to a localized but economically horribly disruptive military conflict between the USA and China;
 - A Georgian attack on South Ossetia, leading to Russian military retaliation, a severe crisis in US–Russian relations, and intensified Russian support for enemies of the USA elsewhere in the world;
 - A global economic crisis, leading to a collapse of the US–Chinese economic relationship, and a surge in mutual hostility.

Conclusion

Any of the above scenarios would be capable of severely shaking, and even possibly shattering, the existing global order, and bringing US global power to an early end. Assuming that none of them takes place, then what we are likely to see instead will be a slower decline in US power. Afghanistan on top of Iraq will emphasize the limitations on US military power, and more states will therefore feel able to defy the USA without fearing US invasion. The Middle East will remain deeply troubled, and a constant drain on US resources and attention, but without any regional eruption dedicated to throwing the USA out altogether, and destroying Israel.

The rise of China will mean that more and more states in the developing world will look to China, rather than the USA, as their key partner. Russia will consolidate its predominance—though not outright control—in the area of the former Soviet Union, without the USA being able to do much about this. Europe, crippled by internal divisions, will make mostly impotent noises from the sidelines, neither really challenging nor really supporting US strategies.

If this is the future, then the USA may be able to handle the gradual decline of US hegemony without disastrous convulsions. The USA will never formally abandon its hegemonic ambitions, but over time will

be drawn more and more to treat with other leading powers on a footing of equality. Increasing disasters as a result of global warming will make many of the seemingly vital problems of today seem less and less important, and will push major states towards closer cooperation.

This is the benign version of the decline of US hegemony and the future of US foreign policy. It must be said, however, that history offers few encouraging examples when it comes to the decline of empires. Most such experiences have been bloody and disastrous in the extreme, with the declining powers launching wars in an effort to re-establish their global or local predominance. This is true even if one takes the west European empires of Britain and France, ruled by west European democracies and with self-assigned civilizing missions not dissimilar to that of the United States. The Dutch and Belgian empires also came to an end amidst great bloodshed.

The end of all these empires involved terrible wars and convulsions; and only took place at all because all the countries concerned had previously been crippled by two world wars which exhausted the will of their metropolitan populations to pay or fight for empire, and undermined the entire claim of Europe to civilizational and racial superiority.

“ KEY QUOTES 22.1

To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy.

(National Security Strategy 2006)

The characteristic American adjustment to the current foreign and domestic enigmas that confound our national myths has not been to abandon the myths but to reaffirm them.

(C. Vann Woodward)

It is possible to speak of a body of political ideas that constitutes ‘Americanism’ in a sense in which one can never speak of ‘Britishism’, ‘Frenchism’, ‘Germanism’, or ‘Japaneseism’.

(Samuel Huntington)

America is becoming more cautious without becoming wiser.

(Anatol Lieven)

Iraq: Victory is not an option.

(Lt.-General (retd.) William Odom)

The [US] military is grossly under-resourced. It’s a flippin’ disaster . . . Their equipment is shot. It’s coming apart. We are in a position of enormous strategic peril. What happens if the other shoe drops [in Iran or North Korea]?

(General (retd.) Barry McCaffrey)

The USA may do better, given its own anti-imperialist traditions, the even greater unwillingness of its population to fight, and the fact that with rare exceptions it is not trying to maintain a territorial empire in which it rules directly over other people. However, Israel—perceived by the Muslim world as identical to the USA—fulfils that bitterly unpopular and dangerous role on America’s behalf; and while most Americans may not believe that they possess

an empire, belief in America’s preordained right to lead humanity is so deeply rooted in the culture of the establishment and most of the population as easily to match the popular imperialism of Europe in the past. Drifting along, in the style of the Democrats, may not be as openly reckless as steaming full speed ahead, in the style of the Bush administration. But given the number of icebergs about, it is still extremely dangerous.

? Questions

1. What are the principal ideological forces shaping US foreign policy?
2. What are the chief domestic political forces and structures shaping US foreign policy?
3. Why is the belief in America’s mission to lead the world towards freedom so strong?
4. What are America’s chief strengths and weaknesses when it comes to projecting power and influence?
5. Why is US international aid low compared to America’s previous record during the Cold War?
6. What is the role of domestic ethnic lobbies in shaping US foreign policy?

7. Why is the 'global war on terror' likely to continue?
8. What would be the possible consequences of another massive terrorist attack on the USA?
9. What are the different possible future courses of US foreign policy with regard to China?
10. What role does Europe play in the US foreign policy mentality?
11. What are some possible future disasters that could accelerate the decline of US power?

» Further Reading

- Bacevich, Andrew J. (2004), *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press).
- Holmes, Stephen (2007), *The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hunt, Michael H. (1987), *Ideology and US Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Ikenberry, G. John (2004), *American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: Longman).
- Lieven, Anatol (2004), *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism* (London: Harper Collins).
- Marshall, Will (ed.) (2006), *With All our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield).
- Perle, Richard, and Frum, David (2004), *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Ballantine Books).
- Smith, Tony, and Leone, Richard C. (1995), *America's Mission* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Walt, Stephen M. (2005), *Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy* (New York: W. W. Norton).

📄 Endnotes

1. Retrenchment of this kind has for example been argued for by Layne (2006) and by Lieven and Hulsman (2006).
2. For the historical background to this belief, see Tuveson (1968); Hughes (2003: 19–41). For fictional versions of America as liberating and/or modernizing redeemer, see Mark Twain, *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* (1889) and the original TV series of *Star Trek*. Cf. also McDougall (1997: 81 ff.); Smith (1979).
3. For a discussion of this theme, see Lieven and Hulsman (2006).
4. Speech at the New America Foundation, Washington, DC, 18 Apr. 2007.



Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for web links to accompany each chapter, and a range of other resources: www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/cox_stokes/