As it is an introductory chapter, Chapter 1 necessarily raises a number of points for discussion, of which the following two are simply examples. The first burrows down further within land law; the second raises the discussion to a more general level.

What’s Special About Different Types of Land?
In Chapter 1, we examine why land law is studied as a special subject. The main focus is on how land differs from other forms of property. However, we could also ask whether all types of land should be studied together: for example, should we expect the legal rules governing one company’s lease of another company’s business premises to be the same as those applying to an individual’s lease of a flat owned by a local authority? This raises the question of whether land law has to be fragmented into different types of land law. We will return to this question at various points in the book. For example, in Part C, we focus on The Shared Home. An important issue discussed in those Chapters is whether the legal rules governing co-ownership of land should change according to the particular context of the co-ownership: should a shared home be treated differently from shared business premises? This issue is explored in more detail in academic work such as Fox, “Conceptualising Home: Theories, Law and Policies” (2007), esp Chapter 1; and Hopkins “Regulating Trusts of the Home: Private Law and Social Policy” (2009) 125 LQR 310. We will also see in Chapter 24 that Parliament’s regulation of leases differs markedly according to the particular context in which the lease arises: for example, commercial leases are indeed treated differently from residential leases granted by a local authority. For further examination of the importance of context in the law relating to leases see Bright, “Landlord and Tenant Law in Context” (2007), esp Chapter 1.

How Should Judges Decide Cases?
In Section 5 of Chapter 1, we make use of Harris’s analysis of the “doctrine” and “utility” models to analyse the decisions of the House of Lords in NPB v Ainsworth and Williams & Glyn’s Bank v Boland. Those models were derived from Weber’s more general analysis of forms of legal reasoning. Indeed, the central issue discussed in Section 5 of Chapter 1 is simply an application, to a particular context, of a more general question: how should judges decide cases? In particular, how free should judges be to take into account the practical consequences of their decisions? This question has of course been extensively debated by legal philosophers. Although it involves a great simplification of the complex answers given, we could contrast two opposing views. On one first, there will inevitably be cases where the existing law runs out (see e.g. Hart, “The Concept of Law” (2nd edn, 1994)¸Chapter 7) and at such points it may be reasonable for judges to take into account the practical effects of their decisions. On another view, the existing law, if correctly interpreted, will always provide an answer and judges may risk usurping the role of the legislature if they begin to make decisions based on what they see as the best practical result (see e.g. Dworkin, “Law’s Empire” (1986); MacCormick, “Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (rev edn, 1994), Chapter VI). Of course, we cannot expect to solve a question as important and general as “How Should Judges Decide Cases?”; but it is important to realise that land law necessarily involves law, and so raises many of the pressing questions that apply across the law and with which legal theory grapples.