

Industrial Organization

Industrial Organization

A European Perspective

Stephen Martin

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Contents

Preface	xv
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1 Background	1
1.1 Subject matter	1
1.2 Markets and market structure	3
1.2.1 Industry classification schemes	5
1.2.2 Measures of supply-side market structure	6
1.3 Perfect competition and monopoly	10
1.3.1 Perfect competition	10
1.3.2 Monopoly	17
1.4 EC competition policy	20
Study points	21
Problems	22

2 Oligopoly markets: noncooperative behaviour	23
2.1 Introduction	23
2.2 Cournot oligopoly	23
2.2.1 The basic model	23
2.2.2 Best response functions	24
2.2.3 Cournot equilibrium	26
2.2.4 Taxes	29
2.2.5 Cost differences	32
2.2.6 Conjectural variations	34
2.2.7 Product differentiation	37
2.2.8 Consumer switching costs	37
2.2.9 Sales maximization	40
2.2.10 Many firms	41
2.3 Bertrand duopoly	43
2.3.1 Standardized product	43
2.3.2 Differentiated products	45
2.4 Summary	47
Study points	47
Problems	48

3 Collusion and tacit collusion	49
3.1 Introduction	49
3.2 Noncooperative collusion	50
3.2.1 Trigger strategy	50

vi CONTENTS

3.2.2	Basing point pricing	53
3.2.3	Publicity	55
3.3	Welfare consequences of collusion	57
3.4	Article 81	59
3.4.1	Provisions	59
3.4.2	Applications	59
3.5	Enforcement	65
3.5.1	Leniency	65
3.5.2	Cooperation	65
3.5.3	Direct applicability	65
3.6	Market definition for the application of competition policy	67
3.7	Summary	68
	Study points	69
	Problems	69
<hr/>		
4	Dominance	70
4.1	Introduction	70
4.2	Quantity leadership	70
4.3	Limit pricing	73
4.3.1	Entry deterrence with output commitment	73
4.3.2	Entry deterrence with imperfectly informed entrants	76
4.4	Predation and the chain store paradox	79
4.5	Article 82	82
4.5.1	Price discrimination	83
4.5.2	Loyalty rebates	85
4.5.3	Public monopolies	86
4.6	Summary	87
	Study points	87
	Problems	88
<hr/>		
5	Innovation	89
5.1	Introduction	89
5.2	Innovation in a market system	90
5.2.1	Spillovers	90
5.2.2	Uncertainty	91
5.3	The rates of return to R&D	91
5.4	Market structure and innovation	93
5.4.1	Schumpeter	93
5.4.2	Arrow	94
5.5	Appropriability and absorptive capacity	96

5.6 Promoting R&D	98
5.6.1 R&D cooperation in practice	98
5.6.2 R&D cooperation in theory	100
5.7 Innovation and EU competition policy	101
5.7.1 Cooperative R&D under Article 81	101
5.7.2 Intellectual property rights and Article 82	102
5.8 Summary	104
Study points	105
<hr/>	
6 Organization	106
6.1 Introduction	106
6.2 Market structure	107
6.2.1 Cournot oligopoly, single-plant firms	107
6.2.2 Conjectural variations, single-plant firms	111
6.2.3 Cournot oligopoly, multiplant firms	111
6.3 Entry and exit	113
6.4 Seller concentration and the size distribution of firms	115
6.4.1 Gibrat's Law	115
6.4.2 Seller concentration and endogenous sunk costs	117
6.5 Network externalities	119
6.5.1 Market structure and market performance with network externalities	121
6.5.2 Path dependence	121
6.6 Firms and firm structure	122
6.6.1 Coase	123
6.6.2 Transaction costs	124
6.6.3 Property rights	125
6.6.4 Chandler	125
6.6.5 Reprise	128
6.7 Merger policy	128
6.7.1 Merger control regulation	129
6.7.2 Joint ventures and joint dominance	132
6.8 Cooperation	133
6.9 Summary	136
Study points	136
Problems	137
<hr/>	
7 Imperfect competition and international trade: I	140
7.1 Introduction	140
7.2 Interindustry trade	142
7.2.1 Comparative advantage	142
7.2.2 Factor mobility and immobility	143

viii CONTENTS

7.2.3	Factor endowments and the Leontief paradox	144
7.3	Intraindustry trade	148
7.3.1	Quantity-setting firms	148
7.3.2	Price-setting firms	153
7.4	Trade and domestic market performance	156
7.5	Summary	157
	Study points	157
	Problems	157
<hr/>		
8	Imperfect competition and international trade: II	159
8.1	Trade policy	159
8.1.1	Strategic trade policy	159
8.1.2	Tariffs and quotas	166
8.1.3	Import barriers and export-promotion	168
8.2	Exchange rate passthrough	169
8.3	Trade and market structure	173
8.3.1	Mode of supply to a foreign market	174
8.3.2	Mutual forbearance	176
8.3.3	Exporting	176
8.3.4	Licensing/joint venture	177
8.3.5	Direct foreign investment	177
8.3.6	Exports v. DFL: substitutes or complements?	179
8.3.7	Hysteresis	180
8.4	Summary	181
	Study points	181
	Problems	181
<hr/>		
9	Trade policy and competition policy	185
9.1	Introduction	185
9.2	Export cartels	185
9.2.1	Theory	186
9.2.2	Practice	189
9.3	Voluntary export restraints	194
9.3.1	Quality upgrading	196
9.3.2	Trade diversion	196
9.3.3	Welfare consequences	197
9.3.4	VERs and the WTO Agreements	197
9.4	Dumping	198
9.4.1	Dumping as price discrimination: reciprocal dumping	199
9.4.2	Dumping as predation	202
9.4.3	Antidumping policy: theory	202
9.4.4	EC antidumping policy: application	204

9.5 What is to be done?	207
Study points	208
Problems	209
<hr/>	
10 Market integration in the European Union	211
10.1 Introduction	211
10.2 Market integration in theory	212
10.2.1 Market integration and market performance	212
10.2.2 Imperfect competition	214
10.2.3 Market integration and market structure	217
10.3 Market integration in practice	219
10.3.1 Prologue: the ECSC	219
10.3.2 Market integration: empirical evidence	222
10.4 State aid and state aid policy	226
10.4.1 The extent of state aid	226
10.4.2 Economic analysis of state aid	229
10.4.3 The application of state aid policy	232
10.5 Summary	234
Study points	234
Problems	234
<hr/>	
References	236
Index of Commission Decisions	247
Index of Court Decisions	247
Index of Names	248
Index of Subjects	251

List of Figures

1.1	Topics in industrial organization	2
1.2	Linear market demand curve	11
1.3	Consumers' surplus	13
1.4	Firm cost curves	15
1.5	Market equilibrium and number of firms, perfectly competitive market	16
1.6	Monopolist's output decision	18
2.1	Firm 1's output decision	25
2.2	Best response curves, Cournot duopoly	27
2.3	Market equilibrium, Cournot duopoly	28
2.4	Taxes and Cournot duopoly best response curves	30
2.5	Market equilibrium, Cournot duopoly, per unit tax	31
2.6	Best response curves	32
2.7	Market power and welfare losses with efficiency differentials	34
2.8	Firm 1's best response curve, alternative conjectures	35
2.9	Cournot equilibrium, alternative conjectural variations	36
2.10	Cournot best response curves with product differentiation	38
2.11	Consumer switching costs and Cournot best response curves	39
2.12	Cournot best response curves, partial sales maximization by firm	41
2.13	Sales maximization and equilibrium firm profit	42
2.14	Firm 1's price decision	44
2.15	Price best response curves, Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation	46
3.1	Private profit maximization with a duopoly collusive agreement	52
3.2	Multiple basing point pricing	54
4.1	Stackelberg leader's residual demand curve	72
4.2	Incumbent's value at limit output	76
4.3	Game tree and payoff matrix for one stage of the chain store game	80
4.4	Possible game trees for one stage of the Kreps and Wilson game	82
5.1	Profit to be gained by innovation under monopoly	95
5.2	Profit to be gained by innovation under perfect competition	96
6.1	Average cost, alternative levels of fixed cost	108
6.2	Equilibrium number of firms—fixed cost relationship	110
6.3	Average cost, multiplant firm, plant cost function	112
6.4	Market shares, EU new car and light truck sales, 1997	116
6.5	Cumulative market shares, EU new car and light truck sales, 1997	117
6.6	Functional (Unitary or U-) form firm	126

xii LIST OF FIGURES

6.7	Multidivisional (M-) form firm	126
7.1	Circular flow diagram	146
7.2	Trilateral trade flows, motor vehicle and aircraft industries, EC, Japan, and US, 1997	149
7.3	Cournot duopoly trade model with intraindustry trade	151
7.4	Cournot duopoly trade model, unit transportation cost	152
7.5	Price best response curves, Bertrand duopoly trade model	154
8.1	Export subsidy and market equilibrium, Cournot duopoly trade model	161
8.2	Duelling subsidies, Cournot duopoly trade model	162
8.3	Export subsidy and market equilibrium, Bertrand duopoly trade model	164
8.4	Import quota and Cournot duopoly equilibrium, interindustry trade	167
8.5	Country 1 quota and Cournot duopoly equilibrium with economies of scale	168
8.6	Total imports of 75 countries, January 1929 to March 1933	171
8.7	Exchange rate fluctuations and Cournot duopoly equilibrium	171
8.8	Domestic v. multinational operation	175
8.9	Cournot duopoly equilibrium, country 2, export v. direct foreign investment	178
9.1	Export cartel and Cournot triopoly reaction functions, export market	187
9.2	Firm 2's price and sales decision, market 1	201
10.1	Two countries, identical markets in each country, perfect competition, identical production costs, no taxes or distribution costs	212
10.2	Two countries, identical markets in each country, perfect competition, identical production costs, no export costs, different tax rates	213
10.3	Average monthly telecommunications expenditures for a standard basket of calls, residential users, v. number of authorized operators	226

List of Tables

1.1	NACE Industry 15.5	4
1.2	1997 new car and light truck sales (1000s) and regional shares	7
1.3	Seller concentration measures examples	8
1.4	Concentration statistics for selected NACE industries, EC, 1994	9
5.1	Social and private rates of return from investment in innovations	92
6.1	Descriptive statistics on entry and exit, 183 German manufacturing industries, 1983–5	114
6.2	EEC market share estimates, turbo-prop commuter aircraft	131
7.1	David Ricardo’s interindustry trade example	142
7.2	Share of manufacturing exports in UK exports during the Industrial Revolution	144
7.3	Domestic capital and labour requirements of a representative million dollar bundle of US exports and of competitive import replacements (1947)	145
IO-1	3-sector input-output table	146
IO-2	Input-output coefficients, 3-sector economy	147
8.1	Payoff matrix, government export-subsidy games, quantity-setting firms	161
8.2	Pluses and minuses of alternative strategies vis-à-vis international markets	176
9.1	Japanese tariffs on imported cars	194
9.2	Restrictions on Japanese imports, by country, 1992	195
10.1	Big Mac prices (including sales tax), selected regions	223
10.2	State aid to manufacturing in the Community, 1994–8, annual values, million 1997 euros	229
10.3	State aid to manufacturing by type, 1996–8, EUR 15	229
10.4	Average annual EU state aid, 1996–8, million euros	230

Preface

It is a foolish thing to make a long prologue, and to be short in the story itself.

Second Book of the Maccabees 2:32

I have tried to follow two guidelines in writing this book. The first is to know my audience, or more precisely, to know those who I hope will make up my audience. The second is to keep in mind not how much I think I have to teach, but rather how much those in my audience have to learn.

I have tried to write an introductory textbook in the field of industrial organization. Most of the students who use this book will not become professional industrial economists,¹ and I have tried to present the material in a way that is accessible to them. For the most part, I use a modelling approach—to do otherwise would be unfaithful to the field—but in the text I rely on minor variations of a single basic model. Some end-of-chapter problems present extensions of this basic model; I make no attempt to hint at the wonderland of models that one encounters at the research level in industrial organization.

I am grateful to several cohorts of students at the Copenhagen Business School and at the University of Amsterdam, who served as guinea pigs for early versions of the book. I would also like to thank Inés Macho Stadler, Peter Møllgaard, David Perez-Castrillo, Bruno Versaavel, and four anonymous reviewers for comments on various parts of the manuscript, without implicating them in remaining shortcomings.

I have had the temerity to entitle this book *Industrial Organization: A European Perspective*. It is not, of course, a European's perspective: I still carry a passport that requires me to stand in the long and slow-moving line at customs counters when I move in and out of the EU and in and out of the Schengen zone, and I carry the mental baggage that goes with the passport. I should like to dedicate this book to all those who have helped me and my family during our extended European vacation. You know who you are.

¹ Not everyone can be lucky.

