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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009

Updates

August 2008

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Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2009

August 2008

August Update 2008

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2008 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, De Montfort University, Leicester, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone's Criminal Practice.

The August update deals primarily with developments during July 2008.

Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law
Part B: Offences
Part C: Road Traffic Offences
Part D: Procedure
Part E: Sentencing
Part F: Evidence
Appendices
New Legislation

Part A General Principles of Criminal Law

A5 Parties to Crimes

A5.7 Joint Venture

In Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, the appellants were part of a group which, armed with weapons including baseball bats, metal bars and knives, chased and attacked the deceased, V. V suffered several injuries, but died from two stab wounds to the back. These wounds were deep and appeared to have been inflicted with great force and with murderous intent. This was not a case in which the killer merely intended to wound or cause serious injury. There was no evidence that the appellants themselves inflicted the fatal injuries, but they were convicted of murder on the basis of joint enterprise.

They appealed on the basis that the jury had not been asked to consider whether they had known or foreseen that the assailant who inflicted the fatal injuries would act with intent to kill, rather than merely with intent to inflict GBH. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, but certified the following questions for consideration by the House of Lords:

If in the course of a joint enterprise to inflict unlawful violence the principal party kills with an intention to kill which is unknown to and unforeseen by a secondary party, is the principal's intention relevant,

to whether the killing was within the scope of a common purpose to which the secondary party was an accessory?

to whether the principal's act was fundamentally different from the act or acts which the secondary party foresaw as part of the joint enterprise?

It is clear from English [1999] 1 AC 1 that the appellants would not have been liable had they intended or foreseen only a serious but non-fatal attack and had not been aware that the principal offender carried a lethal weapon which was then used to kill the deceased. Use of the lethal weapon in that kind of case would take the assault beyond the limits of any joint enterprise. But the appellants contended that a further question should have been put to the jury: even if the appellants knew that other members of their group were armed with knives or other equally dangerous weapons, has the prosecution proved that they knew or foresaw that such weapons would or might be used with murderous intent, rather than for the more limited purpose of causing serious injury? A guilty verdict would, it was argued, require an affirmative answer to that question.

The appeals were rejected. In a passage with which the other Law Lords concurred, Lord Bingham said:

24. Authority apart, there are in my view two strong reasons, one practical, the other theoretical, for [rejecting] the contention. The first is that the law of joint enterprise in a situation such as this is already very complex, as evidenced by the trial judge's direction and the Court of Appeal's judgment on these appeals, and the appellants' submission, if accepted, would introduce a new and highly undesirable level of complexity. Given the fluid, fast-moving course of events in incidents such as that which culminated in the killing of the deceased, incidents which are unhappily not rare, it must often be very hard for jurors to make a reliable assessment of what a particular defendant foresaw as likely or possible acts on the part of his associates. It would be even harder, and would border on speculation, to judge what a particular defendant foresaw as the intention with which his associates might perform such acts. It is safer to focus on the defendant's foresight of what an associate might do, an issue to which knowledge of the associate's possession of an obviously lethal weapon such as a gun or a knife would usually be very relevant.

25. Secondly, the appellants' submission, as it seems to me, undermines the principle on which, for better or worse, our law of murder is based. In the prosecution of a principal offender for murder, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove or the jury to consider whether the defendant intended on the one hand to kill or on the other to cause really serious injury. That is legally irrelevant to guilt. The rationale of that principle plainly is that if a person unlawfully assaults another with intent to cause him really serious injury, and death results, he should be held criminally responsible for that fatality, even though he did not intend it. If he had not embarked on a course of deliberate violence, the fatality would not have occurred. This rationale may lack logical purity, but it is underpinned by a quality of earthy realism. To rule that an undisclosed and unforeseen intention to kill on the part of the primary offender may take a killing outside the scope of a common purpose to cause really serious injury, calling for a distinction irrelevant in the case of the primary offender, is in my view to subvert the rationale which underlies our law of murder.

Both of the certified questions were thus answered in the negative. Lord Rodger declined to answer the first question on the basis that it was 'misconceived' but also answered the second question in the negative.

Doubts were expressed by Lords Scott and Brown, and to some extent by Lord Neuberger, as to the correctness of Carswell J's ruling in Gamble [1989] NI 268, but Lord Bingham's view was that the ruling was right: in that case the defendants had been a party to a kneecapping, but were not guilty of murder because the victim died not of the kneecapping but through having his throat slit with a knife. As Lord Bingham explained (at [29]):

the violence in fact inflicted with the knife was of an entirely different character in an entirely different context from that which they had foreseen and, in that sense, bargained for. The result seems to me consistent with authority.

Lord Roger's view (at [40]) was also that Gamble turned on its own special facts:

The facts of Gamble were unusual, involving a situation where the two defendants could point to a definite limited purpose for which they contemplated that violence would be used. Those unusual facts lent themselves to a possible conclusion, which Carswell J in fact reached, that there had indeed been a break in causation between the assault on the victim, with the intention of inflicting grievous bodily harm, and his murder by cutting his throat. In effect ... it was as if the two defendants whom he acquitted of murder had been about to kneecap the victim when two other men suddenly emerged from the undergrowth and cut his throat ...

The Court of Appeal in Rahman had suggested an elaborate sequential series of questions that might be put to a jury in such cases, but this attracted little support in the House of Lords. Lord Bingham's view (echoed by Lord Neuberger) was that:

There is, and can be, no prescriptive formula for directing juries. Having made clear the governing principle, it is for trial judges to choose the terms most apt to enable juries to reach a just decision in the particular case.

A6 Inchoate Offences

A6.20 Conspiracy

Yip Chieu-Chung v The Queen [1995] 1 AC 111 was distinguished in Rafiq [2008] EWCA Crim 1518, in which the court doubted whether an undercover officer who brings drugs into the UK as part of a controlled operation to catch the traffickers would be guilty of any offence in English law. The second appellant in this case had been convicted of conspiracy to import heroin in contravention of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s. 170(2), but argued that he was entrapped and that there was no genuine agreement to import the drug. Hooper LJ said:

48. We looked ... at Yip Chiu-Chung v The Queen and Latif [1996] 1WLR 104. Yip Chiu-Chung does not help. The offence in that case required no more than proof of export without a licence and thus could be committed by an undercover officer agreeing to the export without a licence.

49. Lord Steyn in Latif was prepared to assume, without deciding the issue, that a customs officer bringing heroin into this country as part of a controlled operation would commit an offence against section 170(2). We confess to considerable doubts whether an officer (and his colleagues in the operation as well as the senior authorising officers) can be knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion of a prohibition if he brings the drugs in with the full knowledge of his superiors even without a licence. In any event, there was, in this case, no evidence whether a licence had or had not been issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 3 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

50. [Counsel] has submitted that the officer might be knowingly concerned in a fraudulent attempt at evasion, namely the attempt being made by the UK purchaser. We do not need to decide the point because [counsel] rightly conceded that Shenwari [the alleged supplier] could not have been knowingly concerned in any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of the prohibition if the supply was not genuine, that is, if he believed that the heroin was to be brought into this country by a customs officer. He was right to make the concession notwithstanding Jones and Warburton [2002] EWCA Crim 735, in which the court said that:
... There is no authority in English criminal law that it is a defence on the part of someone who has actually committed a crime that he was doing so with the ulterior motive of law enforcement.
51. Shenwari, if the supply was not genuine, did not agree to commit a crime, because he did not agree to the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition.

A7 Human Rights

A7.55 Fair Trial in Criminal Proceedings

Edwards v UK (Applications 39647/98 and 40461/98) [2003] All ER (D) 368 (Jul) and H [2004] 1 All ER 1269 were considered by the Court of Appeal in Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 146. It was held to be unfair for a trial judge to rule against the admissibility of statements that the defence sought to admit under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 114(1)(d), on the basis of other documents that he had been given by the prosecution, and to which the defence had no access.

Part B Offences

B10 Terrorism, Piracy and Hijacking

B10.143 Dissemination of Terrorist Publications: Sentencing

Mansha [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 410 (see Blackstone's Criminal Practice, B10.70) and the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 143(1), were considered by the Court of Appeal in Rahman [2008] EWCA Crim 1465.

In Mansha the court had declared that a person convicted of a terrorist offence must expect a substantial sentence in order to serve as a deterrent to others and to mark the extreme seriousness of the criminality involved in terrorist activities; but the court in Rahman noted that:

care must, however, be taken to ensure that the sentence is not disproportionate to the facts of the particular offence... If sentences are imposed which are more severe than the circumstances of the particular case warrant this will be likely to inflame rather than deter extremism.

B11 Offences Affecting Public Order

B11.8 Prohibition of Unlawful Drilling

The Statute Law Repeals Act 2008 repeals the Unlawful Drilling Act 1819 with effect from 21 July 2008.

B12 Offences Relating to Weapons

B12.141 Manufacture, Sale and Hire of Offensive Weapons

The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2039) amends the principal Order of 1988 (SI 1988 No. 2019) so as to widen the defence available in respect of swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more (which were added to the list of weapons prohibited under the 1988 Order by SI 2008 No. 973: see the April Update).

B14 Offences Against the Administration of Justice

B14.47 Disposing of a Body with Intent to Prevent an Inquest

The common-law offence of preventing the decent and lawful burial of a body was examined on bizarre facts in Skidmore [2008] EWCA Crim 1464, in which the offence was held to have been committed by a funeral director who forgot to put an infant's body in the coffin for burial and attempted to conceal this blunder by placing it in the coffin of another deceased, which was in due course cremated. Hooper LJ said:

The use of the common law offence [on these facts] involves no extension of the common law and no contravention of the requirement of certainty. The fact that the applicant and his co-defendant acted in panic rather than from some dishonest motive, does not mean that the offence was not committed. The fact that they panicked can properly be taken into account in mitigation.

Part C Road Traffic Offences

C3 Offences Relating to Driving Triable on Indictment

C3.7 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving

The SGC has published a final guideline on offences involving causing death by driving which cover this offence and which have effect for offenders aged 18 or over who are sentenced on or after 4 August 2008. See http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines/council/final.html

C3.19 Causing Death by Careless Driving when under the Influence of Drink or Drugs

C3.26 Causing Death by Careless, or Inconsiderate, Driving

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1918) brings into force, on 18 August 2008, s. 20 of the Act and, so far as not already in force, s. 30. Section 20 creates the new offence of causing death by driving without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons.

The SGC has published a final guideline on offences involving causing death by driving which cover this offence and which have effect for offenders aged 18 or over. See http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines/council/final.html

C3.39 Causing Death by Driving: Unlicensed, Disqualified or Uninsured Drivers

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1918) brings into force, on 18 August 2008, s. 21 of the Act and, so far as not already in force, s. 30. Section 21 creates the new offence of causing death by driving whilst unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured.

Part D Procedure

D2 The Decision to Prosecute

D2.18 Judicial Review of Decision not to Prosecute

In R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2008] UKHL 60, the House of Lords considered the legality of a decision by the Director of the SFO not to prosecute an alleged case of extraterritorial corruption in connection with the securing of a major arms contract with Saudi Arabia (the Al Yamamah contract). Bribes had allegedly been paid by BAE Systems plc. The House held that the Director had acted lawfully in taking account of threats made by the Saudi government that, if the investigation was continued, Saudi Arabia would withdraw from the existing bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation arrangements with the UK.

The Saudis also threatened to withdraw co-operation from the UK in relation to its strategic objectives in the Middle East and end the negotiations then in train for the procurement of Typhoon aircraft, but economic or commercial considerations could not properly be taken into account without putting the UK in breach of its obligations under the OECD Convention on bribery, to which it was a party. Upholding the Director's decision, which was based on the threat to bilateral counter-terrorism co-operation, Lord Bingham (with whose opinion the other Law Lords agreed) concluded:

The Director was confronted by an ugly and obviously unwelcome threat. He had to decide what, if anything, he should do. He did not surrender his discretionary power of decision to any third party, although he did consult the most expert source available to him in the person of the Ambassador and he did, as he was entitled if not bound to do, consult the Attorney General who, however, properly left the decision to him. The issue in these proceedings is not whether his decision was right or wrong, nor whether the Divisional Court or the House agrees with it, but whether it was a decision which the Director was lawfully entitled to make. Such an approach involves no affront to the rule of law, to which the principles of judicial review give effect (see R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295, para 73, per Lord Hoffmann).

In the opinion of the House the Director's decision was one he was lawfully entitled to make. It may indeed be doubted whether a responsible decision-maker could, on the facts before the Director, have decided otherwise.

D3 Courts, Judges and Parties

D3.69 Abuse of Process: Bringing Justice into Disrepute

A private prosecution may amount to an abuse of process when the alleged crime in question is one that was encouraged by the private prosecutor or when in some other way the private prosecutor has essentially created the same mischief as that about which he now complains: R (Dacre) v City of Westminster Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 1667 (Admin). But it is not enough that the private prosecutor may have some ulterior personal motive for bringing the prosecution. As Latham LJ explained (at [30]):

It is inevitable that many private prosecutions will be brought with mixed motives (hence the decision of this court in Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte South Coast Shipping Company Ltd [1993] QB 645). The neighbour who sought to take out a private summons for assault would not merely have the public interest as his motive. Even the RSPCA may have its own particular motive in pursuing a particular prosecution.

D9 Disclosure

D9.38 Intercept Material

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, ss. 17 and 18, were examined by the Court of Appeal in Khyam [2008] EWCA Crim 1612. No transcript of the judgment is yet available, but it appears that the court in this major terrorist conspiracy case rejected defence submissions that details of certain telephone calls made by the appellants and intercepted by foreign security services should have been disclosed. It was not in the national interest, said the court, that valuable sources of information, which might frustrate an intended terrorist attack or help to identify those responsible for one, should dry up; and foreign authorities could not in any case be required to comply with UK disclosure principles.

Furthermore, a judge should not order disclosure to be made to him under s. 18 unless he was satisfied that exceptional circumstances made disclosure essential in the interests of justice. The self-serving assertions of a defendant could not amount to such circumstances.

D14 Trial on Indictment: General Matters and Pre-trial Procedure

D14.118 Anonymity

The Attorney-General has published new guidelines in response to the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008. The guidelines (The Prosecutor's Role in Applications for Witness Anonymity Orders under the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008) may be found at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov.uk/attachments/Attorney%20General's%20Guidelines%20on%20Witness%20Anonymity%20Orders%2021%20July%202008.pdf

D31 Extradition

D31.6 Part 2 of the Extradition Act

In McKinnon v Government of the United States of America [2008] UKHL 59, the question certified for consideration by the House of Lords was:

Is it an abuse of process of extradition proceedings, such that the proceedings should be stayed, and/or an unjustified interference with the defendant's human rights, for the requesting state to engage in plea bargaining, including a threat to the defendant that, unless he agrees to be extradited, repatriation to the United Kingdom to serve any sentence imposed in the requesting state will not be supported by the prosecuting authority in the requesting state?

Lord Brown, with whose opinion the other members of the House all concurred, considered the Canadian case of USA v Cobb [2001] 1 SCR 587, in which Canadian citizens had been indicted on fraud charges in America. The judge in Pennsylvania imposed lenient sentences on some defendants who had already surrendered to US jurisdiction, but in so doing warned the fugitives that:

...as to those people who don't come in and cooperate and if we get them extradited and they are found guilty, as far as I am concerned they are going to get the absolute maximum jail sentence that the law permits me to give.

The prosecuting attorney than stated on Canadian television that if a fugitive fought extradition and lost, he would end up being, 'the boyfriend of a very bad man'. That was understood to mean that he would be subjected to homosexual rape in a US jail. These threats were held to amount to an abuse of the extradition process. Arbour J said:

By placing undue pressure on Canadian citizens to forego due legal process in Canada, the foreign state has disentitled itself from pursuing its recourse before the courts and attempting to show why extradition should legally proceed. The intimidation bore directly upon the very proceedings before the extradition judge.

In Lord Brown's view, however, the plea bargaining that had taken place in McKinnon bore little resemblance to the threats made in Cobb:

The differences between this case and Cobb are striking. In Cobb it was the judge who stated that non-cooperation would result in 'the absolute maximum jail sentence that the law permits me to give' and he, after all, unlike the prosecuting authority, had the power to pass sentence. And in Cobb the prosecutor, so far from forewarning the defendant of the differing consequences which could be expected to follow (perfectly properly) from his decision whether or not to cooperate, effectively threatened (and here I use the word advisedly) those not cooperating with homosexual rape...

... it would only be in a wholly extreme case like Cobb itself that the court should properly regard any encouragement to accused persons to surrender for trial and plead guilty, in particular if made by a prosecutor during a regulated process of plea bargaining, as so unconscionable as to constitute an abuse of process justifying the requested state's refusal to extradite the accused. It is difficult, indeed, to think of anything other than the threat of unlawful action which could fairly be said so to imperil the integrity of the extradition process as to require the accused, notwithstanding his having resisted the undue pressure, to be discharged irrespective of the strength of the case against him.

Part E Sentencing

E4 Mandatory Life Sentences

E4.2 Schedule 21 Principles

The Criminal Justice Act 2003, sch. 21, para. 5(2)(e) was considered by the Court of Appeal in Bonellie [2008] EWCA Crim 1417. The defendants in this case (aged 17, 16 and 22 respectively) attacked, tormented, humiliated and beat the deceased, who had a serious psychiatric disorder and had misguidedly believed them to be his friends. They casually punched, head-butted, kicked and stamped on him until he died, egging each other on to further violence. It does not however appear that there was any intent to kill.

In sentencing them, the trial judge held that the case fell within sch. 21, para. 5(1) and 5(2)(e), this being a murder where the seriousness of the offence was particularly high and involved sadistic conduct and an extremely vulnerable victim. He accordingly determined that the starting point for the adult defendant (Hughes) was 30 years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. Lord Phillips CJ noted that sadism is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as, 'Enthusiasm for inflicting pain, suffering or humiliation on others' and continued:

Sadly, it is often the case that those who attack others derive pleasure from so doing. Many a person kicking someone else on the ground derives such pleasure. A person, too, may gain pleasure from baiting a vulnerable individual, or showing off to his friends. That is not enough, in our view, to bring the case within subsection (e). That subsection contemplates a significantly greater degree of awareness of pleasure in the infliction of pain, suffering or humiliation, perverted though the pleasure we have described may be.

Although we can understand how the judge came to the view he did, in our judgment appalling though this behaviour was, it fell short of that sort of conduct which is contemplated as sadistic by the subsection. This was a very bad case of gratuitous gang violence directed at a vulnerable individual. In short, the starting point should not have been 30 years for Hughes; it should have been 15.

When certain aggravating features were taken into account, the minimum term was set at 19 years, with terms of 15 and 13 years for his young accomplices.

E22 Recommendation for Deportation

E21.1 Power to Recommend for Deportation

The UK Borders Act 2007 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1818) brings into force, on 1 August 2008, ss. 32 to 39 of the Act in respect of persons sentenced to imprisonment for at least 12 months. These provisions deal with the automatic deportation of 'foreign criminals' and the exceptions thereto.

Part F EVIDENCE

F4 Competence and Compellability of Witnesses, Oaths and Affirmations

F4.11 Requirement to Give Evidence on Oath and Liability to Cross-examination

The Statute Law Repeals Act 2008 repeals the Criminal Justice Act 1982, s. 72(3), with effect from 21 July 2008.

F7 Cross-examination

F7.28 Previous Inconsistent Statements

In B and S [2008] EWCA Crim 365, S made a statement under caution that tended to incriminate B on the charge of attempted robbery. At trial, S changed his story, but admitted under cross-examination that he had made the statement. He said however that this was no longer his recollection of what had happened. At common law, the statement could not have been evidence against B, either as a confession by S or as a previous inconsistent statement by S, but the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has changed the position significantly. As the Court of Appeal explained:

The statements made by the appellant S in interview constitute hearsay evidence under section 114 and could be considered for admission before the jury in the context of the code contained in section 114. Further, because [S] stated that he could not remember the events which he had talked about in interview, the contents of the interview also constituted previous inconsistent statements within the meaning of section 119 of the 2003 Act and were accordingly admissible in accordance with the provisions of that section, but subject always to the provisions of section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and section 126 of the 2003 Act.

F16 Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay

F16.20 Hearsay Admissible in the Interests of Justice

Where it is sought to admit hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 114(1)(d) and no other basis for admission applies, s. 114(1)(d) requires the court to decide whether it is in the interests of justice to admit that evidence. In the case of potential defence evidence, this does not mean that the court should consider merely whether admission would be in the interest of the defendant. The question is whether it should be admitted in the interest of arriving at the right conclusion: Marsh [2008] All ER (D) 338 (Jul). See also Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 146.

F16.20 Hearsay Admissible in the Interests of Justice

See B and S [2008] EWCA Crim 365 (noted above at F7.28).

F18 Evidence of Identification

F18.28 Use of visual Images at Trial

Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr App R 7 and A-G's Ref (No. 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 321, [2002] All ER (D) 73 (Oct) were applied in Ali [2008] EWCA Crim 1522.

Appendices

Appendix 3 Attorney-General's Guidelines

Appendix 8 Sentencing Guidelines Council Guidelines

The SGC has published a final guideline on offences involving causing death by driving. See http://www.sentencing-guidelines.gov.uk/guidelines/council/final.html

NEW legislation

Statute Law Repeals Act 2008

The following criminal law and police enactments which (except in so far as their effect is preserved) are no longer considered to be of practical utility, were repealed by this Act, which also repeals obsolete provisions and enactments dealing with taxation, planning, armed forces, etc.

Criminal Law Statutes

Disorderly Houses Act 1751	The whole Act.
Servants' Characters Act 1792	The whole Act.
Unlawful Drilling Act 1819	The whole Act (except as it extends to Northern Ireland).
Punishment of Offences Act 1837	The whole Act.
Foreign Enlistment Act 1870	Section 3.
Conspiracy, and Protection of Property Act 1875	The whole Act.
Criminal Justice Act 1948	Section 69. Section 78. Schedule 8.
Sexual Offences Act 1956	In section 35(2), the words from '(whether' to '1885)'. In section 35(3), the words from 'or was so convicted' to 'commencement of this Act,' and from 'or under subsection (1)' to the end. In section 52(1), the proviso.
London County Council (General Powers) Act 1959	In section 3(1), the definition 'the Act of 1751'.
Criminal Justice Act 1972	Section 31. Section 59. In section 66(6), the proviso. In section 66(7)(a), the words 'section 31' to '1950,'.
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980	In Schedule 1, paragraph 2.
Criminal Justice Act 1982	Section 28. Sections 30 and 31. Section 68(1). Section 72(3).
Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983	Section 4(1)(a). Section 5A.
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985	Sections 12 and 13. Section 15(7). Section 28. Section 31(4).
Criminal Justice Act 1988	Section 49. Section 64. Section 100. Section 103. Section 123(1) and (5). Section 125. Schedule 5. In Schedule 8, Part 2.
Criminal Justice Act 1991	Section 69. Section 72.
Statute Law (Repeals) Act	In Schedule 2, in Part 1, paragraph 1.
Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1995	In Schedule 2, paragraph 1(a) and the words 'Great Britain and' in paragraph 1(c).
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996	Section 46. Section 65.
Crime and Disorder Act 1998	Section 35. Section 36(3) and (6). Section 97(5). Sections 107 and 108. Section 116.
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001	Sections 37 and 38. Sections 122 and 123.
Licensing Act 2003	In Schedule 6, paragraph 2.

Statutes dealing with Police and Policing

2 & 3 Vict. c.xciv (1839) (City of London Police Act)	Section 40.
Oxford Police Act 1868	The whole Act.
West Riding Police Superannuation Act 1886	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1887	The whole Act.
Lincolnshire Police Superannuation Act 1888	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1888	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1889	The whole Act.
City of London Police Superannuation Act 1889	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1890	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1891	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1892	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1893	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1894	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1895	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1896	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1897	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1898	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1900	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1901	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1902	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1903	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1904	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1905	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1906	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1907	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1908	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1910	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1911	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1912	The whole Act.
Metropolitan Police Provisional Order Confirmation Act 1920	The whole Act.
Police and Firemen (War Service) Act 1939	The whole Act.
Police and Firemen (War Service) Act 1944	The whole Act.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984	Section 108. Section 110. In section 120(2), the entries relating to section 108(4) and (5), and section 110. In section 120(4), the entries relating to section 83(2), section 108(1) and (6), and section 109. In section 120(5), the entry relating to section 83(2).
Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994	Section 33. Section 41.
Police (Insurance of Voluntary Assistants) Act 1997	The whole Act.

UK Borders Act 2007 (Commencement No. 3 and Transitional Provisions) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1818)

This Order brings into force, on 1 August 2008, ss. 32 to 39 of the Act in respect of persons sentenced to imprisonment for at least 12 months. These provisions deal with the automatic deportation of 'foreign criminals' and the exceptions thereto.

Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1918)

This Order brings into force, on 18 August 2008, ss. 20 and 21 of the Act and, so far as not already in force, s. 30. Section 20 creates the new offence of causing death by driving without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other persons, s. 21 creates an offence of causing death by driving when unlicensed, disqualified or uninsured.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 1931)

This Order further amends the list of organisations in sch. 2 to the Act by altering the reference to Hizballah.

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) (Amendment No. 2) Order 2008 (SI 2008 No. 2039)

This Order amends the principal Order of 1988 (SI 1988 No. 2019) so as to widen the defence available in respect of swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more.

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