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Cox & Stokes: US Foreign Policy

The war in Iraq: is the US strategy working?

The Iraq war continues to dominate discussion of US foreign policy, and US strategy in Iraq received renewed scrutiny in April 2008 when the leader of the American forces in the country, General David Petraeus, testified before Congress on the campaign in Iraq.

In the invasion of Iraq, as in Afghanistan before it, the US relied heavily on technological superiority, rapidly achieving its goal of the deposition of the Saddam Hussein regime. However, there is an increasing consensus among analysts of the Iraq war that the Bush administration paid insufficient attention to the issue of post-conflict reconstruction and the potential problems of ‘nation-building’ (see pages 141-143 of Chapter 7, by Beth A. Fischer, and pages 364-365 of Chapter 18, by Paul Rogers, in the textbook).

The US, as Rogers notes, placed excessive hopes in the swift establishment of a pro-Western Iraqi state. By contrast, the immediate challenges faced by the US forces in Iraq are a Sunni insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread crime (see Chapter 18). Increasingly resented by all sides as an occupying force, the US is now caught in the middle of a struggle for power in Iraq.

Within this context, in 2007 President Bush authorised a ‘surge’ of 20,000 troops as a means of alleviating the security situation in Iraq (the US now has in the region of 160,000 troops in the country). Yet, even with this surge, the challenges remain much the same for the US in Iraq: reconstituting Iraqi security, building an administrative capacity and establishing the rule of law.

Though General Petraeus argued to the US Congress on April 9 2008 that the US has made ‘progress in the security area’, most analysts still argue that Iraq is still effectively in the midst of a civil war. The level of violence in Iraq may have dropped from its height in late 2006/early 2007, but many argue that this is due as much to the declaration of a ceasefire by Muqtada al-Sadar’s (leader of the Mahdi army) in August 2007 as it is to the effects of the surge. Meanwhile, the Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki has been widely criticized for its failure so far to foster national reconciliation or deliver essential services. Cities such as Baghdad are increasingly divided along sectarian lines, which now have a physical presence by virtue of the US-built ‘peace walls’ that divide Sunni enclaves from surrounding Shia neighbourhoods.

The report of the US ‘Iraq Study Group’, which was delivered in December 2006, asserted that ‘No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide towards chaos.’ The worst case scenario envisaged by the study group if the situation continues to deteriorate in Iraq is: the collapse of the current Iraqi government; descent into civil war between Sunni and Shiah; a resultant humanitarian crisis; the intervention of neighbouring countries, with the possible spread of conflict as a result; a consequent propaganda victory for al Qaeda; and loss of US prestige internationally and the further polarization of the US public at home.
 
The recommendation of the study group to avoid this scenario was twofold – an external approach and an internal approach: that the US should launch enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the Middle East; and that the primary mission of the US forces in Iraq should be the transfer of security responsibilities to local authorities so that the US can eventually draw down the presence of its own forces.

Petraeus argued before Congress that US forces are beginning to make gains in Iraq, but even he conceded that recent US successes are ‘fragile and reversible’. Efforts to develop a regional consensus on Iraq’s future in the Middle East, as recommended by the Iraq Study Group, are severely hampered by suspected Iranian support of Iraqi insurgents, a factor highlighted by Petraeus. Consequently Petraeus recommended that though the withdrawal of the 20,000 extra troops could be envisaged it would be unwise to set a date or schedule (as some in Congress are arguing for, including Presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton) for further reduction in US troop numbers.

Transferral of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces is proving to be a long and arduous process, and the next US president will face the hard choice between maintaining the US presence in Iraq (in the face of significant popular and Congressional opposition, not to mention the continuing risk to US troops on the ground) or drawing down US forces (at the risk of exacerbating an already volatile security situation in Iraq). With the ‘fragile’ situation in Iraq likely to continue for the foreseeable future, these challenges will effectively be left to the incoming US president, whoever that ultimately is.

Think Points:

  • What are the primary challenges faced by the US in Iraq?

  • Is current US strategy in Iraq succeeding? Are there alternative strategies available to it?

  • Is Iraq in the midst of a civil war?

  • Is Iraq a ‘new Vietnam’ for the US?

  • Is withdrawal of US troops from Iraq an option?

  • Is the forthcoming change in leadership in the US likely to bring significant alteration in its Iraq strategy?