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CONCLUSION: FIN DE SIÈCLE BLUES: A HISTORY OF THE FUTURE

Policing is undergoing momentous change throughout the world, as the previous chapters have already indicated. A fundamental break with the past appears to be occurring globally. 'Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of policing ended and another took its place' (Bayley and Shearing 1996: 585). The dominance of the Peelian model of state police, established slowly and painfully in the nineteenth century, is being challenged by a growing diversification of policing provision (Braithwaite 2000). The police are increasingly cooperating and competing with a variety of other policing agencies and processes, within and between states (Sheptycki, 2000). Their functions are also becoming more diverse and complex. The police are increasingly acting as 'knowledge workers', brokering information to public and private organizations concerned with regulating sundry kinds of risk (Ericson and Haggerty 1997). This partially displaces the traditional function of order maintenance and law enforcement. At the same time the police face increasing demands for adequate accountability for the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the delivery of their traditional functions (Leishman, Loveday, and Savage 1996; McLaughlin and Murji 1996, 1997; B. Dixon and Smith 1998; W. Dixon 1999; Loveday 1999; G. Smith 2000). In particular they face continuing challenges about race and gender discrimination (Heidensohn, 1992, 1997; Walklate, 1996; J. Brown, Hazenberg, and Ormiston 1999; Macpherson 1999; Bowling 1999a).

NEW MILLENNIUM, NEW ORDER?

The transformation of policing itself reflects and reinforces wider shifts in social order, political economy, and culture. During the last quarter of the twentieth century profound social changes occurred, suggesting a fundamental break in the trajectory of world development analogous in its scope to the rise of industrial capitalism some two centuries earlier. Whether or not this constitutes a new kind of social order with

its own novel dynamic has been debated extensively (Callinicos 1989; Giddens 1994; Bauman 1997, 1998; Castells 1996–8; P. Hirst and Thompson 1999; Sparks 1997; Panitch and Leys 1999; Held *et al.* 1999; Giddens and Hutton 2000). The proliferation of labels for the new conjuncture indicates the problems in characterizing the society that is emerging: postmodernity, late modernity, post-Fordism, turbo-capitalism, risk society, globalization, information age, and so on. All connote undeniable aspects of current developments, but with different conceptions of their drivers, directions, and desirability. What is clear, however, is that several interrelated changes—technological, cultural, social, political/economic—coalesced during the 1970s to forge what is arguably a new political and social configuration, with profound implications for crime, order, and policing.

Many (mainly conservative) commentators have invoked the long historical process usually seen as the growth of ‘permissiveness’ to explain rising crime, disorder, and problems for policing. For example, at the May 2000 Police Federation annual conference, the Conservative Party leader, William Hague, spoke of a growing wave of lawlessness attributable to a supposedly dominant culture of liberalism. It is claimed that during the twentieth century there occurred a kind of democratization, a spread to the masses, of the values of Enlightenment liberalism such as individual autonomy, self-realization, and scepticism about claims of authority. The effect of this is said to have become precipitous since the 1960s, commonly seen as a critical watershed (Dennis 1998). The criminogenic consequence has been an undermining of the informal social controls and internalized inhibitions that once held deviant impulses in check. While not sharing the conservative negative evaluation of these trends, many liberal and radical analysts would agree that there has been a long-term progress towards greater individual autonomy and ‘desubordination’ (Miliband 1978; Dahrendorf 1985). This view is commonly found also in popular discourse and media representations, although with varying evaluations of whether it is desirable or not (Reiner, Livingstone, and Allen 2000*a, b*).

The legal and policy changes that are often referred to as promoting ‘permissiveness’, however, represented a restructuring rather simple weakening of social control (Newburn 1992). Furthermore, some areas of deviance exhibit quite opposite trends to increasing liberalization. A clear example is drugs policy, which has toughened into a ‘war on drugs’ despite growing consumption of illegal drugs indicating wider popular acceptance (South 1997*b*). In any event, while liberalization offers the potential for crime to rise if pressures or temptations increase, by itself it is no more an explanation of rising crime than failing brakes are of a car’s forward motion. Changes in informal control and attitudes to authority make sense of increasing crime rates only in a context where other factors generate social strains and opportunities conducive to offending.

The inexorable rise in recorded crime that began in the late 1950s was kick-started by a number of consequences of the development of a mass consumerist ‘affluent society’. This had several implications for the growth of property crime, which constitutes the bulk of offending. Perhaps the most obvious effect was the creation and

proliferation of attractive and vulnerable criminal targets in the shape of new, widely available consumer goods. The car and its equipment, the most common 'victim' of an offence, proliferated. Mass-produced consumer durables were not only tempting to steal but relatively anonymous and untraceable and hence easier to dispose of without fear of identification. The proliferation of such consumer goods also heightened a sense of relative deprivation among those who were excluded from the new more materialistic and acquisitive culture.

The increases in recorded crime levels were accelerated further after the mid-1970s by the consequences of the fundamental shift in the political economy represented by the return of free-market economics, and the deregulation of increasingly globalized markets. A clear consequence has been a rapid increase in inequality and extreme socio-economic polarization (Hutton 1995; Levitas 1998). The share of national income of the bottom half of the British population fell from one-third to one-quarter between 1979 and the early 1990s (Commission on Social Justice 1994: 29). The proportion of children under eighteen living in households with incomes below the official poverty line increased from 10 per cent to one-third in the same period. The gap between the lowest- and the highest-paid is greater than at any time since records began in 1886 (I. Taylor 1999: 15). This amounts to a reversal of the long process, of more than two centuries' duration, of gradually increasing incorporation of all sections of society into a common status of citizenship, albeit with considerable—but diminishing—inequalities (T. Marshall 1950; Bulmer and Rees 1996).

The consequences for crime and social cohesion are enormous. In many parts of the world 'lawlessness and crime have so destroyed the social fabric that the State itself has withdrawn' (S. Cohen 1997*b*: 234). While not threatened by such extremes of social meltdown, Britain and other industrial societies are experiencing profound shifts in the modalities of crime, order and policing.

As social exclusion, economic insecurity, and inequality grow, so the motives and opportunities for crime multiply, and the restraining effects of both formal and informal social controls are eroded. The consequences for crime and order of this social earthquake are profound and intertwined (E. Currie, 1998*a, b*; Davies 1998; Young 1999; I. Taylor 1999). Growing exclusion and immiseration—and the perceived hopelessness of its reversal by legitimate means—not only increases pressures to offend, but also undermines the informal social controls of family, education, work, and community, and encourages a neo-Social Darwinist culture of survival of the fittest. The delegitimation of public expenditure and collective provision by the ethos of the market weakens the state's capacity to provide either the 'soft' controls of welfare provision or effective public policing. Inequalities in access to security widen, as a burgeoning private market in policing develops (Shearing and Stenning 1983, 1987; South 1988, 1997*a*; Johnston 1992, 2000; Michael 1997, 1999; Button 1998*a, b*, 1999; T. Jones and Newburn 1998; Forst and Manning 1999).

During the 1980s, the heyday of free-market triumphalism, recorded crime rates rocketed. Although recorded crime rates fell during most of the 1990s, this was largely

a recording phenomenon. The British Crime Surveys show that victimization rates continued to rise until 1997. The fall in reporting and recording of crime was a paradoxical consequence of the high levels of offending. On the one hand, victims were deterred from reporting because of concern about their insurance policies. On the other hand, the police were under pressure to reduce the proportion of crimes they recorded because of the new 'businesslike' policing-by-numbers regime introduced to enhance their crime-fighting efficiency.

The architect of the 1993–4 reform package intended to achieve 'businesslike' policing in Britain, Conservative Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke, claimed that they amounted to the most profound reorganization since Sir Robert Peel's original establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829. Granted some political licence for this hyperbole, there can be no doubt that the police have experienced themselves as in deep crisis in recent years. They are facing great upheavals, only partly as a result of government pressure. I shall attempt to analyse their predicament, and hazard a glance at the future. Although I shall concentrate on the British police, the underlying pressures to which they are subject are clearly global phenomena, found in other jurisdictions too.

POLICING IN PERMANENT CRISIS

One interpretation of the particularity of the crisis in British policing is indeed that the police are undergoing a normalization process. Whereas in certain respects they used to be very different from other police forces, either in Europe or in the rest of the common law world (Bayley 1985; R. I. Mawby 1991, 1999; Brodeur, 1995, 1998; Marenin, 1996), there is now something of a convergence in organization and style, indicated by, for example, the almost universal fashionability of community- and problem-oriented policing at least at the level of lip-service. Facing similar domestic crime problems, and indeed confronting a common problem of growing international crime, police forces are adapting in similar ways, and this is facilitated by a direct diffusion of ideas and innovations through conferences, exchanges, and increasing collaboration (M. Anderson 1989; Dorn, Murji and South 1991; McLaughlin 1992; M. Anderson and den Boer 1992; N. Walker 1993; Sheptycki 1995, 1997, 1998*a*, *b*, 2000*a*; Hebenton and Thomas 1995; Anderson *et al.* 1995; Tupman and Tupman 1999; den Boer, 1999).

The modern British police were established during the first half of the nineteenth century against widespread opposition across the social and political spectrum, as shown in the first two chapters of this book. In order to overcome this, the architects of the British police tradition (Peel and the first two Metropolitan commissioners, Rowan and Mayne), strove to construct a distinctive organizational style and image for the police. They emphasized the idea of the police as an essentially civilian body,

minimally armed, relying primarily on the same legal powers to deal with crime as all citizens shared, strictly subject to the rule of law, insulated from governmental control, and drawn from a representative range of working-class backgrounds to facilitate popular identification. This conception was succinctly summarized by an official inquiry conducted by the police staff associations: 'traditional British policing is relatively low in numbers, low on power, and high on accountability; . . . it is undertaken with public consent.' (*Operational Policing Review* 1990: 4).

This image of British policing did not develop because of some peculiar affinity of British culture with civic values, as conservative historians suggest. In colonial situations (including Ireland) British policing developed on an overtly militaristic model (M. Brogden 1987). The pacific image of the British bobby was a myth deliberately constructed in order to defuse the virulent opposition to the very idea of police in early nineteenth-century Britain. Police legitimation owed at least as much to the more general long-term social process of greater social integration and consensus over the century between the 1850s and the 1950s as to any actions of the police themselves.

The sources of the English police image of impersonal and nonpartisan legal authority, reliance on minimal force, and cultivation of a service role—now encapsulated in the shibboleth of 'policing by consent'—lie not in social consensus but in conflict. During the first century and a quarter of the 'new police' there occurred a successful process of legitimation and depoliticization. It was the product of the police tactical tradition instituted in the early nineteenth century, together with a wider process of pacification and incorporation of the working class into the political and social order of growing liberaldemocratic capitalism.

During the 1970s a process of renewed politicization was manifested in growing debate about police malpractice, and an apparent change of overall tactics to a more coercive, 'fire brigade' style. This was commonly interpreted, especially on the Left, as a calculated shift in strategy. Anxiety about changing police practices prompted developing civil libertarian concern about limiting police powers and rendering the police more accountable. On the other hand, throughout the 1970s the police lobbied with increasing vociferousness for more powers to deal with 'the fight against crime', and to resist 'political' control.

If the reasoning behind the post-1964 trends in police tactics is examined, however, it becomes less plausible to see them as a coherent and deliberate strategy. Many changes, notably the development of 'fire brigade' policing out of the Unit Beat reorganization, were the unintended consequence of reforms aimed at achieving quite different results. Others, such as the use of more coercive tactics in crowd control and crime-fighting, were largely reactive, ad hoc, and unimaginative responses to pressing problems.

Both police and popular culture embody views of policing and its purposes that are at odds with the reality of police work. They exaggerate the extent to which policing is concerned with serious criminal offences, and overestimate the capacity of the police to deal with criminality by detection and deterrence. In practice most demands for

police interventions are calls for the resolution of a diffuse range of minor conflicts, disorders and disputes—a ‘peace-keeping’ function. The police’s legal powers (especially the capacity to use legitimate force) are the reasons for calling the police in an emergency, rather than, say, a priest, psychiatrist, or marriage guidance counsellor. There is scope for discussion about whether ‘peace-keeping’ interventions are adequately and fairly handled, especially in the case of violent domestic disputes. Concentration on the police’s crime fighting image has distracted attention from exploration of how the craft of ‘peace-keeping’ can be cultivated by training and supervision. On the crime side of police work, research shows the central role of the public (as victims and witnesses) in uncovering and clearing up offences. Only in a relatively small number of atypical (although prominent) major cases does detective work have any resemblance to popular images.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, debate about police powers and accountability unfortunately became polarized between a ‘law and order’ and a civil libertarian lobby, both of which ignored the weaknesses of the ‘rational deterrent’ model (more sanctions = less offending) as a means of policing either crime or the police. The relationship between formal police powers and the extent of either ordinary crime or police malpractice is tenuous and uncertain.

The politicization of policing in the 1970s and 1980s stimulated a series of reform strategies. As new scandals arose they in turn prompted further soul-searching among police leaders and new policy initiatives. A repetitive dialectic seems to play itself out cyclically, with a thesis of tough ‘law and order’ prompting its antithesis in a renewed stress on the need for public consent. The culmination is usually a synthesis based on varying tactics chosen from the coercion–consent spectrum according to intelligence about the requirements of particular situations (the 1981 Scarman Report and the ACPO Tactical Options Manual are examples).

CYCLES OF REFORM

SCARMANIA TO NEWMANIA

The 1981 Scarman Report on the Brixton disorders became the focal point for a multifaceted reorientation of police thinking, which dominated police reform debates throughout the 1980s. The message of Scarman was far from entirely new. Indeed, he explicitly drew on Sir Richard Mayne’s 1829 instructions to the New Metropolitan Police in his discussion of the ‘two principles of policing’ (paras. 4.55–4.60). Scarman adopted Mayne’s definition of the functions of the police being ‘the prevention of crime . . . the protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity’. The nub of Scarman’s approach was that he emphasized the priority of maintaining public tranquillity over law enforcement. Law enforcement must sometimes be sacrificed in the interest of public tranquillity. Skilful and judicious

discretion—‘the art of suiting action to particular circumstances’—may be the better part of valour.

Guided by these principles, Lord Scarman made several criticisms of the police as both background to and immediate precipitants of the Brixton disorders. Overall, he judged, ‘the history of relations between the police and the people of Brixton during recent years has been a tale of failure’ (para. 4.43). While not condoning the disorders or all police practices, Lord Scarman outlined how the deprivations, frustrations, and racial tensions of innercity life ensure that the ‘recipe for a clash with the police is therefore ready-mixed’ (para. 2.37). This had been aggravated by ‘unimaginative and inflexible’ police tactics, such as stop-and-search sweeps which antagonized the many innocent people who fell victim to them. These operations culminated in the notorious ‘Swamp ‘81’ which was the immediate trigger for the riots, a classic illustration of law enforcement at the expense of the maintenance of public tranquillity.

Lord Scarman made numerous recommendations for improving policing so as to prevent reoccurrences of the disorders. They incorporated many of the features that had contributed to improving relations between American police and black people after the 1960s ghetto riots in Watts (Los Angeles), Detroit, and elsewhere (Sherman 1983). There were several suggestions aimed at improving the calibre of individual officers, and making them less prejudiced (paras. 5.6–5.32). There were also recommendations for organizational reform: tightening discipline in relation to racially prejudiced or discriminatory behaviour (paras. 5.41–5.42), increasing consultation (paras. 5.55–5.71), increasing accountability through lay station visitors (paras. 7.7–7.10), more independent investigation of serious complaints (paras. 7.11–7.29), and narrowing the scope of highly discretionary powers (paras. 7.2–7.6).

The Scarman Report attracted anger from the Left for his denial that racism was ‘institutionalised within police practice or in British society as a whole’, a striking contrast with the central conclusion of the 1999 Macpherson Report on the Stephen Lawrence case. Scarman explicitly defined ‘institutional racism’ as discrimination which occurs ‘knowingly, as a matter of policy’ (para. 2.22). Critics argued that there was plentiful evidence of the discriminatory impact of official policies (of the police and other institutions), albeit often unwitting. While this may be a widely accepted usage (I used it myself in Chapter 4), it was not Lord Scarman’s definition. There was indeed no evidence of institutional police racism in Scarman’s specified sense of deliberately adopted policy. In the broader meaning of institutional racism as the unintended consequence of organizational policies, Scarman’s analysis of the disastrous impact of such strategies as stop and search was eloquent testimony to his awareness of the problem. But Scarman was concerned that there might be a closing of ranks against change if he attacked the ‘integrity and impartiality of the senior direction of the force’ (para. 4.62). His proposals were intended to deal with both widespread rank-and-file racial prejudice *and* the unwitting discriminatory impact of policies like stop and search.

Scarman was the trigger for a reorientation of police thinking on a wide front. Indeed, by the late 1980s his ideas had become the predominant conception of

policing philosophy among chief constables (Reiner 1991: Chap. 6). Scarman's principles first had practical impact through their influence on Sir Kenneth Newman's strategy for policing London, which he developed after becoming Metropolitan commissioner in October 1982. This was the prototype of similar programmes around the country over the following decade.

Newman's strategy was intended to be a fundamental reorientation of policy and organization, aimed at achieving the same success in legitimation as Rowan and Mayne's original formulation, but in the face of new problems. This momentous historical role was explicitly avowed. Newman himself described the changes as 'the most sweeping in the Met.'s more-than-150 years history'—a claim repeated a decade later by Kenneth Clarke when he launched a diametrically opposite package of police reforms!

Newman placed great emphasis on the idea of a 'notional social contract', based on the traditional notion of preventive policing. The vehicles for this were primarily the stimulation of greater public involvement, and the 'multi-agency' approach to social control. Among the key devices for public involvement were Scarman-style consultative committees (with lay station visitors reporting back to them), 'neighbourhood watch' ventures, crime prevention panels, victim support schemes, greater use of the Special Constabulary (and attempts to recruit more blacks into it). The 'multi-agency' approach involved police collaboration with other agencies, 'social, economic, cultural and educational', to develop solutions that 'address the root causes rather than the symptoms of crime' (*Commissioner's Report* 1983: 8). Newman's 'notional contract' also aimed at changes in police organization and culture. The key targets were more professional 'management by objectives', and the co-option of all ranks and sections into the overall strategy. Consideration was also given to the problem that has bedevilled all police managerial innovations: how to incorporate the rank and file. A new 'code of ethics' was formulated, and attempts were made to spread the ideas through the force. A 'corporate management' style of involving the rank and file in the formulation of objectives and the targeting of areas for priority attention was aimed at.

The strategy was undermined by the increasing social polarization due to the social and economic policies of the Thatcher government. The worst enemies of the police bid for legitimation were not their overt critics but their apparent benefactor—a 'law and order' government that was unconcerned about destroying the social preconditions of consensus policing and the virtues of the British police tradition. The Thatcher government's social and economic policies generated rapidly increasing inequality, long-term unemployment and political polarization. The vaunted return to 'Victorian values' was above all a return to the spectre of the 'two nations' invoked by Disraeli, and of levels of crime, violence, and disorder unprecedented since the nineteenth century. The policies that achieved police legitimation in the days of Queen Victoria had succeeded only because of the wider processes incorporating the working class into the social and political order. The last two decades of the twentieth century witnessed an accelerating de-incorporation of more and more layers of

society. The young 'never-employed', especially concentrated among ethnic minorities, are swelling the ranks of the 'police property' groups who have always been the hard core of opposition to policing. The implications of deepening social divisions for policing problems were widely recognized by chief constables and the rank-and-file police themselves (Reiner 1991; Chap. 9; Rose 1996; Chap. 6).

The late 1980s and early 1990s were vintage years for police scandals, starting with the release of the Guildford Four by the court of appeal in 1989. This was closely followed by a succession of similar scandals—the cases of the Birmingham Six, the Maguires, Judith Ward, Winston Silcott and the other men convicted for the murder of PC Blakelock during the 1986 Broadwater Farm riots, the troubles of the West Midlands Serious Crimes Squad, and numerous other revelations and allegations of malpractice.

The scandals were reflected in a precipitous decline in the police's poll ratings after 1989. The contrast was sharpest with the postwar period, often regarded as a 'Golden Age' for the police. A Mori poll for *Newsnight* in 1989 found that only 43 per cent today had 'a great deal of respect' for the police, compared with 83 per cent of a national sample asked the same question in 1959 for the Royal Commission on the Police. Fourteen per cent had 'little respect', compared to only 1 per cent in 1959. Before this recent fall in generalized approval ratings, surveys had for several years provided particular pointers to an erosion of support for the police (Hough 1989). Those who tend to be at the receiving end of police powers—the young, male, and economically marginal in the inner cities—have been shown as generally critical of the police in survey after survey. Perhaps even more significantly, a harbinger of the early 1990s collapse of general support was growing opinion-poll evidence of an increasing perception of specific police abuses (such as corruption, excessive force, or racial discrimination) even among the 'respectable' majority of the population.

The other source of the decline in public confidence was the police's apparent failure to deliver effectively the protection that their own propaganda had promised. Recorded crime rates increased inexorably after the mid-1950s, and from the mid-1970s entered a phase justifiably described as 'hyper-crisis' (Kinsey, Lea, and Young 1986). Public confidence in the police was undermined by this combination of apparent police ineffectiveness and revelations of malpractice.

Newman's successors, Sir Peter Imbert and Sir Paul Condon, continued to pursue a strategy aimed at securing the re-legitimation of the police in the face of the many factors that had eroded it, as did police chiefs around the country. In essentials their strategies were similar to Newman's, and certainly incorporated the Scarman spirit.

This coincided with the advent of 'new realism' in the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock, and subsequently Tony Blair's 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime' slogan which aimed to recapture 'law and order' as a political issue. In the 1990s police leaders faced much less radical opposition, as the Labour position became only subtly distinct from that of the police elite (Sheerman 1991). The decline in public confidence in the police also bottomed-out in the 1990s, and appears to have

remained stable since the nadir of 1991 (Mirrlees-Black and Budd 1997; Yeo and Budd 2000).

CONSUMERISM

Instead of the old Labour concern to rein in police power through enhanced accountability, the central theme of New Labour strategy for policing was effective crime reduction. There were of course still differences from either Tory or police versions of crime prevention. Local authorities, not the police themselves, were to be the primary agency coordinating crime prevention strategy (Loveday 1996*b*, 1997). Social crime prevention received as much emphasis as situational, target-hardening measures. But the police received their due weight as essential partners in crime prevention initiatives, and beat policing was accorded paramount importance. More familiar radical concerns were reflected in concern about racism and sexism within the force. However, these were equally emphasized in the statements of Sir Paul Condon and other police leaders. Accountability was seen as a matter of restoring the tripartite system enshrined in the 1964 Police Act, redressing the centralizing tendencies of the Tory years. At the same time, the need for effective national agencies for new forms of organized and international crime was recognized. So was the necessity for national oversight of policing standards by a beefed-up HM Inspectorate of Constabulary.

The new language of managerialism was prominent in Labour thinking, as it was in Conservative and police pronouncements. However, the clearest theme of police reform talk in the early 1990s was the rhetoric of consumerism. Both Conservative government (Citizen's Charter) and Labour opposition (the Quality Commission) offered their rival versions. The police elite themselves rapidly latched on to this new language as a way of founding a new ethic of service to revive their flagging status, circumventing more political forms of accountability.

This was evident in the first major national response by the police to the perceived crisis of public confidence. In 1990 there appeared the *Operational Policing Review* the report of a wide-ranging study of policing problems launched by an unprecedented collaboration between the three staff associations, the Police Federation, the Superintendents' Association, and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). The police assessment of the implications of their own study was that the priorities of police and public were out of kilter. The public expressed a preference for a community-oriented, service style of policing rather than an enforcement-based approach. The ensuing 'Statement of Common Purpose and Values' enshrined a philosophy of policing in which the watchword was service. It was amplified by a 'Strategic Policy Document on Quality of Service' endorsed by the three staff associations. The public were regularly spoken of as the 'customers'—even if they were prisoners!—with the paramount concern being to satisfy their requirements through 'a service culture' (Woodcock 1991: 82; Waters 1996; Squires 1998).

The early 1990s service-based, consumerist rhetoric was infinitely preferable to the tough 'law and order' promises and practices of the previous two decades, which been

the initial police reaction to spiralling crime and disorder. Nevertheless, it could not restore the police to their former high in popular esteem, its avowed aim.

‘BUSINESSLIKE’ CRIMINAL-CATCHING

None of this self-engineered change proved sufficient to satisfy the government. As discussed in the Chapter 6, in 1993 the home secretary, Kenneth Clarke, launched a restructuring of police organization and accountability intended to make policing more ‘businesslike’ according to standards set by central government and its local appointees. This approach was embodied in the 1993 Report of the Sheehy Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and rewards, the 1993 White Paper on *Police Reform*, and the Home Office *Review of Police Core and Ancillary Tasks*. The last had been set up in 1993 to examine whether any police activities could be contracted-out, although in the end its 1995 report was able to suggest only escorting wide loads on highways as a possible candidate for privatization. The entire package was premised on an official definition of the police task as ‘catching criminals’ (specified in the White Paper), which reversed the notion of the priority of preserving public tranquillity as advocated by British police tradition from Peel to Scarman. The reforms were clearly directed at imposing the disciplines of the marketplace on policing, and the police felt under attack as never before.

All three staff associations strongly condemned the government’s plans. At the annual conference of the Police Federation in May 1993 the ritual roasting of the home secretary contrasted strikingly with the enthusiastic reception for Labour’s Tony Blair (*Police Review*, 28 May 1993: 12–13). The political alignments over policing appeared to have turned full circle from the days when law and order was seen as a clear Tory issue, and the police were the pets of the Thatcher government (Downes and Morgan 1997).

The political space for the Conservative government’s confrontation with the police was created by the erosion of public support discussed above. The police were widely perceived as guilty of systematic malpractice as well as falling down on the job, despite generous treatment in terms of pay and conditions compared to other public services throughout the 1980s. This perception was largely exaggerated: malpractice had certainly been prevalent in the past as well, though more readily covered up. Although police resources have increased they have been outstripped by the growing demands placed upon the police, in terms of rising crime rates, greater disorder, heavier traffic volumes, and more emergency calls of all kinds. Whether justified or not, however, there has clearly been a decline in public confidence in the police, even though it remains robust compared to that in many other public institutions.

The 1993 Conservative package failed to be implemented as intended, because it aroused a storm of opposition, not only from the police, local government associations, and civil liberties groups, but from many members of the House of Lords including several former Conservative Home Secretaries, who objected to the centralizing thrust of the proposals. This wide phalanx of opposition succeeded in forcing

several concessions and changes so that the eventual Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 is a much diluted version of the original vision. None the less, it does amount to a fundamental shift in police governance, towards a more 'businesslike' ethos under greater central government control.

NEW LABOUR AND POLICING

The new Labour government elected in 1997 substantially continued the policies on policing that it inherited from the Conservatives. The new governance structure embodied in the Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 remains intact, as does the quest for demonstrable value-for-money, quasi-market performance measurement and sanctions, and the prioritization of crime reduction objectives. However, there have been some important departures that would not have occurred under the Conservatives. These include the establishment of the Macpherson Inquiry into the mis-handled investigation of Stephen Lawrence's murder, the Human Rights Act 1998 (due to become operational in the autumn of 2000), and the commitment to reform of the complaints system (discussed in Chapter 6). Above all, Labour has launched a new approach to crime reduction overall, which, while not downplaying the role of the police, places it in a broader context of policing, in partnership with local government and other agencies.

THE MACPHERSON REPORT AND STEPHEN LAWRENCE

The publication in late February 1999 of the Macpherson Report on the murder of Stephen Lawrence stimulated a flood of agonizing and analysis in all sections of the media. After all the stories, plays, and interviews, there can be few people left who are not aware of the basic facts about the horrific, unprovoked murder on 22 April 1993 of the eighteen-year-old black student by a gang of young racists.

- (i) The perfunctory reaction of many police officers who attended the murder scene, initially suspicious of the dying Stephen and of his friend, Duwayne Brooks.
- (ii) The botched police investigation, and the abortive private prosecution of three of the prime suspects, which meant that whatever evidence came to light later they would be scot-free.
- (iii) The boxing of the leadership of the Metropolitan Police into an unprecedented corner in which they were compelled to issue abject apologies for their numerous sins of commission and omission in the case.
- (iv) The inspiring struggle of Stephen's parents to get at the truth of their son's death, culminating in their pyrrhic victory in the report, which concluded

that the multiple failings of the police investigation, and the police's insufficiently sensitive handling of relationships with the Lawrence family and Duwayne Brooks, owed much to 'institutional racism'.

The public in general seemed understandably shocked and appalled at the catalogue of brutality, violent racism, and police incompetence and callousness that the media coverage revealed.

Yet in the light of the bitter experience of discrimination and violence against black people in this country over the last half-century perhaps the most frightening thing is this. The Lawrence case is unique in the political and public anxiety it has aroused. Sadly, it is far from unique as an example of either violent racism or discriminatory policing. There were at least three racist murders within the previous two years in the borough where Stephen Lawrence was killed (Cathcart 1999). In his definitive book on the subject, Ben Bowling (1999*a*) shows that since the murder in 1959 of Kelso Cochrane there have been at least ninety murders of black or Asian people which appear to be racially motivated. Such murders are only the tiny tip of a huge mass of cases of racial violence, intimidation, and harassment directed at all ethnic minorities (Bowling 1999*a*). Yet this is only a part of a broader picture of 'hate crimes' directed at other vulnerable minorities. In London in April 1999, bombs exploded in Brixton and Brick Lane, areas with a high proportion of ethnic-minority residents, and in the Admiral Duncan pub in Soho, a gay meeting-place, resulting in three deaths and many injuries; in June 2000 a neo-Nazi sympathizer was convicted of all three bombings. Most such cases, including many of the murders, are never cleared up by the police. This is partly because they are disproportionately 'stranger' attacks, which are harder to investigate than the more common examples of violence in which people are assaulted or killed by their supposed nearest and dearest.

What set the Lawrence case apart was not the brutality of the event itself, which had all too many counterparts, nor the police incompetence and racism that the inquiry uncovered. It was unique above all because of the character of the Lawrences themselves. Stephen Lawrence himself was the ideal-typical pure victim, a person of impeccable character suffering an entirely unprovoked attack. Even given this, however, the clinching factor was the perceptiveness and dedication of Stephen's parents in campaigning relentlessly to achieve a measure of truth, if not justice, for their son.

The Macpherson Report, which established all this, has transformed the terms of political debate about black people and criminal justice, and is a comparable landmark to the Scarman Report. Until it, attention had focused on the disproportionate rate of stops, arrests, convictions, and imprisonment of black people. Whether this was interpreted as evidence of racial discrimination in criminal justice, or of disproportionate black criminality, the primary concern was about black people as suspects. What had not featured in public awareness and political debate was the disproportionate rate at which black people suffered as victims of crime. Both sides of this issue reflect the social and geographical exclusion of black people in a discriminatory society. As discussed in Chapter 4 above, the differential involvement of black

people with the criminal justice system was a recent historical development. Until the early 1970s official crime rates clearly showed that black people were relatively infrequently arrested. The growth of officially recorded higher black crime rates coincided with the disproportionate impact on young black men of the increasing economic and social divisions that developed after the early 1970s. This fed the vicious circle of police–black mistrust that was manifested once more in the Lawrence case.

It has become usual to compare the 1999 Macpherson Report favourably with the 1981 Scarman Report, because it grasped the nettle of institutional racism that Scarman had denied. Macpherson is undoubtedly more hard-hitting as a critique of police failure. It succeeded in gaining official acceptance of the existence of institutionalized racism, defined as the ‘collective failure of an institution to provide an appropriate or professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin’. Paradoxically, however, it was Scarman, for all his misplaced emphasis on individual police racism, who had the keener grasp of how police discrimination is intimately bound up with wider structures of racial and social inequality and disadvantage.

With the 20:20 vision of twenty years’ more experience of police discrimination in relation to race, it has become clear that the Scarman Report failed to achieve any significant transformation. This was not because of its own failings, however, but because of the lack of political commitment to achieve the transformation of black people’s social and economic circumstances, as well as the reforms of police organization and policy that it called for. What must be hoped is that the widespread anger and sorrow produced by the Lawrence tragedy may ultimately be the stimulus for some real breakthrough in the vexed relationship between black people and the police and criminal justice system.

CRIME REDUCTION AND PARTNERSHIP POLICING

The main thrust of New Labour’s criminal justice policy, embodied in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Crime Reduction Programme, has been a departure from traditional Conservative or Labour policies. As many critics have pointed out, the Act contains provisions (notably the Anti-Social Behaviour Orders) which are potentially oppressive for human rights and counter-productive (Ashworth *et al.* 1998). Its main strategy, none the less, is novel and cannot be dismissed as either simply punitive or liberal. It is based on an intelligence-led, problem-solving approach, with systematic analysis and reflexive monitoring built into policy development. Its intellectual basis is a thorough review of the evidence concerning the effectiveness, costs, and benefits of the main strategies for dealing with offending: preventing the development of criminality by early childhood intervention and education, situational and community crime prevention, policing, sentencing, and alternative penal techniques (Nuttall, Goldblatt, and Lewis 1998).

The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (s.6) requires local authorities and the police in partnership to audit local crime and disorder problems, identify their sources, and

develop appropriate strategies for reducing them, with regular research evaluations of effectiveness. This is part of the 'evidence-led' Crime Reduction Programme, based on 'joined-up thinking', the realization that crime must be dealt with by wider-ranging policies than criminal justice alone (Nuttall, Goldblatt, and Lewis 1998). In principle this is tough on the causes of crime, not just (as the Tories were) tough on the few lottery losers of the criminal justice system who are convicted. The broad approach to policing, stressing problem-solving in conjunction with other agencies, including local government, acknowledges the research demonstrating the limits of the police's capacity to tackle crime alone. This echoes the analysis of Scarman and those police chiefs who were influenced by him, such as Newman and Imbert, which had been displaced by the emphasis solely on 'catching criminals' emanating from the Clarke-Howard reform package of 1993.

The problem with the Crime Reduction Programme, however, lies in its place within the overall strategy of New Labour, many other aspects of which threaten its possible success. Most obviously, the commitment to keep within Conservative spending plans undermines the capacity of the police, probation, education, and other social services to perform as intended, while exacerbating the pressures leading young people into crime, such as school exclusions and truancy (Downes 1998: 196-7). More generally the criminogenic consequences of failure to bring unemployment down by the New Deal and through macro-economic policy would vastly outweigh any crime-reducing effects of the Home Office programme. New Labour's commitment to old Tory economic policy is its new hostage to fortune in crime control policy. On the other hand, the intelligence-led approach to policing and crime reduction seems to be proving vulnerable to populist attacks from the Conservatives, led by William Hague and Ann Widdecombe. In May 2000 they launched an attack on Labour as 'soft' on crime, which appears to have influenced public opinion to turn towards them.

THE LIMITS OF POLICE REFORM

What remains missing from all these reform strategies is a fundamental sociological analysis of the role of the police, and of the sources of their present plight. Common to all the solutions considered is an unquestioned assumption that falling public confidence has been caused by a decline in police standards, manifested in which is both less effective and more prone to abuses of power.

Certainly there have been many scandals revealing serious police malpractice. But do these indicate that the standard of integrity of the British police force has fallen? The extent of police abuse at any time is unascertainable, and for obvious reasons there is likely to be a substantial dark figure of hidden police deviance. What we do know is that in the 'Golden Age' of the mid-twentieth century, when the police were

symbols of national pride, there was extensive and routinized wrongdoing behind the scenes. This is clear from police memoirs (for example, the very revealing vignettes of life in the Manchester police in the 1930s and 1940s found in Mark 1978) and from oral histories of policing (such as M. Brogden 1991 and Weinberger 1995). It is also evident in the serious miscarriages of justice in that period that are now established beyond reasonable doubt (such as the cases of Timothy Evans and Derek Bentley; see Woffinden 1989).

What prevented these abuses from being revealed at the time was the much more deferential culture of the social strata at the receiving end of policing, and of the media and the educated middle class. Complaints were less likely to be made (rather than sullenly put up with as yet another unpleasant fact of life), and they were far less likely to be given credence by opinion-formers if they were expressed. It is plausible that what appears to be a growing amount of police malpractice is largely just a greater likelihood of it coming to light, due to a much more deep-seated cultural change: the progressive erosion of deference in the postwar period that has been described as a process of 'desubordination' (Miliband 1978).

Even if some of the increase in police scandals really is a reflection of more abuses of power by the police, it is too simplistic to see it as due to a unilateral decline of standards of legalism in the police. Police tactics have always constituted an array of more or less coercive methods, graduated according to the perceived scale of trouble they have to deal with (which the controversial ACPO Tactical Options Manual makes explicit but did not conjure up *ab initio*). As crime and disorder have grown, so the police have moved up the scale of coerciveness in their strategy.

The increase in crime and disorder problems confronting the police in recent years has profound social causes. Among them are growing social and economic divisions and deprivation, which have swelled the numbers of those who in Victorian times would have been called the 'dangerous classes' and today are referred to as the 'underclass' (Crowther 2000*a, b*). They have always constituted the prime business of the police, and have been aptly labelled 'police property'. As their 'property' and problems have increased, so the police have moved higher up the scale of coerciveness in their menu of tactics. This is liable to generate more malpractice, which in turn it is liable to reinforce tendencies to cynicism and authoritarianism in police culture. But these are symptoms of the problem, not its prime mover. Consequently, solutions aimed primarily at changing the police will miss the mark.

At the heart of the well-intentioned solutions considered above there is a systematic failure to confront the question of what policing really is. The consumerist approach, in particular, implies that the police can and should be whatever market surveys reveal consumer preferences to be. But what is the 'service' that the police have historically been organized to deliver? What is the 'service' that clients effectively demand when they call for the police? Research suggests that it is handling disorder or crime, inherently contentious situations, even though the police typically seek to resolve conflicts without recourse to their legal powers of coercion. The police are the specialist repository domestically of the state's monopoly of legitimate force, and the 'service' they are

predominantly called upon to provide is 'the capacity for decisive action' (Bittner 1974: 35). As the title of one episode of the TV series *The Bill* put it succinctly: 'Force is Part of the Service'.

The police are thus inherently a 'dirty work' occupation, in Everett Hughes's term (E. Hughes 1961). It is only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as the consensus climate of postwar Britain, that the police can be regarded widely as anything other than a regrettable necessity. This has always been the status of the police in even the most pacific and law-abiding countries. For the most part, the fashionable languages of managerialism, community and consumerism overlook the fact that policing is not about the delivery of an uncontentious service like any other. Their business is the inevitably messy and intractable one of regulating social conflict. They cannot control, but rather are buffeted by, the prevailing social currents.

The end product of reform cannot realistically be the restoration of the previous status of the police as beloved symbols of national pride. The pedestal on which they stood in the middle of the twentieth century was based on unique circumstances, in particular the consensus climate of Britain during and after the Second World War. PC George Dixon was not the norm for the British police, but their finest hour. In a postmodern society they cannot function as sacred totems of a collective conscience that has become dispersed and diversified. They will have to become a demystified, mundane institution of governmentality, competing and co-operating with other policing forms.

The prospects for reversing this decline by either the new 'businesslike' approach or Labour's Crime Reduction Programme suffer from the same problems as their earlier 'magic bullet' counterparts. All these strategies rest upon a fundamental misconception of policing, which while common has for many years been called into question by research, some of it conducted by the Home Office itself. The premise underlying current initiatives is that, if properly organized, policing can have a significant impact on crime levels, deterring crime in the first place by uniformed patrol, and detecting criminals efficiently after the event if crimes do occur.

There is, however, a substantial body of research evidence, much of it emanating from the Home Office Research and Planning Unit, suggesting that policing resources and tactics have at best a tenuous relationship to levels of crime or the clear-up rate. Innovative strategies may have some impact in particular situations but probably not much effect on overall levels of crime. The police function more or less adequately as managers of crime and keepers of the peace, but they are not realistically a vehicle for reducing crime substantially. Crime is the product of deeper social forces, largely beyond the ambit of any policing tactics, and the clear-up rate is a function of crime levels and other aspects of workload rather than police efficiency.

POLICING POSTMODERNITY

Underlying the many specific causes of controversy over policing, such as malpractice, militarization, or apparently declining effectiveness, there are the deeper and more fundamental changes in contemporary society that were pointed to earlier in this chapter. The rise of a specific organization specializing in policing functions coincided with the development of modern nation-states, and was an aspect of the process by which they sought to gain centralized control over a particular territory. This was particularly true of Britain, where bureaucratic police organizations came into being comparatively late by European standards and coincided with the historical trajectory towards greater social integration after the initial impact of the Industrial Revolution (Rawlings 1999). In all societies the police's symbolic functions are at least as important as their direct instrumental effectiveness in dealing with crime and disorder (N. Walker 1996; Manning 1997).

The position of the police as an organization symbolizing national unity and order is threatened fundamentally by the advent of those social changes often labelled as 'postmodernity', above all increasing fragmentation and pluralism. Postmodern culture lacks any central, commonly accepted reference point or conception of the good life (Bauman 1987, 1997, 1998; D. Harvey 1989; Jameson 1992). Consumerism has become the driving force of action, the 'pleasure principle' displacing the Puritan asceticism and discipline that were the cultural foundation of modern industrialism. The social structure of postmodernity follows the same dynamic of fragmentation, disorganisation, pluralism, and de-centring (Giddens 1990). Economic changes have transformed the economic and social framework, dispersing the centralized Fordist production systems of modern times, and polarizing the class structure into what is often referred to as the 'two thirds, one-third society' (Hutton 1995).

While the majority participate, albeit very unevenly and insecurely, in unprecedented levels of consumption, a substantial and growing 'underclass' is permanently and hopelessly excluded (Dahrendorf 1985: chap. 3; Galbraith 1992; Davies 1998; Crowther 2000*a, b*). Certainly with the political dominance of free-market economic policies there is no prospect at all of their incorporation into the general social order. In other words, the 'police property' group is far larger than ever before, and more fundamentally alienated. This economic fragmentation interacts with the long and complex process of cultural diversification, declining deference, erosion of moral absolutes, and growing 'anomia' (Dahrendorf 1985: chap. 2) to create a more turbulent, disorderly social world.

In this context, the British conception of the police as a body with an omnibus mandate, symbolizing order and harmony, becomes increasingly anachronistic (Reiner 1992*b*). The British police are moving towards the international pattern of specialist national units for serious crime, terrorism, public order, large-scale fraud, and other national or international problems. Local policing of particular communities remains, but with sharp differences between 'service'-style organizations in

stable suburban areas, and 'watchman' bodies with the rump duties of the present police, keeping the lid on underclass symbolic locations.

For those in society who can afford it, provision of security is increasingly privatized, often in the 'mass private property' where more and more middle-class leisure and work takes place (Shearing and Stenning 1983, 1987; South 1988, 1997*a*; Rawlings 1991; Johnston 1991, 1992, 2000; Shearing 1992, 1996; T. Jones and Newburn 1998; Forst and Manning 1999). Specialized human policing in any form, however, is becoming a smaller part of an array of impersonal control processes built into the environment, technological control and surveillance devices, and the guarding and self-policing activities of ordinary citizens (M. Davis 1990, 1998; Norris and Armstrong 1999). *The* police are becoming part of a more varied assortment of bodies with policing functions, and a more diffuse array of policing processes, within and between nation-states (Sheptycki 2000*a*). Police officers can no longer be totems symbolizing a cohesive social order which no longer exists. They have to perform specific pragmatic functions of crime management and emergency peace-keeping in an effective and just way, or forfeit popular and political support.

THE LIMITS OF POLICING

Police and policing cannot deliver on the great expectations now placed on them in terms of crime control, whether by Conservative 'law and order' or New Labour intelligence-led crime reduction policies. 'Nothing works' was far too bleak and demoralizing a conclusion to draw from evaluation studies of criminal justice and police practice, as was frequently done in the 1970s. There are enough well-researched examples of targeted policing and crime prevention innovations, for example, to suggest that these can have a significant, if modest, effect on crime and fear (Sherman 1992*a*; Pease 1997; Ekblom 1998; Hope 1998; Jordan 1998). However, the burden placed on them by the Crime Reduction Programme is excessive. The kind of reductions that have been experienced or are envisaged—while welcome, and cost-effective compared to either more crime or mass imprisonment—would go nowhere near reversing the increases of the last quarter-century. For example, Home Office research suggests that targeting higher-risk areas (about one-tenth of households) with Safer Cities-style burglary prevention programmes would reduce national burglary rates by 5.5 per cent, and if this was extended to half the country's households the reduction would be just under one-eighth (Ekblom 1998: 35). Extensive delivery of crime- and criminality-reduction programmes to the most vulnerable, while justifiable even in cost-benefit terms, would involve significant public expenditure. This would affect fiscal policies, and amount to a significant redistribution of resources to the poorer sections of society.

A substantial return to earlier levels of crime is simply not possible without major changes in the conditions that generated the rise in the first place. The 'realist'

exploration of what works more immediately is worthwhile, but at best can have modest results unless it becomes a wedge for broader reforms. It may be that the 'social' is indeed dead (N. Rose 1996), and that a return to Keynesian-style economic policies aimed at stabilization and solidarity are no longer feasible, because of globalization and changes in popular values. But there is a price to be paid: living with a high-crime society permanently.

David Garland (1996) has cogently argued that states have already adjusted their policies and rhetoric in recognition of the limits to their sovereignty in terms of crime control. There has been a bifurcation between two levels of crime-control policy and discourse. On the one hand, there is promulgation of detailed policies to implement best practice in crime prevention—what Garland calls the 'criminologies of everyday life'—as in Labour's Crime Reduction Programme. Such discourses are largely stripped of moral condemnation, but treat crime pragmatically, as an actuarial risk to be calculated and minimized (Feeley and Simon 1994). On the other hand, there are regular moral panics about especially horrific crimes (such as the murder of Jamie Bulger or the Dunblane massacre), which become occasions for orgies of punitiveness and anguished Jeremiads about moral decline. The explosions of punitiveness prompted by the relatively rare, spectacular, exceptionally fear-provoking crimes symbolically assuage popular anxiety and frustration, while the 'criminologies of everyday life' are geared to provide as much limited pragmatic protection as possible against more mundane offences.

THE LONG GOOD-BYE

However, a continuation of high rates of routine crime, and the variety of security and control measures adopted to contain or reduce them, offers a highly dystopian image of the future. We are already getting accustomed to everyday routines geared to crime prevention, with varying tactics and success depending on social location. In essence there is a vicious circle of interdependence between social divisions and exclusion, crime, and crime-control strategy. Growing social divisions fuel rising crime, which in turn generates control strategies that accentuate social exclusion. In a variety of interlocking ways crime and reactions to crime both exacerbate the social divisions that generated them.

The clearest example is the social bifurcation that produces and is in turn reinforced by the flourishing market in private security, aptly described as a 'new feudalism' (Shearing and Stenning 1983; I. Taylor 1999, chap. 7). The more privileged sections of society increasingly protect themselves from the burgeoning 'dangerous classes' of the socially excluded by a variety of environmental, spatial, architectural, and technological segregation devices such as the increasingly ubiquitous CCTV cameras. Together with private policing, these provide the 'moats' seeking to secure the castles of consumerism. The wealthy flit between 'security bubbles' in 'cities of quartz'

guarded not so much by police (public or private) as by more or less subtle physical and social barriers (M. Davis 1990, 1998: chap. 7; Bottoms and Wiles 1997: 349–54). Inequalities in exposure to crime and disorder are exacerbated as policing and security increasingly become strategies of border control between the dreadful enclosures of the excluded and the gated denizens of the wealthy, between and within different countries.

Unable or unwilling to tackle the sources of rising crime, states and citizens react punitively on the hapless minority of criminals they encounter or apprehend. Tough new sentencing policies on the ‘three strikes and out’ model have swelled the prison populations of the USA, Britain, and other countries which have increasingly followed this example, to unprecedented levels (Morgan 1997; J. Young 1999: chap. 5). This is despite little evidence that it cuts crime to any substantial extent (Moxon 1998) None the less current policies will result in further huge growth of the penal empire, if only as an expression of impotent rage at the losers in the criminal justice lottery. An apparent rise in vigilante activity is the citizen counterpart of the increase in official punitiveness, striking at those suspected offenders who are at hand, as an expression of impotence in the face of crime and insecurity (Johnston 1996; Abrahams 1998).

This image of a society polarized between a gilded but insecure elite and a threatening, temporarily subjugated mass haunted dystopian visions of the future at the end of the nineteenth century, as in H. G. Wells’s *The Time Machine*. They returned with a vengeance in the last quarter of the twentieth century not because of some inevitable *fin de siècle* phobia, but because of the rapid reversal of the slow march of social inclusion (Hobsbawm 1995; J. Young 1999). The proliferation of *Blade Runner*-style imaginings of the revolt of the repressed (M. Davis 1998: chaps. 6, 7) testify to a scarcely subconscious anxiety that the burgeoning array of sophisticated surveillance and control measures cannot indefinitely hold the lid down on the expanding excluded classes.

It is hard to see how order of any kind can be maintained if we head towards the ‘20:80’ society of two-fifths excluded from legitimate work projected by some analysts of globalization (H.–P. Martin and Schumann 1997: chap. 1). There are, of course, already many parts of the world where functioning states and civil society have weakened to the extent that a ‘new barbarism’ prevails (Hobsbawm 1994: 53). In such places the tenuous modern distinction between crime and politics ceases to be useful as ‘low intensity warfare runs into high intensity crime’ (S. Cohen 1997b: 243). Up to the beginning of the twenty-first century, the new ‘mixed economy’ of control (South 1997a) has prevented such ‘degree zero’ collapses of order in most advanced industrial societies (Reiner 1999). However, given the huge increases in crime and disorder that have already occurred as a result of our current two-thirds/one-third societies, it is hard to be optimistic about the consequences of even more precipitous inequality and exclusion.

Whether this will be the shape of law and order in the twenty-first century is anyone’s guess. But the prospects can be summed up by a paraphrase of Rosa Luxemburg. The choice is between some form of social democracy and at best, the barbarism

of high crime-rates, and a fortified society. What is clear is that the police cannot protect us from increasing insecurity, not even if they are transformed into a more diverse array of 'pick 'n' mix' policing services.

In Chapter 1 I began my account of the rise of modern policing with a quote from Raymond Chandler's *The Long Good-Bye* and I shall conclude with another. In that classic 1953 private eye novel, Philip Marlowe made some prescient remarks about the prospects for policing and crime control: 'Crime isn't a disease, it's a symptom. Cops are like a doctor that gives you aspirin for a brain tumour, except that the cop would rather cure it with a blackjack' (Chandler 1977: 599). Blackjacks (tough 'law and order' policing) and aspirin (community policing) can be only temporary palliatives without more fundamental social surgery.