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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009

May 2009

May Update 2009

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort Law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone's Criminal Practice.

The May update primarily considers developments reported in April 2009.

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• Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law
• Part B: Offences
• Part D: Procedure
• Part E: Sentencing
• Part F: Evidence
• New Legislation

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Part A General Principles of Criminal Law

A2 Mens Rea

A2.2 Intention

The concept of oblique intent was considered (and in effect recognised) by Stadlen J in R (Tait) v Criminal Injuries Compensation Appeals Panel [2009] EWHC 767 (Admin), in which the claimant, a police officer, sought compensation for injuries inflicted by an unknown driver who had deliberately rammed the claimant's police car for the purpose of wrecking that car and making good his escape. Could it be said that the injuries had been inflicted 'intentionally' even though the driver's purpose had been to disable the police car? The Panel had assumed the answer was 'no', but Stadlen J disagreed. He said:

12. The Panel appears to have proceeded on the assumption that that finding of fact as to the driver's motive was conclusive and determinative of the question whether the vehicle was being used so as deliberately to inflict or attempt to inflict injury on any person. . . .

13. It thus is apparent that notwithstanding their use of the word 'intention' the only aspect of the driver's state of mind which the Panel considered it necessary to address was his motive. They did not consider the separate question of whether even if, as they found, the driver's motive was not to injure the police officers, nevertheless he intended to injure them. . . .

14. . . . The Panel appears to have concluded that support for their construction of paragraph 11 is to be found in the Guides to the 1995 and 2001 Schemes. Paragraph 24 of the latter, in the section commenting on paragraph 11 of the 2001 Scheme states:

The general rule is that we cannot pay compensation for injuries caused as result of traffic accidents. The only exception is if the vehicle was used as a weapon. In general we have to be satisfied that the driver of the vehicle deliberately drove it at you to injure you.

However, as it seems to me, if a vehicle is used to ram another car for the purpose of causing so much damage to it as to disable it that is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that the car was being used as a weapon. It may be that the weapon was being used for the purpose of causing criminal damage to the car rather than physical injury to its occupants but it does not seem to me impossible to say that it may nonetheless have been used as a weapon. While the words “to injure you” do appear to focus on the purpose or motive of the driver as distinct from his intention, it is to be noted that the proposition that the defendant has to be satisfied that the driver of the vehicle deliberately drove it at the applicant with that purpose is stated only as being a general practice rather than an invariable and inevitable requirement dictated by the mandatory requirements of paragraph 11. It does not seem to me that paragraph 24 of the Guide focused on the specific question which is raised on this application namely whether paragraph 11 is intended to exclude from the definition of criminal injury an injury directly attributable to the use of a vehicle by which the driver intended to inflict or attempt to inflict injury on any person even though that was not his motive.

. . .

22. As a matter of common sense it seems to me obvious that looked at objectively if a car is used in effect as a battering ram with the specific purpose of causing so much damage to it as to make it un-drivable, the natural and probable consequence of such conduct, indeed the almost inevitable consequence of such conduct will be some degree of physical injury to the person or persons inside the car. While the use of the word 'deliberately' undoubtedly, in my view, connotes the requirement of a subjective state of mind on the part of the driver, it would be open to the Panel even in the absence of evidence from the driver, who was not traced, to conclude as a matter of inference on the balance of probabilities that the driver did in fact foresee those natural and probable consequences. The question then is whether for the purposes of paragraph 11 the Panel was either entitled or bound to find that the driver intended the natural and probable or almost inevitable consequences of his conduct.

. . .

29. However the instant case appears to me to be in a wholly different category to the ordinary case of reckless or careless driving. Just as in Waide the claimant in this case was deliberately targeted by the driver of the other car. Unlike in Waide, the other driver in this case had no intention of veering away at the last minute. On the contrary his intention was to hit the claimant's car with so much force as to disable it. Without question he used the vehicle so as to cause damage to the car. Equally he used the vehicle so as to cause so much damage to it as to make injury to its occupants very likely if not almost inevitable. Although injuring the claimant was not his motive it was his intention. In those circumstances it does seem to me that it was intended that a person in the position of the claimant would fall within the class of persons who are eligible for compensation despite the general exception in paragraph 11 in that a vehicle was deliberately used so as to inflict injury on him.

A3 General Defences

A3.31 Self-defence, Prevention of Crime, and Related Defences

Shaw v The Queen [2001] 1 WLR 1519 and Rashford [2005] EWCA Crim 3377 were considered in Harvey [2009] EWCA Crim 469.

A3.39 Infancy

T [2008] EWCA Crim 815 has been affirmed by the House of Lords in JTB [2009] UKHL 20. Having referred to Hansard, the Appellate Committee was satisfied that Parliament's intention in enacting the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 34 had indeed been to abolish the entire defence of doli incapax as far as children over the age of 10 are concerned.

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Part B Offences

B1 Homicide and Related Offences

B1.22 Provocation

Smith (Morgan James) [2001] 1 AC 146 and A-G for Jersey v Holley [2005] 2 AC 580 were considered in Symmons [2009] EWCA Crim 654, in the course of which Dyson LJ said:

50. There is now no doubt as to the constituents of provocation. The defendant must have been provoked by things said or done or by both together to lose his self-control (limb 1). The jury must form a view as to the gravity of the provocation for the defendant in all the circumstances; and then (limb 2) decide whether, having regard to the actual provocation and their view as to its gravity, a person having the power of self-control to be expected of a person of the sex and age of the defendant would have done what the defendant did.

B1.37 Sentencing Guidelines: Diminished Responsibility

Chambers (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 190 was considered in Wood [2009] EWCA Crim 651. D (an alcoholic, aged 50, with a long criminal record including offences of violence) had initially been convicted of murder and sentenced to life with a minimum term of at least 18 years. His victim had been subjected to what the court described as 'a murderous and prolonged attack of extreme ferocity'. D's conviction for murder was quashed in 2008 and a conviction for manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility was substituted (see Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009 at B1.19).

The question of sentence was deferred to this later hearing, where the five-judge court was assisted by a psychiatric report which advised that 'although [D] is not violent on a regular basis, he has the ability to cause serious harm in the context of inter-personal conflict and especially when he is under the influence of alcohol'. Lord Judge CJ (giving the judgment of the Court) said:

11. There are two distinct questions for decision. In the absence of any medical disposal (and none is suggested) the first question is whether the case requires a sentence of imprisonment for life under section 225(2) of the 2003 Act or imprisonment for public protection under section 225(3) of the Act as amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Whichever of these orders is appropriate, the second question is the assessment of the minimum term to be served by the appellant before any possibility of his release on parole may arise. That raises questions as to the nature of the link, if any, between the legislative structures introduced by section 269 of the 2003 Act for the determination of the minimum term in cases of murder, and the assessment of the minimum term where the defendant is convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility.

. . .

19. . . . the striking feature of this offence is not simply that the victim was killed, but he was killed in the course of a prolonged murderous (on the judge's findings, unprovoked) attack of repeated and utmost ferocity. We accept, of course, that the appellant's culpability was diminished, but it was very far from extinguished, and his level of responsibility for his actions merits examination in the light of his immediate activities both before the attack began and after it was concluded, and his insight into the need to do what could be done to cover up the fact of the killing and his involvement in it. In our judgment the level of his responsibility was just, but only just sufficiently diminished for the purposes of section 2 of the Homicide Act. As in Chambers, a very substantial element of mental responsibility remained. Finally, the risk represented by the appellant has not yet diminished. While in custody he is not able to obtain alcohol but there is no basis on which we can be satisfied that the alcohol dependency syndrome from which he suffered at the date of his crimes is now permanently cured, and that if and when released, he would not return to his excessive and dangerous drinking habits.

20. In the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the appropriate sentence is a discretionary sentence of imprisonment for life.

Lord Judge then moved on to consider the setting of a minimum term.

21. There is no express statutory link between the guidance in schedule 21 of the 2003 Act and the principles to be applied to sentencing decisions in diminished responsibility manslaughter. Where diminished responsibility is established it serves to reduce the defendant's culpability for his actions when doing the killing, but the remaining circumstances of the homicide are unchanged. There is no express statutory link between the guidance in schedule 21 of the 2003 Act and the principles to be applied to sentencing decisions in diminished responsibility manslaughter. Where diminished responsibility is established it serves to reduce the defendant's culpability for his actions when doing the killing, but the remaining circumstances of the homicide are unchanged. Specific features of the seriousness of the homicide, for example a double rather than a single killing, or the sadistic killing of a child may be common both to murder and diminished responsibility manslaughter. At the same time the mitigating features expressly identified in schedule 21 extend to what may approximate but not amount to the defence of diminished responsibility and provide an additional connection between the schedule and the defence. Finally, the culpability of the defendant in diminished responsibility manslaughter may sometimes be reduced almost to extinction, while in others, it may remain very high. Accordingly when the sentencing court is assessing the seriousness of the offence with a view to fixing the minimum term, we can discern no logical reason why, subject to the specific element of reduced culpability inherent in the defence, the assessment of the seriousness of the instant offence of diminished responsibility manslaughter should ignore the guidance. Indeed we suggest that the link is plain. . .

. . .

24. As a case of murder, the trial judge assessed the minimum term at 18 years. We have not been invited to, and we see no reason to disagree with this assessment. It carefully reflected the essential features of the case as described in this judgment. The minimum term must now be reduced to allow for the level of reduced culpability consequent on diminished responsibility. We shall not repeat the very grave features which led us to conclude that imprisonment for life is appropriate in this case. Bearing in mind that the protection of the public for the future is secured by the sentence of imprisonment for life, the minimum term should be fixed at 13 years.

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Part D Procedure

D13 Juries

D13.57 Discharge of Jurors or Entire Jury: Accidental Prejudice

Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 and Lawson [2005] EWCA Crim 84 were applied by the Privy Council in Mitcham v The Queen [2009] UKPC 7.

D14 Trial on Indictment: General Matters

D14.118 Anonymity

Mayers [2008] EWCA Crim 1418 (noted in the January 2009 update) was applied in Powar [2009] EWCA Crim 594, in which an already strong case against the defendants on a charge of murder was supported by a number of independent witnesses (local residents) who had seen the incident and had been granted anonymity at the trial on the basis that they were clearly in fear of the defendants and would not otherwise be prepared to testify. Checks by the prosecution revealed that none of the anonymous witnesses had previous convictions or had otherwise come to the adverse notice of the police. There was no reason to think that there was anything in their backgrounds to suggest that they had any reason to be dishonest. Nor was there any reason to think that any of them bore any malice, grievance, grudge or ill will towards the defendants, or that any of them would derive any benefit, gain or advantage by their conviction. Certain inadvertent disclosures by the prosecution may have given the defendants some idea of who the anonymous witnesses might be, but each witness remained anxious to preserve what was left of their anonymity, for fear of the consequences of testifying.

The trial judge declined to reveal their exact identities, and the Court of Appeal agreed with her ruling. They also held that it was a ruling that the judge could still have made had the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 been in force at the time:

79. It was one thing for the appellants to have a suspicion as to the identity of an anonymous witness but it was quite another thing to confirm the identity of the anonymous witnesses to them. Furthermore, stripping the witnesses of the protection of anonymity would inform any one in the public gallery, including the associates of the appellants, of their true identity, which the judge thought would again heighten the risks.

80. In our judgment, this ruling was plainly right: it would have been highly irresponsible indeed dangerous to authorise a public revelation of the witnesses' names.

. . .

105. We give full weight to the need for defendants to know the names of those who give evidence against them. However, in our judgment, the anonymous witnesses in this case were ordinary law abiding neighbours, who were terrified of giving evidence against the appellants, whom they feared, on reasonable grounds, having seen them batter a man to death in the street in front of their houses and in respect of whom there was a long history giving rise to an aura or atmosphere of fear. They would not give evidence without the protection of anonymity. We see nothing to suggest that they - or any of them - were dishonest or lacked credibility or had any reason at all to give other than truthful evidence. There was, we think, a proper opportunity to examine the view which they had of the incident. There was a strong case against both appellants, without even considering the evidence of the anonymous witnesses. It was, in our judgment, plainly in the interest of justice that the orders were made.

106. For these reasons, applying the statutory test in section 11 of the Act, we do not consider that the order for anonymity was not one which the trial court could have made if the Act had been in force at the time. Furthermore, and in any event, we are entirely satisfied that the appellants received a fair trial and that the convictions are safe.

D31 Extradition

D31.8 Part 2 of the Act: The Extradition Hearing

An illustration of possible circumstances in which extradition must be refused because of the risk of a denial or justice in the requesting state is provided by Brown v Government of Rwanda [2009] EWHC 770 (Admin), in which the court allowed an appeal against the Secretary of State's order that the appellants were to be extradited to Rwanda to face trial in that country for crimes of genocide. The risk of injustice included both a likely inability to adduce the evidence of witnesses supporting the appellants and a risk that the speciality rule would not be observed.

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Part E Sentencing

E4 Custodial Sentences for Dangerous Offenders under the Criminal Justice Act 2003

E4.9 Assessment of Dangerousness

Terrell [2008] 2 All ER 1065 was considered in Hicks [2009] EWCA Crim 733. D had been convicted and imprisoned for a number of offences involving the making and possession of indecent photographs and pseudo-photographs of children. Shortly after his release on licence, he set up and advertised a 'modelling agency'. As a result, a number of teenage girls replied, and D took a number of indecent photographs of girls aged between 17 and 13, some of which he later doctored.

The Court of Appeal concluded that D presented a continuing danger to young people in general but his offences did not disclose any element that could be said to give rise to a significant risk of serious harm. The initial sentence of imprisonment for public protection was quashed and a determinate sentence of 12 months (less time spent on remand) was substituted. A stringent Sexual Offences Prohibition Order would apply indefinitely from the date of his release.

E10 Referral Order

E10.1 Requirement to Refer, and Power to Refer, Young Offender to a Youth Offender Panel

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 860) inter alia brings into force on 27 April 2009, s. 35 of the 2008 Act. Section 35 amends s. 17 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 so as to substantially extend the circumstances in which a referral order can be made.

E10.4 Breach, Revocation and Amendment of Referral Orders

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 860) inter alia brings into force on 27 April 2009, ss. 36 and 37 of the 2008 Act. Section 36 inserts a new s. 27A into the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 so as to provide for the revocation of a referral order where the offender is making good progress. Section 37 inserts a new s. 27B into the 2000 Act so as to provide for the extension of the period for which a young offender contract has effect and amends sch. 1 to that Act accordingly.

E19 Confiscation Orders

E19.3 The Human Rights Act 1998

In Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19, the House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal ([2008] EWCA Crim 146).

D was convicted of a conspiracy to import heroin. No heroin was in fact imported (and no profits made) in the course of this conspiracy, but the prosecution argued that D's involvement was linked to his experience as a leading importer of cannabis. He was not charged with the importation of cannabis, and denied it, but there seemed to be no other explanation for his substantial wealth. Following D's conviction for the heroin conspiracy, a confiscation order was made against him in the sum of £2,628,490, on the basis that his assets, which included a hotel and a portfolio of properties, must have been derived from the proceeds of the earlier drug trafficking (i.e. offences of which he had never been convicted). There was no finding or allegation that he had hidden assets.

The House of Lords had to consider (inter alia) whether that order was compatible with the ECHR, Article 6.

Their lordships (Lord Brown dissenting) were satisfied that in the circumstances of the instant case, Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR did not apply as the confiscation proceedings (brought under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, s. 4, now repealed) did not involve charging the defendant with any criminal offence. Lord Phillips said:

40. . . . There are two ways of proving, with the aid of assumptions, the existence of benefit derived from drug trafficking. The first is to prove the existence of property and to make a reasonable assumption that it was derived from drug trafficking. The second is to prove the existence of drug trafficking and to make a reasonable assumption as to the benefit that must have been derived from it.

41. Although . . . the requirements of Article 6(2) and 6(3) did not apply in this case, those of Article 6(1) were nonetheless applicable. The requirements of a fair trial in confiscation proceedings are not poles apart from those imposed by Article 6(2) and 6(3). Where, as here, the prosecution rely on criminal offending to prove the existence of benefit, they have to prove that offending. The defendant is presumed innocent until proved guilty, albeit by the civil standard of proof. When, in Grayson & Barnham ((App No 19955/05 and 15085/06) [2008] All ER (D) 110 (Sep)) the Strasbourg Court set out the safeguards in our system that had led it to conclude that our procedure satisfied Article 6(1) it might well have been carrying out a check list of the relevant requirements of Article 6(3).

42. The facts of this case are unusual. The prosecution, as part of their case on the conspiracy to import heroin, gave the defence particulars of evidence that they intended to adduce of other drug offences. The appellant challenged these at his trial and could have challenged them again in the confiscation proceedings. The judge was sure on the evidence that the relevant offences were proved. He deduced the benefit from the proved offending. In the Court of Appeal Richards LJ held that the procedure adopted was compatible with Article 6(2). There is no basis for suggesting that the fair trial requirements of Article 6(1) were not satisfied.

E19.21 The Amount of Benefit

Carter [2006] EWCA Crim 416 was followed in Paulet [2009] EWCA Crim 288, where Lord Judge CJ said:

15. Mr Farrell drew our attention to a decision of this court in R v Carter, where an appellant who used false identity papers to obtain employment was convicted of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. In the course of confiscation proceedings under the previous legislation (the CJA 1988), it was submitted that his wages did not constitute benefit; the offence was the dishonest obtaining of the opportunity for work. That submission was rejected. Newman J, giving the judgment of the court, observed at [38]:

It seems to us to be obvious that where you obtain an opportunity to work from an offer of employment being made to you, and the offer has been induced by a false representation that you are entitled to work, the false representation continues thereafter for the benefit of the offender who, permitting the representation to continue, is able to retain employment. Once made, it continues to have effect throughout the employment which has been taken up. At any stage had the representation been corrected, it is plain the employment would have ceased.

16. The decision of the court in Carter is not as well known as it should be. . . . It is worth underlining in the course of this judgment that that decision ought to be better known. If it were possible for it to be better known, it would be to everyone's advantage.

E19.32 Enforcement, Reconsideration and Appeals

The concept of 'realisable property' was examined in Peacock [2009] EWCA Crim 654, in the context of proceedings under the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (now repealed). Slade J said:

Realisable property . . . is any property held by the defendant. It is not confined to that which is specifically identified. Money received is a realisable asset even though its source is described generically and its exact provenance is not established. Further, a court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences as to the existence of realisable assets from evidence satisfying it to the requisite standard of proof.

Note that for the purposes of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, realisable property must be 'free property' within the meaning of s. 82 of that Act (i.e. must not already be subject to forfeiture or deprivation orders) and may also include free property held by the recipient of a tainted gift.

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Part F Evidence

F12 Bad Character of Accused

F12.21 Relevance to Important Matter

An important matter in issue between the defendant and prosecution may include his propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged, or his propensity to be untruthful, but is not confined to such matters. According to the Court of Appeal in Jordan [2009] EWCA Crim 953, evidence of bad character may also be relevant for a different kind of reason such as to rebut a defence of innocent association or coincidence. In Jordan itself, D and two other men had been arrested by armed police who intercepted a stolen car. A pistol, balaclavas, gloves and various other things that might be used by armed robbers were found in the car. D was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to the Firearms Act 1968, s. 18.

D's defence was that he had that he had been walking to the bus stop when the driver, whom he had met once or twice, stopped and offered him a lift. He had no knowledge of the firearm, but was merely an innocent passenger in the car. To prove his involvement, the prosecution were permitted to call evidence of two of D's previous convictions: one for possession of a firearm without a certificate and one for robbery, both of which dated from 1991. He had been in prison for much of the time since then.

Upholding the conviction, the Court treated this not as evidence of propensity but as evidence relating to the question whether D knew that there was a firearm in the car. Arguably, however, it was both. One may of course envisage cases where previous convictions can be used to prove knowledge without necessarily relying on propensity (see for example Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Siu Yuk-shing [1989] 1 WLR 236) but this was not one of them. It was precisely because D's criminal record suggested a propensity to commit such offences that his protestations of ignorance appeared so far fetched.

For a broader (and arguably better) view of what amounts to evidence of propensity, see Johnson [2009] EWCA Crim 649 (noted below at F12.24).

F12.24 Prescribed Categories of Offences to Show Propensity

The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) Order 2004 (SI 2004 No. 3346) was considered by the Court of Appeal in Johnson [2009] EWCA Crim 649, in which one of the questions that arose was whether previous convictions for substantive offences of dishonesty, (including burglary with intent to steal) could be admissible as evidence of propensity in connection with a charge of conspiracy to commit such burglaries. Curiously, conspiracy is not one of the offences listed in the schedule to the Order, although other inchoate offences are so listed.

The trial judge ruled that this meant the previous convictions could not be admitted to establish propensity under s. 101(1)(d). He seems thereby to have overlooked the Court of Appeal's earlier ruling in Hanson [2005] 1 WLR 3169, but this error was cancelled out by another error, in which he ruled that:

Propensity is not the only important matter in issue between a defendant and the prosecution. Bad character is also relevant to whether [a defendant] would participate in a conspiracy to burgle, it being admitted that the burglaries in question did in fact take place.

If evidence of a defendant's bad character demonstrates that the defendant in question would be 'willing to participate in a conspiracy to burgle' that is synonymous with evidence of propensity, so the judge ended up admitting the convictions as evidence to establish propensity after all. As Maurice Kay LJ explained (at [21]):

If the judge had not fallen into error in concluding that propensity was off the agenda, we have no doubt that he would have admitted the bad character evidence on a propensity basis. It is obvious that, having decided to admit the evidence on a basis which we have found to be synonymous with propensity, he would have admitted it on a propensity basis but for the error we have identified. It follows that the error, by itself, is not material to the safety of the convictions.

One is left wondering what purpose if any is now served by the Categories of Offences Order. The answer appears to be 'none'. As Hanson and Johnson demonstrate, a previous conviction may be admissible to establish propensity even though it is neither for an offence of the same description nor for an offence of the same category as the offence[s] now charged, whereas a previous conviction may not necessarily be admissible for that purpose even though it is for an offence of the same category or description. The futility of the 'prescribed categories' approach is surely demonstrated by the fact that after the first (Categories of Offences) Order no more such orders were ever made.

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NEW Legislation

Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 860)

This Order brings into force the following provisions of the Act:

(a) on 1 April 2009:

• s. 1(5) (youth rehabilitation orders), insofar as it relates to sch. 1, paras. 26(5) and 35 (further provision about youth rehabilitation orders);
• s. 125 (parenting contracts and parenting orders: local authorities);
• s. 143 (persistent sales of tobacco to persons under 18);
• s. 146 (convention against human trafficking);
• related repeals, revocations and transitory, transitional and saving provisions;

(b) on 27 April 2009:

• s. 35 (referral conditions);
• s. 36 (power to revoke a referral order);
• s. 37 (extension of period for which young offender contract has effect);
• sch. 26, paras. 40, 42, 43 and 49 (minor and consequential amendments: to the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000) and the repeal in sch. 28, part 2 relating to s. 17 of the 2000 Act.

Iran (United Nations Sanctions) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 886)

This Order gives effect to United Nations sanctions relating to the procurement of arms from Iran. Inter alia a number of offences are created concerning procurement, transport of arms and failure to provide information.

Police and Justice Act 2006 (Commencement No. 1) (England) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 936)

This Order brings ss. 19, 20 and 21 of, and sch. 8 to, the Act into force in England on 30 April 2009. The provisions relate to local authority crime and disorder committees.

Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 8) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 1028)

This Order brings into force sch. 25, paras. 1 to 23, 26(1) and (2) and 28 to 33 on 31 October 2009. All the provisions which are implemented concern amendments to the legislation affecting the armed forces.

Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions) Order 2009 (SI 2009 No. 1059)

This Order, which largely has effect only from 31 October 2009, makes transitional provision consequent on the coming into force of the Armed Forces Act 2006 on that date. Inter alia it provides that offences under the various Acts repealed and replaced by the Armed Forces Act 2006 ('SDA offences') will be treated as within the definition of the term 'service offence', a term inserted in other legislation by the 2006 Act.

Armed Forces Act 2006 (Commencement No. 5) Order (SI 2009 No. 1167)

This Order inter alia brings the whole of the Act into force on 31 October 2009.

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