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McFarlane, Hopkins & Nield: Land Law Text, Cases & Materials

Chapter 10

An interesting illustration of adverse possession in an unusual context arose in Port of London Authority v Ashmore [2009] EWHC 954 (Ch).  The judgment is a preliminary ruling on the question whether the owner of a vessel moored on a tidal river can obtain title to the river bed by adverse possession where the vessel rests on the bed at low tide.  The Port of London Authority holds title to the bed of the River Thames, except where ownership is established by other parties.  The Authority applied to register its title and this prompted a claim by Mr Ashmore that he had acquired title to part of the river bed where he had moored his house boat since 1983 (a period well in excess of the 12 years required to obtain title by adverse possession in unregistered land, as explained in part 5.1).  The claim concerned the “footprint” of Mr Ashmore’s houseboat; an area of the river bed on which the boat rested twice a day at low tide.  The Authority argued that Mr Ashmore could not demonstrate sufficient factual possession or an intention to possess.

  • Factual possession.  This requirement is discussed in part 4.2.1.  The principal argument directed against the claim was that the resting of the vessel on the river bed twice a day did not constitute exclusive possession.  This argument was rejected.  Referring to the test proposed by Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452 and endorsed by the House of Lords in Pye v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419, the judge noted that factual possession is dependent on “the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed”.  It was not necessary to show physical presence every minute of the day.  There was little more that Mr Ashmore could sensibly have done in his use of the land.

  • Intention to possess.  This requirement is discussed in part 4.2.2.  The judge was satisfied that sufficient intent was demonstrated; alternative suggestions of how Mr Ashmore’s presence could be construed by the paper owner (for example, as exercising a public right of navigation or a licence) were rejected.

One notable point is that the area of the river bed on which Mr Ashmore’s vessel came to rest was not static.  It would vary to a relatively small extent according to the prevailing wind and tide.  The court was satisfied that the claim should extend to the extreme points where contact with the sea bed had been made over the years.

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