Cox & Stokes: US Foreign Policy 
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Essay questionsCox & Stokes: US Foreign Policy
US options on Iran
Iran has continued to rise in prominence on the US foreign policy agenda in recent weeks and months. In particular its test of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile in July has exacerbated US anxieties over Iran's military ambitions, which have already been heightened by Iran's interest in nuclear technologies.
In terms of conventional military capability Iran is already the major power in the Middle East, with around 1.5 million active troops plus another 500,000 in its elite Revolutionary Guard. The concern of the US is that Iran will gain a nuclear weapons capability to complement its already strong military presence in the Middle East region, and that Iran's plans to develop a civil nuclear energy programme – which it has had an interest in since the 1970s – could in turn produce weapons grade uranium (that is, uranium which could be used in nuclear weapons).
Even if Iran is still some way from developing both nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles capable of carrying them, many in the US view the July missile test as a direct provocation of America and its allies in the Middle East. Iran does not currently have the missiles that can reach the US itself, but the Shahab-3 (armed with powerful conventional warheads) is capable of hitting Iran's neighbours in the Middle East. This includes US allies such as Israel, which is why the July test has been so controversial. The frequently inflammatory rhetoric of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad towards both the US and Israel (Ahmadinejad infamously threatened to 'wipe Israel off the map' in 2005) has also done little to allay fears that an Iranian attack on Israel might be a realistic possibility.
This combination of factors ensures that Iran remains a priority with regard to US foreign policy. Three main options that have been suggested in response:
The first is engagement: that is, engaging Iran through diplomacy and dialogue with the US, Europe and other states in the region (this was the option apparently favoured at one point by presidential candidate Barack Obama). A problem for the US here is the historical antipathy and mistrust between the two states, which dates back at least to perceived US interference in Iran and the deposition of the Mossadeq regime in the 1950s (see Chapter 11 of the textbook for more detail). Added to this is the presence of hardliners and ideologues on both sides. Though there are moderates in both camps, the headlines tend to be grabbed by the likes of Ahmadinejad on the Iranian side and hawks within the US. The latter group were highly vocal in their criticism of Obama when he appeared to favour the engagement option early in his campaign for the Democratic nomination (as noted in the Monthly Commentary for July).
A second option is containment: containing Iran's rise as a military power, through sanctions in particular. Under President Clinton, the US imposed sanctions on Iran in 1996. In March 2001, President Bush renewed these sanctions, stating that 'the actions and policies of the government of Iran continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.'
In December 2006, with the Iranians still seemingly pursuing the enrichment of uranium, the UN also imposed sanctions banning the supply of nuclear-related technology and materials to Iran and froze the financial assets of key Iranian individuals and companies. The hope is that by doing so, Iran will begin to cooperate with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) as regards its nuclear ambitions.
In the wake of the Iranian missile test Obama has called for strengthening of sanctions to deal with the 'great threat' Iran poses. The drawback of the sanctions option, though, is that it is difficult to tell whether or not sanctions will actually have their desired effect of containing Iran and curtailing its nuclear ambitions. Iran has a well-developed infrastructure and economy, and is much better placed than Iraq was in the 1990s to withstand the effects of sanctions. Consequently Obama's opponent, John McCain, has argued that pursuit of a missile defence system (see the Monthly Commentary for June) capable of nullifying Iran's missile threat will ultimately be a more effective means of containing Iran in the future.
The third and most controversial option is direct military action. This is the option favoured by some American neoconservatives and by hardliners within the Israeli government. Neoconservative policy advocate Bill Kristol has argued in past that the US 'has to be ready to use force against Iran' to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons programme if diplomacy fails, and suggests that 'the right use of targeted force' could cause the Iranian people 'to reconsider whether or not they really want to have this regime in power' (see transcript and video available from http://thinkprogress.org/2006/07/19/kristol-iran/). Hawks arguing for 'preventive' military action against Iran point to the alleged supply of weapons to insurgents in Iraq, and the supply of weapons to the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbollah as further causes for US action.
If a US attack on Iran is to come, it is likely to be in the form of airstrikes, using an aerial bombardment to try and destroy the infrastructure of Iran's nuclear programme. Iran has a massive land army that includes its well-equipped Republican guard, and the US army is already being stretched by the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. By contrast, the US has a clearly superior air force to that of Iran, hence the attractiveness of airstrikes.
Taking on Iran directly would nevertheless be much more difficult for the US than was the invasion of Iraq, and hence the US is likely to try and pursue alternative options. Francis Fukuyama (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2002439,00.html), himself a former neoconservative, argues that a 'lesson that should have been drawn from the past five years is that preventive war cannot be the basis of a long-term US non-proliferation strategy'. Hence, to paraphrase President Bush's assessment of the Iranian issue in 2006, all options 'remain on the table'.
Think Points:
Why is the US concerned by Iran's military ambitions?
What are the reasons for the historical antipathy between the US and Iran?
Could an Iranian nuclear capability actually help stabilize the Middle East?
Are sanctions against Iran likely to be effective?
What are the prospects for diplomatic engagement between the US and Iran?
What is the likelihood of direct US military action against Iran?
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