Cox & Stokes: US Foreign Policy 
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Essay questionsCox & Stokes: US Foreign Policy
Afghanistan: coming to terms with the Taliban's resurgence?
In October 2001 Afghanistan and its Taliban regime became the first major target in the 'War on Terror'. Operation 'Enduring Freedom' began on 7 October with the aerial bombardment of the Afghan capital Kabul and the cities of Khandahar and Jalalabad by US and British forces. Subsequently the US, working in combination with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, made rapid gains against the Taliban. By 12 November, Taliban forces had fled the capital Kabul, and by early December the US had also taken the cities of Konduz and Kandahar. Al-Qaeda's support base in the country had been virtually destroyed, a key original aim of the operation, and the Taliban regime deposed. Thus, in spite of the subsequent failure to capture Osama Bin Laden, the other crucial aim of Operation Enduring Freedom, the intervention in Afghanistan was otherwise considered a military success for the US. The culmination of this success was seen to come with the election of a pro-US regime in Kabul under Hamid Karzai in 2004.
Seven years on from the initial intervention in Afghanistan, we know in hindsight that this was something of a false dawn. Taliban forces have since regrouped, the Karzai government has little or no control over many areas of the country, and US-led NATO forces have effectively become bogged down in a counter-insurgency war. Even President Karzai himself admitted recently (on 29 October 2008) that his government's efforts had yet to achieve stability in the country, stating that 'one of the nation's biggest wishes was full security…which we have not brought. It has even dropped.' Although government control in Kabul itself has been maintained, Karzai acknowledged that the situation outside of the capital is very different, with road travel in areas south of the capital increasingly prone to attacks and kidnappings by Taliban insurgents and bandits.
This situation persists in spite of the backing of a NATO-led force (ISAF) of 50,700 troops, around 13,000 of which are provided by the US (the US has a total presence of approximately 32,000 soldiers in Afghanistan in total). ISAF has increasingly been caught up in a counter-insurgency campaign against resurgent Taliban forces. Far from disintegrating in the wake of the initial US invasion in 2001, the Taliban has regrouped in Pakistan's northwest region. From there, Taliban forces have increasingly been attacking US and NATO forces. Most recently insurgents successfully brought down a US Black Hawk helicopter during an exchange of fire near Kabul. Though none of the troops aboard the helicopter were injured, the helicopter was forced to crash land as a result of being hit and the incident has been seen as symptomatic of the rising confidence of the insurgent forces.
On the same day, a suicide bombing at a police station in northern Afghanistan killed two American soldiers and wounded five other people. Such incidents have added to the growing catalogue of US/NATO casualties in Afghanistan. More US and NATO troops have died in Afghanistan in 2008 than in any other year since the 2001 invasion. The Taliban-led insurgency shows little sign of abating at present, and the problem it presents for the US and NATO forces is a complex one. Not only do insurgents tend to rely on 'asymmetric' and unconventional means of warfare, the ability of the US-NATO soldiers to combat the insurgency is also hindered by the fact that the main base of the insurgency appears to lie outside of Afghanistan itself. The mountainous areas straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border are difficult for the US-led forces to police, and the Bush administration has grown increasingly exasperated by the operation of the Taliban inside of Pakistani territory. In response, the US has reportedly used unmanned Predator drone planes to launch targeted strikes against Taliban positions inside of Pakistani territory.
This, however, is a controversial option as it risk deterioration of relations between the US and Pakistan. With this in mind some in Washington and Kabul have tentatively begun to suggest the alternative possibility of engaging in negotiations with the Taliban leadership as a means to halt the insurgency. In late October 2008 Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell stated that those in the US and Afghan leadership would 'have to figure out a way to embrace those who are willing, ultimately, to work with the central government, lay down their arms – at least stop pointing them at the government and us – and work in a constructive manner for the good of all of the Afghan people.' US General David Petraeus, who recently took over control of US forces in Afghanistan as part of the US Central Command, has also refused to rule out the idea: 'If there are people who are willing to reconcile (with the government), then that would be a positive step in some of these areas that have actually been spiraling downward'. However, the idea of negotiating with the Taliban leadership is still a highly contentious one in Washington. The Pentagon has been quick to rule out the option of negotiation with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, instead focusing on the possibility of coming to terms with more moderate elements of the Taliban leadership. Additionally, there is no clear evidence as yet that negotiation would even be enough to quell the Taliban resurgence. In the meantime the 'victory' that the US thought it had achieved in Afghanistan in November 2001 remains far from assured.
Think Points:
Why has security and stability in Afghanistan been so difficult to achieve?
What challenges do the US and NATO face in Afghanistan?
How has the issue of the Taliban insurgency affected relations between the US and Pakistan?
How have the two presidential candidates proposed to deal with the issue of Afghanistan?
Should the US attempt to negotiate with the Taliban? What are the arguments for and against such a strategy?
Does Afghanistan illustrate the limits of America's military might?
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