Rose: Consciousness 
Updates
FiguresRose: Consciousness
Chapter 02
Section 2.2.2.2 Panpsychism
Skrbina (2005) has now produced a book-length historical account of the theory, while a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies (Freeman, 2006) presents and discusses a modern philosophical argument for the position. Here, Galen Strawson outlines all the relevant theses about the mind-body problem (it turns out they number ≈42!), and defends the idea that panpsychism is entailed by physicalism. Needless to say, the 17 commentaries on his argument make for entertaining reading (as does Strawson’s 97 page reply1!)
Section 2.4.3.6 Reductionism is obsolete or inappropriate
A collection of essays by Darden (2006) collates her work on how scientific fields co-evolve, arguing that progress consists of forming bridging hypotheses that link fields together without reducing one to another.
Sections 2.4.5.2 and 2.5.2.2 Zombies
A detailed explanation of why the theory of zombies is incoherent (and they are therefore ‘inconceivable’) has been published by Kirk (2005). Putting it very briefly: he argues that if zombies are conceivable then so too are epiphenomenal qualia. (Such qualia are defined to be such that it is our particular relationship to them that makes us conscious; cf. section 2.1.2.) But the latter are not conceivable, so therefore neither are the former. Note that his argument depends upon the assumption that we are not zombies: that there are ‘properties which we have and zombies supposedly lack’ (p. 37), that we can ‘notice, attend to, think about, and compare’ (pp. 40, 42) them, and their effects on behaviour are not an illusion. This premise is inconsistent with the rest of the theory.
Instead, Kirk’s positive theory of phenomenal consciousness is a variety of functionalism (Consciousness, section 2.5), one in which the particular internal processes play a crucial role. There must be a ‘basic package’ of functional mechanisms which enable the organism to make decisions (these include processors for the acquisition and retention of information, initiation and control of behaviour, interpretation, assessment of situations, making choices between alternative actions, and holding goals). For sensory experience to occur, it must simultaneously be the case that incoming inputs have ‘direct activity’ in controlling behaviour. Neither language nor a self-model is necessary for this level of ‘raw feeling’.2
I haven’t been able to do full justice to all the details in Kirk’s book here, but note he also includes many useful critiques of alternative models of consciousness (for example, in his final chapter).
Section 2.5 Computational functionalism
Thagard (2005) has produced a second edition of his very readable introductory text in support of the computational functionalist approach. Several types of represention and processing are described and defended, and recent research is summarised that shows which brain areas are engaged in these various types of thinking. The chapter on consciousness introduces some of the theorists that I cover in later chapters of my book, and further supports the representationalist/computationalist thesis. In addition, the importance of emotions and hormones is stressed, and such topics as system dynamics, the environment and social cognition are introduced. A multi-level (biological-cognitive-social) integrative picture is supported, which is also consonant with that depicted in Consciousness Chapter 4. More arguments and examples can be found in Thagard (2006).
Another new introduction to the computational/representational theory has recently appeared (Kolak et al., 2006) and readers might find this helpful too.
Recommended reading
An excellent introduction to the traditional philosophical studies of the mind/body problem is given by Searle (2004). The major positions, themes and arguments are summarised with great clarity. However, towards the end Searle does drift into using his own terminology (‘aspectual shape’, ‘features’, ‘conscious field’) and you will need to consult his earlier works to (at least try to) understand his own view fully.
References
Darden, L. (2006) Reasoning in Biological Discoveries: Essays on mechanisms, interfield relations and anomaly resolution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Freeman, A. (2006) ed. Does physicalism entail panpsychism? Special issue on realistic monism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11), 1-285.
Kirk, R. (2005) Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kolak, D., Hirstein, W., Mandik, P. and Waskan, J. (2006) Cognitive Science. Routledge, London.
Searle, J.R. (2004) Mind: a brief introduction. Oxford University Press, New York.
Skrbina, D. (2005) Panpsychism in the West. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Thagard, P. (2005) Mind: introduction to cognitive science. 2nd edn. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Thagard, P. (2006) Hot Thought. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Footnotes
1. My favourite is: ‘There are those who look down on footnotes, but I think they are one of the great pleasures of life.’ (p. 185).
2. See also the web update to Chapter 11, which places this type of consciousness within the context of others, and the update to section 11.5 for some similarities.
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