Chen-Wishart: Contract Law 2e 
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Diagrams from the textbookChen-Wishart: Contract Law 2e
Chapter 11
1. 'Rule one is that the task of the judge when interpreting a written contract is to find the intention of the parties.' Discuss the principles which guide the judge in performing this task.
See 11.1.
This question invites you to state and assess the rules on the interpretation of written contracts.
You should set out the principles discussed in Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society as well as other rules (e.g. on the interpretation of exemption clauses).
To what extent do they seek to discover and give effect to the parties' intentions? Is it always possible to do that?
To what extent do the principles of interpretation express other policies?
To what extent are the latter justifiable?
Is the current law satisfactory? Do you have any suggestions for reform?
2. What evidence is, and what evidence should be, admissible when courts interpret contractual documents?
See 11.1.2 and 11.1.3.
This question invites you to discuss the evidence that should be taken into account by the courts in interpreting contractual documents.
What are the aims of contract interpretation? You must refer to Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society (e.g. the 'meaning of persons' and not merely of 'words').
What evidence is definitely 'in'? Assess these in the view of the aims of interpretation.
What evidence is controversial (e.g. absolutely anything relevant to reasonable person's interpretation)? Assess these in the view of the aims of interpretation.
What evidence is definitely 'out' (e.g. parole evidence rule, previous negotiations)? What is the propriety of exclusionary rules? Assess these in the view of the aims of interpretation.
3. 'They still had before them the idol, "freedom of contract". They still knelt down and worshipped it, but they concealed under their cloaks a secret weapon. They used it to stab the idol in the back. The weapon was called "the true construction of the contract". They used it with great skill and ingenuity.' To what extent is this an accurate description of the judicial approach in interpreting exemption clauses?
See 11.2.1, 11.2.3 – 11.2 6.
This question invites you to discuss the techniques employed in interpreting exemption clauses (e.g. contra proferentem).
What is the justification for these techniques?
Is there a consistency between what courts say and what they do? Is there consistency in the cases?
Look at the quote more closely; why might the courts want to stab the 'idol'? What policies are in play? What policies contradict that of freedom of contract?
What other techniques (than interpretation) can give effect to these policies (e.g. statute)?
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