Oxford University Press
  Home About Us Contact Us Help Jobs News Site Index OUP Worldwide
Search:
Advanced Search
Email this to a Friend Printer-Friendly View
Academic, Professional, & General
Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2007
Updates
Part C
You are here: Home > Academic, Professional, & General > Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2007 > Updates > Part C

Companion Website

Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2007

Part C

Updates to Part C

May 2007

C1.1 Accident

The concept of an 'accident' was considered at length by the Court of Appeal in Currie [2007] EWCA Crim 926, in which D appealed against his conviction for dangerous driving on the basis that he had not been served within the 14-day time-limit with a notice of intended prosecution. See Blackstone's Criminal Practice, C2.1. The Crown, however, contended that D had been involved in an accident, and that accordingly no such notice was required to be given (Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 2(1)).

D had been stopped by police officers who suspected cannabis misuse. He and his passengers were required to step out of their car but, when one of the passengers became troublesome and the officers were distracted, D got back into the car and started the ignition. As one of the officers attempted to prevent him from driving off, the car lurched forward and she had to put her hands on the bonnet to save herself from being knocked over. D then reversed away and escaped. D denied driving at the officer but admitted driving away. He contended that there had been no accident for the purposes of s. 2(1). An issue also arose as to whether it should be for the judge or the jury to determine whether an accident in fact occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that, where there were disputed issues of fact to be determined in order to decide whether there had been an accident for the purposes of s. 2(1) of the Act, they had to be determined by the judge. The burden of proof is on the prosecution.

As to what is or is not capable of being classified as an accident, the court cited the judgment of Bridge LJ in Chief Constable of West Midlands Police v Billingham [1979] RTR 446 I which he said that 'accident':

[Is] a word which has a perfectly well understood meaning in ordinary parlance, but that meaning is an elastic one according to the context in which the word is used.

In the context of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 2(1), the reason why notice of intended prosecution is not required where there has been an 'accident' is that D will in such cases be aware of what has happened and put on his guard. Accordingly, it does not matter whether what happened was truly 'accidental' or the result of deliberate misconduct by D or another. There had been physical contact between D's car and the police officer, and the trial judge was fully entitled to classify that as an accident for the purposes of s. 2(1).

Author: MH

December 2006

C1.13 Road or Other Public Place

In Filmer v DPP [2006] All ER (D) 08 (Nov), it was held that the privately owned customer parking area of a tyre and exhaust centre could properly be described as a 'public place'. The parking area was readily accessible by members of the public for parking their vehicles, as was used after hours as a turning space in the road. It was also used as a shortcut by pedestrians.

Author: MH

March 2007

C2.1 Notice of Intended Prosecution

Myers [2007] EWCA Crim 599 provides guidance on the interpretation of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 2, by which no notice of intended prosecution need be served under s. 1 of the Act where, 'at the time of the offence or immediately after it, an accident occurs owing to the presence on a road of the vehicle in respect of which the offence was committed.'

M, E, and B were each driving their cars aggressively and showing off to each other. M performed a handbrake turn. B then appears to have attempted a similar turn, but crashed into a parked van and killed himself. Subsequently, M and E were charged with (and imprisoned for) dangerous driving, but appealed on the basis that no notice of possible prosecution had been served on them within the 14-day time-limit prescribed by s. 1.

Had it been proved that B died as a result of a collision with M, or as a result of a manoeuvre designed to avoid collision with M, or perhaps even as a result of a race with M, it could be said with some confidence that s. 2 applied and that the service of notice under s. 1 was unnecessary, but here there was nothing more than mutual showing off as incitement.

Having examined Quelch v Phipps [1955] 2 All ER 302 (see Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2007, C6.38), the court nevertheless concluded that s. 2 was applicable on these facts. May LJ explained (at [18] to [20]):

  1. The policy of the relevant exception in section 2 must be, speaking generally, that drivers who have committed a relevant road traffic offence and whose vehicles have been involved in or concerned with an accident, do not need the warning or notification because the very fact of being involved in or concerned with the accident is a sufficient indication of the risk of prosecution. . . .
  2. In many such instances, we would expect the offence to have been the or at least a cause of the accident, but the section does not we think absolutely require that. This is because the section attributes the accident to the presence of a vehicle on the road, not to the fact that its driver committed a road traffic offence. The policy of the section however, in our view, requires there to be a sufficient causal link between the offence and the accident that the driver does not need to be warned of the risk of prosecution.
  3. Applying that analysis, we consider that there was a sufficient causal link between B's fatal accident and the presence on the road of the vehicles which these appellants were driving dangerously. All three of them were driving dangerously: one of them crashed his car. The accident occurred owing to the presence on the road of all three dangerously driven vehicles. Neither of the appellants needed to be warned, in the light of their involvement in that accident, that they risked prosecution.'

Author: MH

April 2007

C2.6 Proof of Identity of Driver in Summary Proceedings

The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2007 (SI 2007 No. 699), which came into force on 2 April 2007, include changes to the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 which affect service. A new Part 4 (service of documents) is added in substitution for the existing Part 4. This consolidates, revises and simplifies the rules about the service of documents in criminal cases including the service of summonses.

Author: MH

September 2007

C2.12 Alternative Verdicts

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 33 of the Act. Section 33 amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 24. The effect is that conviction for an offence under any of ss. 1 to 3A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (causing death by dangerous driving, dangerous driving or causing death by careless driving while under the influence of drink or drugs) or under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, s. 35 (furious driving) is available where a prosecution for manslaughter in connection with driving has been unsuccessful.

Author: MH

August 2007

C2.15 Duty to Provide Information

In O'Halloran v United Kingdom (App Nos 15809/02 and 25624/02) (2007) The Times, 13 July 2007 a challenge to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 172, based on the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR, Article 6.1, failed before the European Court at Strasbourg. The Court ruled that a person's right not to be forced into self-incrimination was not absolute right and that the right to require an actual or potential suspect to provide information which might contribute to his conviction does not automatically involve a violation of Article 6. In the case of s. 172, those who own or drive motor vehicles know that by doing so they subject themselves to a regulatory regime. Furthermore, s. 172 involves only a limited inquiry. The identity of the driver is only one element in a road traffic offence such as speeding, and there is no question of a conviction arising solely on the basis of information obtained as a result of s. 172(2)(a). No offence is committed if the keeper of the vehicle shows that he does not know and cannot with reasonable diligence discover who the driver was.

Author: MH

September 2007

C2.15 Duty to Provide Information

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 29 of the Act. Section 29 increases the number of penalty points applicable for the offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 172 from 3 to 6.

Author: MH

April 2007

C3.9 Dangerous Driving and Causing Death by Dangerous Driving

The speeding policeman affair rumbles on, and we are still without a final ruling. In the widely publicised case of DPP v Milton [2006] EWHC 242 (Admin) the Divisional Court (in a judgment given by Hallett LJ) allowed a prosecution appeal against a district judge's ruling that D, a class 1 police driver, was not guilty of dangerous driving when he 'familiarised himself' with a powerful new unmarked police car in the early hours of the morning at speeds of up to 149 mph on the M54 and at an average speed of over 60 mph on restricted urban roads with a 30 mph limit.

The court did not go so far as to remit the case with a direction to convict, but merely required it to be reheard on the basis that the district judge had misdirected himself on certain matters and had taken some irrelevant matters (including expert evidence as to police driver skill and training etc) into account. Hallett LJ said:

It matters not whether [D] intended to drive dangerously, or believed that he could drive at grossly excessive speeds without causing danger to others because of his advanced driving skills. I repeat that the test is, what is the standard judged objectively and what would have been obvious to the independent bystander? As to whether the district judge would have been entitled to impute knowledge of the respondent's driving skills to the independent bystander on the basis of the arguments advanced before us, I can form no concluded view.

My comment at the time (in the March 2006 update) was that the court ought to have expressed a concluded view on that last question. I argued that D's skill and experience was a highly relevant consideration which any reasonable bystander must surely be required to take into account; but, in the absence of guidance from the Divisional Court, a different district judge held on rehearing the case that the test for dangerous driving was in absolute terms and that he was obliged to approach the evidence from the perspective of the mythical competent and careful driver, unburdened by any knowledge of the particular ability or lack of ability of the defendant. Accordingly he found D guilty of dangerous driving.

In Milton v DPP [2007] EWHC 532 (Admin), a differently constituted Divisional Court disagreed. Smith LJ said (at [27]:

The fact that the driver is a Grade 1 advanced police driver is a circumstance to which regard must be had, pursuant to [the RTA 1988] s. 2A(3). The weight to be attached to such a circumstance is entirely a matter for the fact finder. In the instant case, the fact finder might conclude that the driving was thoroughly dangerous regardless of the skill of the individual driver. On the other hand, he might conclude that, whereas for a driver of ordinary skill, such driving would have been dangerous, for a man of exceptional skill it was not. Such a thought process does not offend against the requirement that the test for dangerous driving is objective. It simply refines the objective test by reference to existing circumstances.

Had the court dealt with this question at the first time of asking the case would by now have been resolved. As it is, it has been remitted to the second district judge to reconsider in light of the later ruling.

Smith LJ doubted that the ruling would have much relevance to a typical dangerous driving case. At [28] he explained:

It seems to me that there will not be [many] cases in which the driver's personal skill or lack of it will be capable of making a difference to the objective assessment of the dangerousness of the driving in question. It will, in my view, only be the extremes of 'special skill' and 'almost complete lack of experience' that will be such as could affect the mind of the decision maker. The mere fact that a driver has driven for 30 years without an accident will not be relevant; nor will evidence that a driver does not drive frequently. If, where the circumstance is such as could properly affect the mind of the decision maker, for better or worse, then so be it. Section 2A(3) appears to me to require that regard should be had to such circumstances.

With respect, there must be many circumstances in which it would be absurd to disregard all evidence concerning the skill, experience or inexperience of the driver. In few cases will such evidence be decisive and in some cases it may be of no relevance at all. Overtaking on a blind bend or summit must almost inevitably be considered dangerous, however skilled the driver. Indeed, an experienced driver ought to know better. But not all cases are as clear as that. Where, for example, it is merely alleged that D was driving too fast for the prevailing conditions on a winding road, his skill and experience (or the lack of it) must surely be taken into account when assessing the dangers involved.

Author: MH

November 2006

C3.13 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving: Sentencing

Cooksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996 was considered in Buckland [2006] EWCA Crim 2516, in which a sentence of nine years' imprisonment (reduced from 10 years on the basis of a very late guilty plea) was upheld in respect of a prolonged case of deliberately dangerous driving that fell into the most serious category and was aggravated by drugs and by leading the police in a high-speed pursuit that became so hazardous that it had to be abandoned.

The Court of Appeal recognised that it was not always appropriate to break down the individual characteristics of the driving in question, and that it was the overall character and effect of the driving that determined where in the spectrum the offence fell.

Author: MH

January 2007

C3.13 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving: Sentence

The Cooksley guidelines on sentencing in cases of causing death by dangerous driving (or by careless driving when intoxicated) were reconsidered in Richardson and other appeals [2006] EWCA Crim 3186, in light of the increase in the maximum sentence now available in such cases. The court in Richardson also offered some guidance on the likely impact of the new offences of causing death by careless driving (Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 2B) or by driving when disqualified, uninsured or unlicensed (s. 3ZA), neither of which is yet in force.

One issue before the court was whether the increases in maximum sentences effected by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 285, should lead to increased sentences generally, or whether such increases should be directed only 'at cases of the greatest culpability, which have caused the greatest harm'. On this issue, the court opined (at [14] and [16]):

The primary object of the increase in the maximum sentence was to address cases of the most serious gravity, so as to permit the sentence to be greater than before, [but] if the level of sentence in cases of the utmost gravity is significantly increased . . . there should be some corresponding increase in sentences immediately below this level of gravity, continuing down the scale to the cases where there are no aggravating features at all. In adopting this approach, we are following earlier guidance given by this court in Attorney General's References 14 and 24 of 1993, where the court addressed the doubling in the maximum sentence from five to ten years' imprisonment by significantly increasing the higher, but not the lower starting points.

At the lowest levels of seriousness, . . . the 2003 Act itself requires the sentencer only to impose a custodial sentence if such a sentence is necessary, and if it is, for the sentence to be no longer than necessary to fulfil the statutory purposes of sentencing laid down in s142. For these reasons, at these levels there will continue to be cases in which the broad guidance in Cooksley will remain appropriate and, we should add, exceptional situations where even shorter sentences, or non custodial sentences, may be appropriate.

As to causing death by careless driving when intoxicated, the court forcefully emphasised that that, 'in culpability terms this is and should be equated with causing death by dangerous driving', but noted (at [24] to [25] and [29]) what it regarded as a critical difference in culpability between those offences and the new 'death by [non-intoxicated] careless driving' offence:

The dangerous driver falls 'far below' what would be expected of a competent and careful driver to whom it would be obvious that the driving in question is dangerous. In summary, the standard of driving is very bad, and the driver himself should appreciate that it is. By contrast careless driving involves a failure to exercise the degree of care and attention required of drivers, and is an offence designed to address the daily cases which involve, '. . ..the kind of inattention or misjudgment to which the ordinarily careful motorist is occasionally subject without it necessarily involving any moral turpitude, although it causes inconvenience and annoyance to other users of the road' (per Lord Diplock in Lawrence [1982] AC 510 at 525).

Taken on its own, and wholly excluding any element of drink or drugs, careless driving is hugely less culpable than dangerous driving. And the true level of culpability of the driving should always . . . be taken into account when sentence is determined. This is elementary.

. . . Absent the consumption of alcohol, careless driving on its own almost always involves culpability at the lowest possible scale. In one sense, every driver is careless when he makes a mistake. Every driver, even the best, and most experienced, and normally careful, does so from time to time. . . . We therefore suggest that when the [new s 2B offence] comes into force, it will no longer be appropriate for the difference between dangerous and careless driving to be elided. Indeed it will shortly become critical to a fair and balanced sentencing process for the difference to be understood and acknowledged. . . . These issues, and indeed the various difficult issues arising from driving offences which result in death will shortly be the subject of a fresh public consultation by the Sentencing Advisory Panel. And this may produce further guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council.

There is clearly much good sense in these observations, but the distinction between careless and dangerous driving is, with respect, even less clear than the court would have us believe. The statutory definition of 'dangerous driving' is no less objective than the new statutory definition of careless driving, Recklessness, foresight of danger or wilful disregard for safety or legality are not required in either case. Convictions for causing death by dangerous driving have been upheld by the Court of Appeal on the basis of a momentary loss of concentration, or even of mere clumsiness, incompetence or panic (as for example in Topasna [2006] EWCA Crim 1969).

Author: MH

August 2007

C3.13 Causing Death by Dangerous Driving: Sentencing

In A-G's Ref (No. 56 of 2007), Legrys [2007] EWCA Crim 1605, the Court of Appeal considered the issue of sentencing in a case of causing death by dangerous driving involving something close to the lowest level of culpability, with several mitigating circumstances and no aggravating ones. It was a case involving a misjudged overtaking manoeuvre, where D attempted to overtake a long vehicle and was unable to avoid a fatal collision with an oncoming motorcycle. It was an uncharacteristic error by a man of 59 with an excellent driving record. Character witnesses described D as a quiet, careful, gentle and kind person, and that was reflected in the manner in which he drove. The trial judge imposed a 12-month sentence, suspended on condition that D undertook 200 hours unpaid work. He referred to prison overcrowding as one of the reasons for suspending the sentence.

It was argued that the sentence was undely lenient, but the Court of Appeal disagreed, even though they did not consider prison overcrowding to be a good reason for suspending it. Hooper LJ said:

There is nothing in the circumstances of the accident or in the history of the offender's driving to suggest that the offender himself realised that what he was doing was dangerous and could put the lives of others at risk. His error was to underestimate how long it would take to overtake the vehicles in front of him. In a more powerful car he would no doubt have succeeded. We are, for our part, not prepared to say that the offender was reckless in the sense of realising the risk of what he was doing.

When the offender realised that he could not complete the manoeuvre safely, it was too late to return to his own side. The fact that the tractor and trailer were unlit may well have prevented [the motorcyclist] from taking any avoiding manoeuvre.
The court concluded that despite this a custodial sentence was still required and that a 12-month sentence would ordinarily have been appproriate, but:
Nonetheless we cannot describe the sentence as unduly lenient. Even if it were, we would not have altered the sentence given all the circumstances including the fact that the offender has all but completed his 200 hours unpaid work.
This case, and A-G's Ref (No. 74 of 2005), Modhvadia [2005] EWCA Crim 3120 (in which a suspended sentence similarly survived a challenge from the A-G), are in all probability ones that would have been charged as causing death by careless driving, had the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 2B, inserted by the Road Safety Act 2006, been in force at the time.

Unfortunately, it seems that judges will still be required to impose custodial sentences in all but the most marginal of s. 2B cases (where a community order may be acceptable) but Legrys and Modhvadia indicate that some sentences may properly be suspended, even where the more serious offence is proved.

Author: MH

September 2007

C3.14 Causing Death by Careless Driving when under the Influence of Drink or Drugs

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 31 of the Act. Section 31 amends the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 3A so as to extend its application to persons who refuse to give permission for a laboratory test.

Author: MH

September 2007

C3.32 Wanton or Furious Driving: Punishment

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 28 of the Act. Section 28 amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, sch. 2 so as to add the offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, s. 35 (furious driving) to sch. 2, part II, with the effect that the offence is subject to discretionary disqualification and obligatory endorsement (carrying 3 to 9 points).

Author: MH

February 2007

C5.1 Preliminary Testing

In Smith v DPP [2007] EWHC 100 (Admin), the Divisional Court rejected an argument that, in a prosecution for drink-driving under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 5, the prosecution was under a duty to disclose the 'F11 settings' on the Alcolmeter SL 400A device used at the roadside when the defendant was first arrested. The appellant had argued this on the basis that the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 15(2) provides, 'Evidence of the proportion of alcohol or any drug in a specimen of breath, blood or urine provided by the accused shall in all cases . . . be taken into account'.

The specimens of breath which establish whether or not a defendant has committed an offence under section 5(1) of the 1988 Act, are those which may be required of a defendant at the police station under section 7 of the Act, the two specimens of breath mentioned in section 7(1)(a). The requirement under section 15(2) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 to "take into account" a specimen of breath is, in relation to the roadside test, no more than a requirement to ensure that the section 6 procedure which led to the arrest, and to the section 7 requirement, has been correctly followed. The bracketed words now included in section 15(2) broaden the range of specimen to be taken into account but do not extend the purpose of the roadside test.

I do not consider that the statutory scheme in relation to specimens has been fundamentally changed by the amendment to the 1988 Act which took effect in 2004. However, the use in the current section 6 and 6A of the Act of the expressions "preliminary test" and "preliminary breath test" confirm the purpose of the roadside test. The roadside procedure, as section 6A provides, is a procedure by which an "indication" whether the prescribed limit is likely to be exceeded is obtained, and the specimen has no greater status.

Pausing there, it ought perhaps to be emphasised that an irregularity in the observance of the s 6 procedure does not in itself invalidate any subsequent procedure for the obtaining of evidential specimens under s. 7, although in extreme cases such an irregularity might give rise to an application to exclude unfairly obtained evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 78. The Divisional Court cannot in that respect have intended to question the authority of Fox [1986] AC 281, which was binding on them.

Pill LJ concluded with the suggestion that disclosure of evidence derived from the roadside test might usefully be provided as a matter of good practice.

I would, however, consider it to be good practice, where equipment is in use which permits it easily to be done, for the reading in figures obtained from the roadside breath specimen to be disclosed to the defence. We are told that that has become general practice. It is a sound practice and one which may be required by section 3 of Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, which deals with the prosecution's duty to disclose material. While in most cases the evidence, if adduced, is likely to support the prosecution case, there may be cases in which it can provide a basis for a challenge to the accuracy of the section 7 specimens obtained.

Author: MH

September 2007

C5.6 Evidential Specimens

In Breckon v DPP [2007] EWHC 2013 (Admin), the appellant challenged his conviction for a drink driving offence on the basis that the Lion Intoximeter EC/IR machine from which the incriminating reading was obtained was not an approved device. The machine in question used a manual change-over valve, and not an automatic change-over valve as referred to both in a guide to the relevant Type Approval Order and in an agreement between Lion Laboritories and the Home Office.

If upheld, this challenge would have had the potential to cause a major upset, because it appears that all such machines now use manual valves. Kemsley v DPP [2004] EWHC 278 (Admin) indicates that if a device is not the same as that which has been approved, the results of its use cannot be admissible even where it was substantially like an approved device, and even if its performance is the same as that of an approved device.

The court avoided such an awkward conclusion by holding that the key document was the Schedule to the Approval Order dated 25 February 1998, which made no reference to change-over valves. The EC/IR Intoximeter used the gas delivery system and software specified in the Schedule, and on that basis it was an approved device. Nelson J said:

There is no reference, express or implied, in this schedule to either the Agreement with the manufacturer or to the Guide, and I see no reason why those documents should be incorporated within the Approval or why the Approval should be read as being subject to them. The definition of the device, in my judgment, stands by itself in the Schedule to the Approval and does not admit of further identification or specification.

Author: MH

September 2007

C5.23 Admissibility of Specimens

The Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 15(2), refers only to evidential specimens (or specimens taken for analysis) under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 7, and not to roadside samples taken under s. 6 or s 6A of that Act for the purpose of establishing whether there are grounds to make an arrest (Breckon v DPP [2007] EWHC 2013 (Admin), following Smith v DPP [2007] EWHC 100 (Admin).

Author: MH

September 2007

C6.1 Careless and Inconsiderate Driving

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 30 (to a limited extent) of the Act. Section 30 provides a new statutory definition of careless and inconsiderate driving.

Author: MH

September 2007

C6.8 Careless and Inconsiderate Driving: Punishment

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 23 of the Act. Section 23 amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, sch. 2 so as to increase the level of maximum fine for the offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 3 from level 4 to level 5.

Author: MH

September 2007

C6.27 Using Vehicle in Dangerous Condition: Punishment

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 25 of the Act. Section 25 amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 34 and sch. 2 so as to provide for an obligatory disqualification of six months for an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 40A if committed within three years of a previous conviction for that offence.

Author: MH

February 2007

C6.30 Contravention of Construction and Use Regulations: Punishment

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 237) brings into force, on 27 February 2007, s. 26 of the Act, which relates to increases in penalties for the breach of requirements as to driver's control of a motor vehicle and the use of a hand-held mobile telephone or similar device whilst driving a motor vehicle.

Author: MH

January 2007

C6.44 Speeding

In Coombes v DPP [2006] EWHC 3263 (Admin), (2006) The Times, 29 December, a driver's conviction for speeding, contrary to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s. 89, was quashed by the Divisional Court (following an unsuccessful appeal to the Crown Court) because the road sign imposing the 30-mph limit in question was obscured by overgrown hedgerows, so that it became visible to motorists only at the point where it was passed.

Referring to the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, s. 85 (below), Walker J held that this imposed (at the least) a requirement that, at the geographical point where the motorist exceeded the limit, the signs could reasonably have been expected to have conveyed the limit to an approaching motorist in sufficient time for him to reduce from a previous lawful speed to a speed within the new limit. Motorists should not be convicted of speeding in the absence of adequate guidance

Section 85 (where relevant) provides:

  1. For the purpose of securing that adequate guidance is given to drivers of motor vehicles as to whether any, and if so what, limit of speed is to be observed on any road, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State, in the case of a road for which he is the traffic authority, to erect and maintain . . . traffic signs in such positions as may be requisite for that purpose.
  2. In the case of any other road, it is the duty of the local traffic authority -
    1. to erect and maintain . . . traffic signs in such positions as may be requisite in order to give effect to general or other directions given by the Secretary of State for the purpose mentioned in subsection (1) above, and
    2. to alter or remove traffic signs as may be requisite in order to give effect to such directions, either in consequence of the making of an order by the Secretary of State or otherwise.
  3. Where no such system of street or carriageway lighting as is mentioned in section 82(1) is provided on a road, but a limit of speed is to be observed on the road, a person shall not be convicted of driving a motor vehicle on the road at a speed exceeding the limit unless the limit is indicated by means of such traffic signs as are mentioned in subsection (1) or subsection (2) above.
  4. In any proceedings for a contravention of section 81 of this Act, where the proceedings relate to driving on a road provided with such a system of street or carriageway lighting, evidence of the absence of traffic signs displayed in pursuance of this section to indicate that the road is not a restricted road for the purposes of that section shall be evidence that the road is a restricted road for those purposes.

Author: MH

September 2007

C7.8 Disqualification for Certain Offences

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 25 of the Act. Section 25(2) amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 34 so as to add a new s. 34(4B), which provides for an obligatory disqualification of six months for an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 40A (using vehicle in a dangerous condition etc.) if committed within three years of a previous conviction for that offence.

Author: MH

September 2007

C7.15 Endorsement

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia s. 14 of the Act. Section 14 amends the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 45(7) so as to add a reference to an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 7A(6) (failing to allow a specimen to be subjected to a laboratory test) to the list of offences in respect of which endorsement endures for 11 years.

Author: MH

September 2007

C9.2 Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, sch. 2

The Road Safety Act 2006 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2007 (SI 2007 No. 2472) brings into force, on 24 September 2007, inter alia ss. 23, 24, 25, 27, 28 and 29 of the Act, which amend the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, sch. 2. Section 23 increases the maximum fine under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 3 (careless and inconsiderate driving) from level 4 to level 5. Section 24 increases the maximum fine under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 15(4) (driving in contravention of seat belt requirements for children in rear seats) from level 1 to level 2. Section 25 provides that the offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 40A (using vehicle in a dangerous condition etc.) will carry obligatory disqualification if committed within three years of a previous conviction for that offence. Section 27 increases the maximum fine under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 163 (failing to stop when required to do so) from level 3 to level 5 where the offence is committed by a driver (for cyclists the level remains at level 3). Section 28 adds the offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, s. 35 (furious driving) to sch. 2, part II, with the effect that the offence is subject to discretionary disqualification and obligatory endorsement (carrying 3 to 9 points). Section 29 increases the number of penalty points applicable for the offence under the Road Traffic Act 1988, s. 172 (duty to give identity of driver) from 3 to 6.

Author: MH

^ Return to the top

    About this book
    Price, bibliographic details, and more information on the book

    About Us | Contact Us | Help | Jobs | News | Site Index | OUP Worldwide Email this to a Friend | Printer-Friendly View | Accessibility
    Copyright © 2009 Oxford University Press | Privacy Policy | Legal Notice