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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009

December 2008

December Update 2008

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, Leicester De Montfort law School, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone's Criminal Practice, with occasional contributions from other Criminal Practice authors.

The December update primarily considers developments reported in November 2008.



Part A General Principles of Criminal Law

A6 Inchoate Offences

A6.54 Conspiracy to Defraud and Related Offences

Whittle [2008] EWCA Crim 2560 is the first reported case involving offences under the Enterprise Act 2002, s.188, by which it is an offence for an individual dishonestly to agree with one or more persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements between two or more undertakings that are anti-competitive within the UK. By s. 190, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for five years or a fine or both.

The sentences imposed in this case were influenced by special circumstances and are not be treated as guidelines, but on a more general level the court noted the following factors as likely to be relevant to any sentence passed for such an offence:

  • the gravity and nature of the offence;
  • the duration of the offence;
  • the degree of culpability of the defendant in implementing the cartel agreement;
  • the degree of culpability of the defendant in enforcing the cartel agreement;
  • whether the defendant's conduct was contrary to guidelines laid down in a company compliance manual;
  • mitigating factors: e.g. any co-operation the defendant may have provided in respect of the enquiry; whether or not the defendant was compelled to participate in the cartel under duress; whether the offence was a first offence; and any personal circumstances of the defendant which the courts may regard as a factor suggesting leniency.

Part B Offences

B3 Sexual Offences

B3.282 Indecent Photographs of Children, etc

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provision) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2993) inter alia brings into force on 26 January 2009, ss. 63 to 68 (extreme pornography) and sch. 14 (special protection for providers of information society services).


B4 Theft, Handling Stolen Goods and Related Offences

B4.5 Sentencing Guidelines: Offences of Theft Generally

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued a new sentencing guideline which relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008). It applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for theft on or after 5 January 2009. The guidelines cover inter alia (i) theft in breach of trust (thereby superseding the former Court of Appeal guidelines in Barrick (1985) 81 Cr App R 78 and Clark [1998] 2 Cr App R 137: see B4.8) (ii) theft in a dwelling, (ii) theft from the person (see B4.7) and (v) theft from a shop (superseding Page [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 221: see B4.6).

B4.6 Sentencing Guidelines: Shoplifting

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued a new sentencing guideline which relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008). It applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for shoplifting on or after 5 January 2009.

B4.7 Sentencing Guidelines: Theft from the Person

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued a new sentencing guideline which relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008). It applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for theft from the person on or after 5 January 2009.

B4.8 Sentencing Guidelines: Theft in Breach of Trust

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued a new sentencing guideline which relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008). It applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for theft in breach of trust on or after 5 January 2009.

B4.58 Burglary: Sentencing Guidelines

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued a new sentencing guideline which relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008). It applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for burglary other than in a dwelling on or after 5 January 2009.


B7 Company, Investment and Insolvency Offences

B7.1 Scope of the Companies Acts

The Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2860) inter alia brings the following provisions of the Act into force on 1 October 2009 for all remaining purposes, namely in part 36 (offences under the Companies Acts), ss. 1121 to 1123 (liability of officer in default), s. 1125 (meaning of 'daily default fine') and ss. 1127 to 1133 (other provisions).

The transitional provision in art. 7 includes the following:

(1) Where a provision creating an offence is repealed and re-enacted without modification by or under the Companies Act 2006-
(a) an offence committed before the commencement of the new law is to be charged under the old law,
(b) an offence committed after the commencement of the new law is to be charged under the new law, and
(c) an offence committed partly before and partly after the commencement of the new law is to be charged under the new law and not under the old.
(2) For this purpose an offence is committed partly before and partly after the commencement of the new law if a relevant event occurs before commencement and another relevant event occurs after commencement.
(3) A 'relevant event' means an act, omission or other event (including any result of one or more acts or omissions) proof of which is required for conviction of the offence.
(4) This article is without prejudice to section 1297(2) of the Companies Act 2006 (continuity of the law).

B7.4 Liability of Officers in Default

The Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2860) inter alia brings ss. 1121 to 1123 into force for all remaining purposes on 1 October 2009.

B7.6 Summary Offences: General Provisions

The Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2860) inter alia brings s. 1125 (meaning of 'daily default fine') and ss. 1127 to 1133 (other provisions) into force for all remaining purposes on 1 October 2009.


B10 Terrorism, etc

B10.56 Information about Acts of Terrorism: Sentencing

Guidance on principles to be applied in sentencing for offences under the Terrorism Act 2000, s. 38B, was provided in Sherif [2008] EWCA Crim 2653, a case arising out of the unsuccessful terrorist bombing attacks on the London transport system in July 2005. The defendants in this case were persons who had known of the planned attacks and had either assisted the bombers in some way (before or after the offences) or had failed to disclose evidence concerning them. Latham LJ said (at [45]):

(a) The offences under s. 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000 carry maximum sentences of 5 years imprisonment. The first general question, therefore, is whether the judge was right to impose, on so many counts, the maximum sentence. It is well established that the maximum sentence for any offence should not be imposed except for the worst type of offending. ... In many cases, it will be the seriousness of the terrorist activity about which a defendant has failed to give information which will determine the level of criminality, rather than the extent of the information which could be provided which will affect the sentence. ...
(b) ...there is nothing wrong in principle with imposing consecutive sentences where both limbs of s. 38B of the Act have been charged. The failure to give information before the act, arguably the more serious offence, and failure to give information afterwards are entirely separate offences, although the failure may arise out of the same state of mind, for example misplaced loyalty. Where, as here, the offence of assisting an offender is charged, however, care needs to be taken to ensure that there is criminality over and above the failure to inform if a consecutive sentence is to be justified.
(c) ...There is of course always a place for exceptional personal mitigation even in cases as grave as this. We are very much alive to the personal dilemma that can be presented to someone faced with the unexpected and unwelcome news, or the gradual realisation, that a close family member or friend may be about to participate or has participated in a terrorist outrage. We understand that every encouragement must be given to such people to come forward to tell the authorities what they know, to prevent bloodshed or to bring to justice those responsible. There may be cases where the court may be able to show some understanding and even mercy when someone, if vulnerable either because of age or their particular relationship with an offender, for a time, mistakenly and misguidedly puts loyalty to a family or to a friend before duties to the public or before disclosing what they know to the police.

B11 Public Order Offences

B11.109 Demonstrations without Authorisation in Designated Area

As to when a demonstration amounts to a public procession under the Public Order Act 1986, s. 11(1) and (2), see Kay v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2008] UKHL 69, in which it was held that a fixed and known route was not an essential characteristic of a 'procession commonly or customarily held'. This was relevant to the 'Critical Mass' cycling event which involves a mass cycle ride that starts from same meeting point in London at same time each month since 1994, but does not have a fixed and known route.

Lord Phillips said (at [21]):

Section 11 does not require notice to be given of every procession that is capable of creating a disturbance. The fact that, on their natural meaning, the words of section 11(2) are wide enough to exclude some processions in respect of which the police do not have all the information that they would wish is no reason to give those words an unnatural meaning. They should be given their natural meaning so as to apply to Critical Mass as a procession that is commonly or customarily held. For this reason I would allow this appeal.

A wider issue also arose, and was considered in some of the opinions delivered, but did not ultimately fall to be decided, namely, whether 'Critical Mass' involved any advance planning or organisation such that, because of its spontaneous nature and because those who took part in it knew where and when it was to start, s. 11 had any application at all to it. Brief consideration was also given to the position of organisers who were proposing to hold, for the first time, a procession which had no predetermined route, but the case was determined solely on the basis of the narrower issue noted above.


B18 Offences Involving Writing, Speech or Publication

B18.16 Publishing, or Having for Publication for Gain, an Obscene Article

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provision) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2993) inter alia brings into force on 26 January 2009, s. 71 of the Act, which amends the Obscene Publications Act 1959, s. 2(1)(b) so as to increase the maximum penalty on conviction on indictment from three years' imprisonment to five years.


B22 Immigration Offences

B22.6 Illegal Entry and Deception: Defences

Having considered Makuwa [2006] EWCA Crim 175 and Asfaw [2008] 2 WLR 1178 the Court of Appeal held in Hasan [2008] All ER (D) 116 (Nov) that the phrase, 'as soon as was reasonably practicable' when used in the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 s. 31(1)(c) does not mean 'at the earliest possible moment'. Where an aircraft carrying a refugee who is using false documents lands briefly in some other safe country, that does not necessarily preclude him from seeking asylum when his flight eventually reaches the UK.

The court held it to be clear from Makuwa that once there is credible evidence that the accused is a refugee the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the contrary; but in relation to the other matters which must be established under s. 31(1) the burden of proof is on the defendant. The usual standard of proof for defendants then applies. It was meanwhile considered clear from Asfaw that ss. 31(1) and (2) must be construed generously in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention.


Part D Procedure

D1 Powers of Investigation

D1.2 Reasonable Suspicion

O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286 was considered and the ruling of the High Court in Raissi v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2007] EWHC 2842 (QB) was affirmed in Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Raissi [2008] EWCA Civ 1237.

One of the issues that arose in Raissi was whether an officer who is instructed to arrest a person, but without being given reasonable grounds to suspect that person's guilt, may properly assume that his superior must have some other (undisclosed) information that would justify the arrest. Dicta expressed by members of the Appellate Committee in O'Hara may have appeared at first sight to be ambiguous on that issue, but the Court of Appeal in Raissi was ultimately satisfied that no differences of opinion existed within the Committee. It is clearly no defence for an officer to say that he was 'only obeying orders' and there is no practical difference in practice between such blind obedience and an assumption that the orders must have some justification. It cannot avail the arresting officer to say that his superior probably had other information justifying arrest but he did not tell him what it was.


D8 Assets Recovery

D8.32 Confiscation Orders: Procedure

Proceedings to enforce a confiscation order by civil means attract the protection of the ECHR, Article 6(1). Enforcement of a confiscation order involves the imposition of a financial penalty, analogous to a fine. The ultimate sanction in default of payment is imprisonment. Accordingly, enforcement of confiscation proceedings involves the determination of a criminal charge: R (Minshall) v Marylebone Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 2800 (Admin). In that case, however, the fact that enforcement of a confiscation order imposed on the claimant in October 2000 was suspended until May 2006 pending various complex appeals by the claimant and others (and was not finally proceeded with until August 2006) did not constitute an infringement of the claimant's Convention rights. Whilst the period between the imposition of the confiscation order and the enforcement proceedings had been unusually long it was not unreasonable within the meaning of Article 6(1).


D24 Civil Behaviour Orders

D24.14 Breach of the ASBO

Definitive guidelines have been published dealing with breaches of ASBOs (adult and youth offenders). The guidelines will be effective from 5 January 2009.

D24.23 Closure Orders

The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provision) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2993) inter alia brings s. 118 and sch. 20 (closure orders: premises associated with persistent disorder or nuisance) into force on 1 December 2008.


D27 Reference to the Court of Appeal

D27.1 Reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission

The conflict between R (Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions) v Criminal Cases Review Commission [2007] 1 Cr App R 395 and Cottrell [2007] 1 WLR 3262 was noted once again in Rowe [2008] EWCA Crim 2712, where Lord Judge CJ emphasised that it is not open to the CCRC to choose between these two authorities when deciding whether to refer a case to the Court of Appeal. In this context, Cottrell is authoritative and must be followed.


D30 Public Funding and Costs

D30.3 Grant of Right to Representation

In R (GKR Law Solicitors) v Liverpool Magistrates Court [2008] EWHC 2974 (Admin), a driver sought to call her 12-year-old son as a witness at a hearing in which she asserted special reasons for not having her licence endorsed. She claimed that he had witnessed an incident that had scared her into speeding away, and argued that she should be granted legal representation in order that her son could be examined in chief by a trained advocate. This was refused by the magistrates' court, but an application for judicial review by her solicitors was successful. Cox J held that it had clearly been in the interests of justice to grant legal representation, so as to secure the necessary professional skills to enable a fair and proper consideration of the questions to be determined. Cox J noted the statutory requirement that special measures be taken to assist a young child in giving evidence to the court so as to improve the quality of his evidence. The defendant lacked the necessary skills and resources to make the appropriate arrangements herself for those special measures to be undertaken.


Part E Sentencing

E4 Custodial Sentences for Dangerous Offenders

E4.11 Imprisonment for Public Protection: Multiple Offences and Concurrent Terms

Certain observations made by Rose LJ in Lang [2006] 1 WLR 2509 were considered and explained in Stannard [2008] EWCA Crim 2789, which concerned the sentencing of 'dangerous' offenders for offences committed both before and after 4 April 2005, when the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 225, was brought into force. Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Judge CJ condemned what apparently has been the widespread practice of disregarding s. 225 and its related provisions in cases where offences committed before 4 April 2005 were more serious than those committed on or after that date. It may be appropriate to impose no separate penalty in respect of lesser offences committed before that date, but nothing that was said in Lang suggested that the statutory provisions relating to the post 4 April 2005 offences should or could be disapplied.

Where the judge concludes that a convicted offender poses the requisite risk to the public, as set out in s. 225(1)(b), and imposes a sentence of imprisonment for public protection or an extended sentence, the earlier offences should instead be dealt with by imposing concurrent determinate sentences, because 'an order for no separate penalty will tend to convey to the victim that the court did not properly address the impact of the crimes'.

Stannard made only passing references to the significant amendments made to the dangerous offender provisions by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, which have effect from 14 July 2008. The important case of A-G's Ref (No. 55 of 2008) [2008] EWCA Crim 2790 considers this further. In this case the Court of Appeal considered nine otherwise unrelated appeals arising under these provisions, in all of which cases the sentence had been imposed after the relevant amendments had come into force. Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Judge CJ began by pointing out that the amended scheme applies whenever an offender is sentenced after 14 July for whatever reason, such as the demands of the court, the illness of witnesses, the length of any trial, or where sentence is delayed because the offender has absented himself. Next, his lordship stressed the 'most striking feature' of the amendments, which is the repeal of the 'prescriptive and unhelpful statutory assumption' formerly to be found in s. 229(3). Nonetheless, the sentence of imprisonment for public protection remains (as originally stated in Johnson [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 112) a sentence which, although punitive in its effect, 'is concerned with future risks and public protection' rather than representing punishment for past offending. His lordship went on to consider the revised conditions for imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, set out in s. 225(3A) and (3B). It was noted that the list of offences specified in sch. 15A is much shorter than the original list of 'specified offences' in sch. 15. Where, however, the offender at the time the offence was committed had been convicted of an offence listed in sch. 15A, the sentence of imprisonment for public protection becomes available irrespective of the seriousness of the latest offence. The condition set out in s. 225(3B) requires that the notional sentence should be at least four years. Judge CJ stressed that a court should not reach such a figure unless it was justified by the seriousness of the offence. If the offender has been convicted of more than one offence then the issue was whether the totality of the offending was appropriately met by a notional sentence of that magnitude (while disregarding any credit which would normally be due for time spent on remand). Accordingly, 'condition 3B may be established notwithstanding the absence of an individual offence for which a four-year term would be appropriate'.

In deciding whether a sentence of imprisonment for public protection should be passed, the court should first consider the suitability of other available means of providing public protection from the offender, including a determinate sentence (perhaps with a sexual offences prevention order) or an extended sentence. If an appropriate overall sentencing package short of imprisonment for public protection can be found, then imprisonment for public protection should not be imposed. Lord Judge CJ said (at [14]):

Returning to the exercise of the court's discretion, or more accurately, its judgment, whether a sentence of imprisonment for public protection should be passed when the necessary criteria are established, the court is entitled to and should have in mind all the alternative and cumulative methods of providing the necessary public protection against the risk posed by the individual offender. For example, structured around a determinate sentence, or indeed an extended sentence under section 227 of the Act, which we shall shortly address, a sexual offences prevention order, with appropriate conditions attached could form part of what we may colloquially describe as the total protective sentencing package. Apart from the discretionary sentence of life imprisonment, imprisonment for public protection when the necessary conditions are fulfilled, is the most draconian sentence available to the court. If they are, we re-emphasise that the primary question is the nature and extent of the risk posed by the individual offender, and the most appropriate method of addressing that risk and providing public protection. If what we have described as the overall sentencing package provides appropriate protection, imprisonment for public protection should not be imposed.

See further the observations of the Court of Appeal in Terrell [2007] EWCA Crim 3079, [2008] 2 All ER 1065, considered in Blackstone's Criminal Practice at E21.12) on the use of the sexual offences prevention order, comments which are now even more relevant following the amendments made by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

(Comment on A-G's Ref (No 55 of 2008) contributed by Professor Martin Wasik CBE.)


E7 Detention and Training Orders

E7.16 Breach of Order

The reference to the 'remainder of the term of the DTO' in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s. 104(3)(a), means the period between the occasion on which it was proved, to the satisfaction of the court before which the offender was brought, that he had failed to comply with specified requirements, pursuant to s. 103(6)(b), and the expiry of the DTO (H v Doncaster Youth Court [2008] All ER (D) 194 (Nov)).


E9 Community Sentences: Offenders Aged under 18

E9.1 General

The Sentencing Advisory Panel has published a consultation paper on the sentencing of young offenders.  The paper follows the creation of youth rehabilitation orders in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and it is anticipated that implementation of that provision will await the publication of definitive guidelines from the SGC. The closing date for the consultation is 23 March 2009.

See www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk


E19 Confiscation Orders

E19.1 General

In Moulden [2008] EWCA Crim 2561, the court considered a case involving two separate incidents of deception under the Theft Act 1968, each of which had been the subject of a separate indictment. One had occurred before and one after commencement of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 regime on 24 March 2003. Having considered the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Commencement No. 5, Transitional Provisions, Savings and Amendment) Order 2003 (SI 2003 No 333), para. 3, the court found that the two indictments reflected not just two separate offences but two separate sets of proceedings and that consequently, two frameworks applied. That ruled out any application of criminal lifestyle assumptions under either the 2002 Act or the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s. 72AA. Her total benefit would thus be assessed at £ 23,000 + £ 3,602, whereas the potential benefit under 'criminal lifestyle' assumptions would have amounted to a staggering £ 524, 200.

E19.32 Enforcement

Proceedings to enforce a confiscation order by civil means attract the protection of the ECHR, Article 6(1). Enforcement of a confiscation order involves the imposition of a financial penalty, analogous to a fine. The ultimate sanction in default of payment is imprisonment. Accordingly, enforcement of confiscation proceedings involves the determination of a criminal charge: R (Minshall) v Marylebone Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 2800 (Admin). In that case, however, the fact that enforcement of a confiscation order imposed on the claimant in October 2000 was suspended until May 2006 pending various complex appeals by the claimant and others (and was not finally proceeded with until August 2006) did not constitute an infringement of the claimant's Convention rights. Whilst the period between the imposition of the confiscation order and the enforcement proceedings had been unusually long it was not unreasonable within the meaning of Article 6(1).


E23 Notification Requirements under the Sexual Offences Act 2003

E23.2 Listed Offences

Notification requirements apply in respect of some offences only where the offender has received a specified type of sentence. In cases of sexual assault a community sentence of at least 12 months will suffice, but one of less than 12 months will not. In D (AV) [2008] EWCA Crim 2795 (sub nom Davison [2008] All ER (D) 13 (Nov)) it was held that a sentence of so many hours unpaid work to be completed within 12 months is for these purposes a sentence of at least 12 months, even if the offender might in practice be able to complete his allotted hours in a shorter period.

Odam [2008] EWCA Crim 1087, in which the court had assumed the contrary, has been the subject of academic criticism and was disapproved.


Part F Evidence

F12 Evidence of Bad Character of Accused

F12.11 The Statutory Gateways

The often complex relationship between the various gateways to admissibility of bad character evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 101, was examined in Assani [2008] EWCA Crim 2503, in which the court stressed the importance of ss. 105(7) and 106(3). These provisions (which seem to have been overlooked at trial) limit the admissibility of evidence of bad character under ss. 101(1)(f) and (g) to prosecution evidence. They can never enable evidence of the bad character of one defendant to be adduced at the behest of a co-defendant. (The same is of course true of the gateway under s. 101(1)(d), which is limited by s. 103(6).) Maurice Kay LJ said:

In short, we do not consider that gateway (f) - or for that matter, gateway (g) - permits evidence of the bad character of one defendant to be adduced at the behest of another defendant. Applications of that sort often arise, but their governing provision is gateway (e). Gateway (e) was also relied upon by the appellant at trial. The difficulty is that, whereas under gateway (f) the evidence must have "probative value" in correcting a false impression, under gateway (e) the evidence must have "substantial probative value" in relation to an important issue between defendants. That is an additional protection for the defendant whose character is under attack by a co-defendant. ...

Appendices

Appendix 8 Sentencing Guidelines Council Guidelines

The Sentencing Guidelines Council has issued two new sentencing guidelines.

The first relates to Theft and Burglary in a building other than a dwelling (December 2008), which applies to offenders aged over 18 falling to be sentenced for theft, or for that particular form of burglary, on or after 5 January 2009. The guidelines cover (i) theft in breach of trust (thereby superseding the former Court of Appeal guidelines in Barrick (1985) 81 Cr App R 78 and Clark [1998] 2 Cr App R 137: see B4.8) (ii) theft in a dwelling, (ii) theft from the person and (v) theft from a shop (superseding Page [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 221: see B4.6), as well as (vi) burglary in a building other than a dwelling. House burglary offences remain subject to the well known guidelines issued by the Court of Appeal in McInerney [2002] EWCA 3003 and these sentences are not affected by the new SGC guidelines.

The second guideline deals with sentencing for Breach of an Anti-Social Behaviour Order (December 2008). Again, it is applicable to offenders falling to be sentenced for such a breach, on or after 5 January 2009. This document provides separate guidelines applicable to adults and to young offenders.

The full text of these guidelines can be found at www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk


NEW legislation

Counter-Terrorism Act 2008

This Act received Royal Assent on 26 November 2008 and some parts are already in force. The Act makes several changes to the law against terrorism, notably in respect of the gathering, retention and sharing of documents, fingerprints and other information, the post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects; the prosecution of offences and punishment of offenders; notification requirements; terrorist financing and money laundering; 'financial restrictions proceedings' and inquiries dealing with sensitive information.

Part 5 of the Act (terrorist financing and money laundering) and Part 6 (financial restrictions proceedings) came into force on 27 November. Most other substantive provisions will be brought into force on such dates as may be specified by Order of the Secretary of State.

Part 5 (s. 62 and sch. 7) confers powers on the Treasury to act against terrorist financing, money laundering and certain other activities.

Part 6 (ss. 63 to 73) deals with financial restrictions proceedings, which are civil proceedings in the High Court or (in Scotland) the Court of Session by which a person affected by certain kinds of Treasury decision may apply to have the decision set aside. The types of decision in question are those made under UN Terrorism Orders, part 2 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, or under part 5 of and sch. 7 to the 2008 Act.

Section 75 of the Act will, when brought into force, amend the definition of 'terrorism' in a number of existing provisions, including:

(a) The Terrorism Act 2000, s. 1(1)(c);
(b) the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, s. 113A(2);
(c) the Criminal Justice Act 2003, sch. 21, para. 4(2)(c); and
(d) the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (SI 2006 No. 2657), art. 2(3)(c).

When amended, the definition of terrorism in these provisions will include acts done for the purpose of advancing a racial cause (in addition to a political, religious or ideological cause). The practical effect of the change is probably small. As the explanatory notes to the Act point out, a racial cause will in most cases be subsumed within a political or ideological cause, but this amendment is designed to put the matter beyond doubt.


Energy Act 2008

This Act also received Royal Assent on 26 November and deals inter alia with such energy related issues as the offshore gas infrastructure, carbon dioxide storage, the 'Renewables Obligation', feed-in tariffs for small scale low carbon electricity generation, renewable heat incentives, the decommissioning of energy installations, offshore transmission and smart meters.

The Act creates a number of offences, notably in respect of licence applications and unlicensed activities, but none of these are yet in force.


Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 8, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2860)

This Order brings the following provisions of the Act into force on 1 October 2009, together with related repeals.

(a) in part 1 (general introductory provisions), s. 1 (companies) and ss. 3 to 6 (types of company);
(b) part 2 (ss 7 to 16) (company formation);
(c) in part 3 (a company's constitution), s. 17 (a company's constitution), ss. 18 to 28 (articles of association) and ss. 31 to 38 (other provisions relating to a company's constitution);
(d) in part 4 (a company's capacity and related matters), ss. 39 to 42 (capacity of company and power of directors to bind it), ss. 43 and 45 to 47 (formalities of doing business under the law of England and Wales or Northern Ireland), s. 48 (formalities of doing business under the law of Scotland) and ss. 49 to 52 (other matters);
(e) in part 5 (a company's name), ss. 53 to 57 (general requirements), ss. 58 to 65 (indications of company type or legal form), ss. 66 to 68 (similarity to other names), ss. 75 and 76 (powers of Secretary of State in relation to company names) and ss. 77 to 81 (change of name),
(f) part 6 (ss 86 to 88) (a company's registered office);
(g) part 7 (ss 89 to 111) (re-registration as a means of altering a company's status);
(h) in part 8 (a company's members), s. 112 (the members of a company), ss. 113 to 115 and 120 and 122 to 127 (register of members), ss. 129 to 135 (overseas branch registers) and ss. 136 to 144 (prohibition on subsidiary being member of its holding company);
(i) in part 10 (a company's directors), ss. 162 to 167 (register of directors), ss. 240 to 246 (directors' residential addresses: protection from disclosure),s 247 (power to make provision for employees on cessation or transfer of business);
(j) in part 12 (company secretaries), ss. 275 to 279 (register of secretaries);
(k) in part 17 (a company's share capital), ss. 540 to 543 and 545 to 548 (shares and share capital), ss. 549 to 559 (allotment of shares: general provisions), ss. 560 to 577 (allotment of equity securities: shareholders' right of pre-emption), ss. 578 and 579 (public companies: allotment where issue not fully subscribed), ss. 580 to 592 (payment for shares), ss. 593 to 609 (public companies: independent valuation of non-cash consideration), ss. 610 to 616 (share premiums), ss. 617 to 628 (alteration of share capital), ss. 629 to 640 (classes of share and class rights), ss. 641(1)(b) and 645 to 653 (reduction of share capital confirmed by the court) and ss. 655 to 657 (miscellaneous and supplementary provisions);
(l) part 18 (ss 658 to 737) (acquisition by limited company of its own shares);
(m) part 24 (ss 854 to 859) (a company's annual return);
(n) part 25 (ss 860 to 894) (company charges);
(o) part 31 (ss 1000 to 1034) (dissolution and restoration to the register);
(p) in part 33 (UK companies not formed under companies legislation), ss. 1040 to 1042 (companies not formed under companies legislation but authorised to register);
(q) part 34 (ss 1044 to 1059) (overseas companies);
(r) in part 35 (the registrar of companies), ss. 1060 to 1062 (the registrar), s. 1063 (fees payable to registrar), so far as not already in force, ss. 1064 to 1067 (certificates of incorporation and registered numbers), ss. 1068(1) to (4), (6) and (7) and 1069 to 1071 (delivery of documents to the registrar), ss. 1072 to 1076 (requirements for proper delivery), ss. 1081 to 1084 (the register), ss. 1093 to 1098 (correction or removal of material on the register), ss. 1099 to 1101 (the registrar's index of company names), ss. 1108 to 1110 (language requirements: transliteration) and ss. 1112 to 1120 (supplementary provisions);
(s) in part 36 (offences under the Companies Acts), ss. 1121 to 1123 (liability of officer in default), s. 1125 (meaning of 'daily default fine') and ss. 1127 to 1133 (other provisions);
(t) in part 37 (companies: supplementary provisions), ss. 1134 to 1136, 1137(2), (3) and (5)(a) and 1138 (company records), ss. 1139 to 1142 (service addresses), ss. 1149 to 1153 (requirements as to independent valuation), ss. 1154 and 1155 (notice of appointment of certain officers) and s. 1156 (meaning of 'the court'),
(u) in part 38 (companies: interpretation), s. 1158 (meaning of 'UK-registered company'), ss. 1159 and 1160 and sch. 6 (meaning of 'subsidiary' and related expressions), s. 1163 (meaning of 'non-cash asset'), s. 1166 (meaning of 'employees' share scheme'), ss. 1168, 1171, 1173 (so far as not already in force) and 1174 and sch. 8 (other definitions etc);
(v) in part 39 (companies: minor amendments), s. 1180 (repeal of certain provisions about company charges) and s. 1181 (access to constitutional documents of RTE and RTM companies);
(w) part 40 (ss 1182 to 1191) (company directors: foreign disqualification);
(x) part 41 (ss 1192 to 1208) (business names);
(y) in part 44 (miscellaneous provisions), s. 1275 (levy to pay expenses of bodies concerned with actuarial standards etc) and s. 1283 (commonhold associations);
(z) part 45 (ss 1284 to 1287) (Northern Ireland).

Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (Commencement No. 4 and Saving Provision) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2993)

Inter alia, this Order brings the following provisions into force:

(a) on 1 December 2008, s. 61 (compensation for miscarriage of justice), s. 118 and sch. 20 (closure orders: premises associated with persistent disorder or nuisance), s. 126(1) and (3) and sch. 22, paras. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 17 (police misconduct and performance procedures), s. 127 and sch. 23, paras. 4 to 19 (investigation of police misconduct);
(b) on 26 January 2009, ss. 63 to 68 (extreme pornography) and 71 (publication of obscene articles) and sch. 14 (special protection for providers of information society services).

Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 3009)

This Order brings into force various provisions of the Act relating to mutual recognition of driving disqualifications made in the UK or Ireland. The dates of commencement largely depend on the making of declarations in Ireland and the UK under the Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union.

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