Companion Website

Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2006

July 2006

July Updates

Updates to Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2006 are produced by Michael Hirst, Professor of Criminal Justice, De Montfort University, Leicester, and Laurence Eastham, Editorial Co-ordinator, Blackstone's Criminal Practice.

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• Part A: General Principles of Criminal Law
• Part B: Offences
• Part C: Road Trafic Offences
• Part D: Procedure
• Part E: Sentencing
• Part F: Evidence
• New Legislation

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PART A GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

A6 Inchoate Offences

A6.7 Incitement: Mens Rea

See Walker [2006] All ER (D) 08 (Jun) (6 June 2006, CA), which is discussed below at B3.46.

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PART B OFFENCES

B3 Sexual Offences

B3.6 Sentencing Guidelines for Rape

The Millberry guidelines were considered in A-G's References (Nos. 14 and 15 of 2006); French and another [2006] EWCA Crim 1335 (the notorious 'baby rape' case) in which the Court of Appeal held that the principal offender's offending was so gross as to go beyond anything envisaged by the guideline authorities. It combined the aggravating features of repeated rape of a victim over a period of time, breach of trust, and rape of the most vulnerable victim possible - a tiny baby. A starting point of 24 years' imprisonment was held to be appropriate, although this was reduced to take account of his guilty plea (as to which see E1.6 below).

B3.35 Rape of a Child: Elements

In G [2006] EWCA Crim 821 (noted in the update for May 2006) the Court of Appeal confirmed that rape of a child is a strict liability offence as far as the age of the child is concerned, and rejected arguments that such an interpretation involves any conflict with the ECHR, Article 6 or, in the case of a child offender, with Article 8. The court has now (see G [2006] All ER (D) 197 (Jun)) certified two points of law of general public importance arising from this case, namely:

1. whether a criminal offence of strict liability violated art 6(1) and / or (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights; and
2. whether it was compatible with a child's rights under art 8 of the Convention to convict him of rape contrary to s. 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in circumstances where the agreed basis of plea established that his offence fell properly within the ambit of s. 13 of the 2003 Act (child sex offences committed by children or young persons).

B3.46 Causing or Inciting a Child under 13 to Engage in Sexual Activity

In Walker [2006] All ER (D) 08 (Jun) (6 June 2006, CA) it was held that the offence of inciting sexual activity may be committed without proof that D ever intended that the activity in question should take place. So, when D said to a child over the telephone, "show us your fanny" there was no need for proof that he ever intended her to do so. No full transcript is yet available, but the decision is, with respect, a surprising one.

In both Armstrong [2000] Crim LR 279 and C (David Alexander)) [2006] EWCA Crim 2827 approval was given to this proposed definition of incitement (from Law Com 177):

A person is guilty of incitement to commit an offence if-

1. he incites another to do or causes to be done an act or acts which, if done, will involve the commission of the offence or offences by the other; and
2. he intends or believes that the other, if he acts as incited, shall or will do so with the fault required for the offence or offences

There is of course a difference between inciting another to commit an offence (contrary to common law or to provisions such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 4) and inciting a child to act in a certain way (for the purposes of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 8 or s. 10). The child would not ordinarily commit an offence even if he does so act. But incitement is incitement, and the idea of incitement without intent seems to be at odds with the above definition. Does it mean that, at common law (or under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 4) D may be guilty of inciting or soliciting E to commit an offence without for one moment intending that E should ever do any such thing, but nevertheless intending that if E does by chance respond to the incitement, he would do so with the requisite mens rea? That would not be an impossible definition, but it would be a very strange one.

B12 Offences relating to Weapons

B12.12 Imitation Firearms

Bentham [2005] UKHL 18 and Morris (1984) 79 Cr App R 104 were considered by the Court of Appeal in Williams [2006] EWCA Crim 1650, in which D had pleaded guilty to possession of an 'imitation firearm' that eventually proved to be only a bottle in a plastic bag.

The court took the view (as does Blackstone's Criminal Practice) that the authority of Morris is unaffected by Bentham. Moses LJ said:

11. In our judgment, [Bentham] has nothing to do with this case. The statute, as well as the decision of the House of Lords in Bentham, are authority for the proposition that a defendant must be proved to have with him a thing which, absent a plea of guilty, the jury is sure has the appearance of a lethal barrelled weapon of any description. In the instant appeal, the appellant admitted he had a "thing" with him, namely a bottle, independent of his own body. Whether it had the appearance of a firearm was a question of fact to be judged not by the words he used, but by the appearance of the thing.

12. There was no warrant, in our judgment, for the suggestion, made on behalf of this appellant, that the thing had to be adapted or altered to be made to look like a firearm, like the metal pipes bound together in Morris [1984] 79 Cr App R 104. A stick or table leg within a bag might have the appearance of a firearm. The question of whether the jury is persuaded that the thing a defendant has with him has the appearance of a firearm is to be determined on all the evidence, including the evidence of witnesses at the time. But their evidence, whilst it is material in order to illustrate to the jury what appearance the thing had at the time, is not dispositive. It is a matter for a jury, on the evidence, to judge what appearance the thing had at the material time.

B21 Offences Relating to Dangerous Dogs and Hunting with Dogs

B21.9 Offences Involving Hunting with Dogs

In R (Countryside Alliance and others) v Attorney General and others; R (Derwin and others) v Attorney General and others [2006] EWCA Civ 1677, one group of claimants contended that the ban on hunting imposed by the Hunting Act 2004 infringed their right to respect for their personal autonomy their culture/community/lifestyle, their home and their use of that home (ECHR, Article 8). On that basis, they sought a declaration under the Human Rights Act 1998, s. 4, that the Hunting Act is incompatible with the ECHR. A second group of claimants submitted that the ban engaged and infringed two of the free movement provisions contained in the EC Treaty: the free movement of goods (Article 28) and the free movement of services (Article 49).

All claimants argued that that no legislative aim could be derived from the Act; that the defendants had adduced insufficient evidence before the lower court to support the conclusion reached by that court; and that the Divisional Court (see [2005] All ER (D) 482 (Jul)) consciously defined an objective wider than that intended by the legislature.

Dismissing these appeals, the Court of Appeal identified the objective of the Hunting Act as a composite one of preventing or reducing unnecessary suffering to wild mammals, together with the view that causing suffering for sport is unethical, and agreed with the Divisional Court that it was manifest from the available background material that the legislature did frame the Hunting Act with such an ethical sentiment in mind. The appellants' submissions on this question were either misconceived or based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of the enquiry which a court will undertake in determining the objectives of an Act of Parliament.

The specific arguments based on the ECHR and EC Treaty were also rejected, for reasons summarised at paras [184] - [193] of the judgment.

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PART C ROAD TRAFFIC OFFENCES

C5 Drink-driving Offences

C5.17 Punishment

As to special reasons for non-disqualification, see Woolfe v DPP [2006] EWHC 1497 (Admin) and C8.8 below

C5.23 Admissibility of Specimens

The court's duty to take account of evidence of the proportion of alcohol in a specimen for the purposes of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, s. 15(2), extends only to evidence that has actually been placed before the court. Evidence of the proportion of alcohol stored in the memory of a roadside device may be admissible if any such evidence has been obtained from the manufacturer but, if no such evidence has been obtained, there will be no such evidence to take into account.

To hold otherwise would mean that in every case, the prosecution would have to obtain from the manufacturer of the roadside device an analysis of the proportion of alcohol in the relevant specimen and then put that analysis in evidence: see Murphy v DPP [2006] EWHC 1753 (Admin).

C8 Endorsement, Penalty Points and Disqualification

C8.8 Special Reasons

Wickens (1958) 42 Cr App R 236 and Newton [1974] RTR 451 were applied and Zafar v DPP [2004] EWHC Admin 2468 considered in Woolfe v DPP [2006] EWHC 1497 (Admin).

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PART D PROCEDURE

D1 Police Powers

D1.50 Terrorist Investigations

As noted in the May update, the Government's attempts to impose control orders on terrorist suspects suffered a major setback in Re MB [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin), in which Sullivan J examined the procedures established by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, s. 3, relating to the supervision by the High Court of control orders made by the Home Secretary under s. 2 of that Act. Sullivan J ruled that the s. 3 procedure was 'conspicuously unfair' and was accordingly incompatible with the right to a fair hearing that is guaranteed under the ECHR, Article 6(1). A declaration to that effect was made pursuant to the Human Rights Act 1998, s. 4.

In Re JJ (control orders) [2006] EWHC 1623 (Admin), Sullivan J upheld a further challenge, this time to the content of orders imposed under s. 2 on asylum seekers who had been detained on national security grounds. The orders required the suspects to be confined for 18 hours per day in designated domestic residences, which would be subject to random searches at any time. They would be electronically tagged, and allowed only limited and controlled contact with other persons.

Sullivan J ruled that the cumulative impact of these orders were such as to deprive the persons in question of their liberty, contrary to the ECHR, Article 5(1). The orders were accordingly unlawful and would be quashed (although the quashing order was stayed, pending an appeal).

D6 Bail

D6.44 Procedure for Bail Applications in the Crown Court

Malik v Central Criminal Court and Crown Prosecution Service [2006] EWHC 1539 holds that in principle an application for bail in the Crown Court under s. 81G of the Supreme Court Act 1981 should be held in public. The starting point, hallowed in English case law as well as in decisions of the ECHR, is that hearings should be held in public unless it is necessary in the interests of justice to hold them in private. The principal purpose of requiring a public hearing is to ensure that persons are not arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. A public hearing may be held in open court or in chambers. The latter course may be necessary for example where time is short and it is not convenient to schedule a hearing in court. In such cases reporting restrictions may not be imposed. In some cases a private hearing may be required in the interests of justice itself.

While Malik foreshadows a change in procedure, the change does not mean that in practice all cases must be listed for hearing in public. There will be cases where a listing for hearing in private is appropriate. If a different course is to be sought advocates will have to respond promptly, with reasons.

The defendant need not be present at a hearing in public. The CrimPR 2005, r 19.18 lists reasons for not producing the defendant. The Court thus states:

If, as was the case here, the defendant has legal representation one can see sound pragmatic reasons why he should not have a right to be "produced". Producing a defendant at court for a bail application can be and often is inconvenient and expensive. It is by no means uncommon for defendants who are in custody to be held at prisons a considerable distance away from the court where they are to be tried. Moreover, the increasing use of video links between the court and the prison where the defendant is detained effectively remove any disadvantage to the defendant by reason of his not being physically present when the application for bail is heard.

Author: LL

D7 Assets Recovery and Confiscation

D7.3 Magistrates' Court: Cash Seizure and Forfeiture

The Proceeds of Crime (Recovery of Cash in Summary Proceedings: minimum Amount) Order 2006 (SI 2006 No. 1699) reduces the minimum amount for the purposes of the exercise of the search powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s. 289, from £5,000 to £1,000.

D8 Disclosure

D8.12 Disclosure Prior to Implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 2003

In Murphy v DPP [2006] EWHC 1753 (Admin) the Divisional Court ruled that a defendant's right to secondary disclosure was not automatically forfeited by his own failure to serve his defence statement in time. Parliament could not have intended that a defendant should be penalised in that way for what might only have been a short delay on his part.

As to sanctions for failures under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s. 11 (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003), see the main text at D8.9.

D16 Trial on Indictment: Procedure between Close of Defence Evidence and Retirement of Jury

D16.19 Summing-up Amounting to Direction

Despite the ruling in Wang [2005] EWCA Crim 476, convictions previously imposed following directions to convict are not necessarily unsafe. In Caley-Knowles and Jones [2006] EWCA Crim 1611 the Court of Appeal distinguished cases such as the ones before them (or Wang itself) in which the jury had been required to return a guilty verdict without even retiring, and cases such as Kelleher [2003] EWCA Crim 3525 in which, despite being told that the only possible verdict was 'guilty', the jury was at least allowed to retire and bring back a verdict. In Kelleher the court held that the conviction could still be considered safe, even though the judge had 'crossed the line' between firm advice as to the only proper verdict and a direction to convict. Caley-Knowles suggests that this was the right approach and was not overruled by Wang. Tuckey LJ said (at [26]):

There is clearly a distinction between our cases and Kelleher which is that in Kelleher the jury were left to make a decision and retired in order to enable them to do so. In our cases, as the facts which we have related show, the judges said in terms that they had taken the decision away from the jury who were given no opportunity to retire and consider the matter for themselves. We think these are crucial distinctions. The decision in each of our cases was not in reality made by the jury at all. In each case it was made by the judge. Following clarification of the law in Wang, this must, we think, be characterised as a significant legal misdirection or a material irregularity, even though the evidence of the appellant's guilt in each case was clear.

In other words, nothing can be done to save a conviction if the jury foreman is simply told to stand up and say 'guilty'.

There is of course a paradox here: a jury can properly be told that if they find the facts to be X, they must convict, but they cannot properly be told that, since everyone (including the defence) agree the facts are X, they must convict.

D24 Appeal to the Court of Appeal

D24.42 Powers of the Court of Appeal when Determining an Appeal against Sentence

As to the power of the Court of Appeal to take account (under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, s. 11(3)) of the appellant's co-operation with the police etc where such assistance is provided after conviction and sentence, see A [2006] EWCA Crim 1803.

D26 Reference to the Court of Appeal

D26.1 Reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission

In Sidall [2006] EWCA Crim 1353, the Court of Appeal expressed its dissatisfaction with various procedural problems that had arisen in the course of a reference by the CCRC, and in particular by "the wholly unsatisfactory way" in which various documents had been presented to the court, so that it was often difficult to ascertain what materials had been available at trial and what had emerged subsequently.

The court issued the following instructions:

57. The overriding objective, as set out in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (SI 2005 No 384) ("the Rules") Part 1 Rule 1.1(2)(e), requires all criminal cases to be dealt with "efficiently and expeditiously". This equally applies to criminal appeals; see Part 2, Rule 2.1(1)(b). All participants in criminal proceedings must prepare and conduct the case in accordance with the overriding objective; see Part 1, Rule 1.2 (1)(a). . . . Dealing with the case "efficiently and expeditiously" in a complex and serious case of this kind (where there were numerous documents, late disclosure, and changing issues on the appeals) obviously required counsel and solicitors for all parties to co-operate in producing to the court an agreed, composite series of numbered bundles, put together in a logical order, properly labelled, indexed and paginated, with dividers where necessary. It was essential not only to ensure that each member of the court had the bundles in the same form as counsel but also that the skeleton arguments sufficiently and accurately identified any relevant document by reference to the appropriate bundle, tab and page number. That should have been done and bundles and skeletons lodged with the Criminal Appeal Office in good time, so as to have enabled satisfactory pre-hearing preparation to have taken place. Consideration should also have been given as to whether a core bundle would have assisted the court.

58. It is quite wrong that any reference should be placed before the court more than six months after the date of its referral without good reason sanctioned by the court. To this end consideration must be given to complying with some such time-table as we now suggest:-

1. Within 6 weeks of the date of referral, the appellant's solicitors must cause all relevant papers to be bundled into files and paginated; counsel must lodge a skeleton argument referring to the documents as paginated and apply to the Criminal Appeal Office for a date (giving estimated length of hearing) and any other directions considered necessary;
2. Within 4 weeks thereafter, the Crown must propose the inclusion of any further documentation which it requires;
3. Within 2 further weeks, the Crown must lodge its skeleton with any suggested change to the estimate it deems to be necessary;
4. Any response skeleton to be lodged within 2 further weeks thereafter;
5. Consideration be given to the question whether a core bundle should be provided for the hearing.

59. Any material breach of these requirements will run the risk of the appeal being stood out from the list at the risk of a wasted costs order being made. CCRC references must be treated with the respect they deserve.

D26.4 Reference for Review of Sentence

In A-G's References (Nos 14 and 15 of 2006); French and another [2006] EWCA Crim 1335 the Court of Appeal made these observations concerning the question of allowance for 'double jeopardy':

"62. Where a defendant's offence was so serious that he still has a lengthy period of imprisonment to serve at the time of the Attorney General's reference, any distress and anxiety at the prospect of the sentence being increased will be much less significant. We do not accept the Attorney General's extreme submission that there is no place for consideration of double jeopardy in such circumstances. So to hold would constitute an unwarranted interference with the discretion of the court when determining a sentence. We agree, however, that in such circumstances the principle is of limited application and that there will be occasions where a judge can properly decline to make any discount for double jeopardy.

63. The same is true where the Attorney General's reference relates to the length of a minimum term set within a discretionary life sentence. Section 272 of the 2003 Act expressly precludes the court from having regard to double jeopardy when reviewing the minimum term under a mandatory life sentence. Parliament left it open to the court to allow for double jeopardy when reviewing the minimum term under a discretionary life sentence. Whether or not an allowance should be made in those circumstances must depend upon the facts of the particular case. This court has said that in those circumstances some discount should be made for the element of double jeopardy but not as much as where the overall total sentence was affected by the decision of the court - A-G.'s Ref. No. 6 of 2001 [2001] 1 Cr App (S) 72 at 76. This should not, however, be read as saying that a discount must always be made, regardless of the particular facts."

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PART E SENTENCING

E1 Sentencing: General Provisions

E1.6 Reduction in Sentence for Guilty Pleas

The guidance given by the Sentencing Guidelines Council as to the effect of guilty pleas was considered once again in A-G's References (Nos 14 and 15 of 2006); French and another [2006] EWCA Crim 1335 (the notorious 'baby rape' case) in which the Court of Appeal rejected each of the following arguments advanced on behalf of the Attorney-General, and upheld the one third discounts given to the offenders:

1. The offenders had no alternative but to plead guilty on the facts of this case. It follows that the maximum reduction of one third should not have been given.
2. Each offender should have intimated a guilty plea when interviewed by the police and before appearing before the court. This was a further reason for not according the maximum reduction of one third.
3. The special provisions of the guideline in respect of murder indicate, inferentially, that in respect of other serious offences the sentencing judge should not permit the reduction to be disproportionate to the circumstances.

Lord Phillips CJ nevertheless added (at [56]):

This conclusion should not be taken as rejection of the suggestion that it is not satisfactory to award a discount of as much as one third where the case against a defendant is overwhelming or where the sentence is so long that the effect of such a discount might appear disproportionate. We believe, however, that these arguments of principle received detailed consideration by the Panel and the Council when the guideline was formulated. We are aware that many judges are not happy with aspects of the guideline and that it is one that the Council is likely to reconsider. The Council should treat this as a matter of urgency.

E1.11 Personal Mitigation

As to mitigation on account of co-operation with the police etc, so as to enable the arrests of other offenders (and the power of the Court of Appeal to take account of this where assistance is provided after conviction) see A [2006] EWCA Crim 1803.

E5 Custodial Sentences for Dangerous Offenders

E5.1 Overview of Provisions

References in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss. 225 to 228 to 'persons aged 18 or over' must be construed as applying to persons who are of such an age at the date of conviction: see Robson [2006] EWCA Crim 1414.

E21 Confiscation Orders

E21.9 Determination of the Available Amount

Richards v Richards; Crown Prosecution Service v Richards [2006] EWCA Civ 849 makes it clear that where, in family proceedings, any of the partners assets are tainted with criminality and subject to confiscation they should not ordinarily be distributed between them.

The court did not go so far as to hold that there could be no exceptions to this rule. Account might perhaps need to be taken of the needs of an innocent and seriously disabled child living in specially adapted accommodation. In most cases, however, the fact that the assets are tainted will be a decisive factor; and in the instant case the fact that the wife had been aware, throughout her married life, that the lifestyle and assets she enjoyed were derived from her husband's criminal activities (drug trafficking) was utterly fatal to her case.

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PART F EVIDENCE

F3 Burden of Proof

F3.1 Legal and Evidential Burdens

The basic distinction between a legal and evidential burden of proof is neatly illustrated by DPP v Uddin [2006] EWHC 1523 (Admin), in which the magistrates' court first rejected a submission of no case to answer at the end of the prosecution's evidence and then, when the defendant offered no evidence in reply, acquitted him on the basis that the case had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution appealed on the basis that this was an illogical ruling, but the Divisional Court rightly disagreed. There was no contradiction or illogicality in the magistrates' ruling. In rejecting the submission of no case, they had merely ruled that the prosecution evidence was capable, if believed, of proving the case. When they retired to consider their verdict, they would decide for the first time whether they were indeed satisfied to the criminal standard of proof. McCombe J said:

It is often helpful, in my view, in considering such points to recall the differing roles of the judges of law and of fact respectively in a criminal trial. In considering the submission of no case, the judge of law has to ask whether there is sufficient evidence upon which the judges of fact, properly directed, are entitled to convict. They are not deciding that the tribunal of fact must convict upon such evidence. If the judge decides that there is such evidence the case proceeds. The defence calls such evidence as they wish. If the defendant fails to give evidence the justices or the jury (as the case may be) are entitled to consider, if they think fit, that those facts are additional support for the prosecution case. A similar adverse inference may be drawn against the defendant from a failure to respond to questions in interview. However, the justices or jury must not convict wholly or mainly on the strength of such a conclusion: see section 38(3) of the 1994 Act. Still less are they bound to convict on the basis of such matters.

F6 Examination in chief

F6.14 Recent Complaints

The impact of the CJA 2003, s. 120, on the law governing the admissibility and effect of evidence concerning recent complaints was examined by the Court of Appeal in O [2006] EWCA Crim 556.

It was emphasised that, although s. 120(5) and (7) cover ground very similar to that covered by the old common-law rules, they do not merely codify those rules, but must instead be seen as freestanding provisions which provide their own criteria for admissibility and are not governed by old common-law restrictions. It is clear, for example, that the new rules are not confined to complaints in proceedings for alleged sexual offences, and evidence of matters stated in such complaints may be admissible as evidence of fact, and not merely as evidence of a witness's consistency.

Less obviously, the admissibility of a complaint under s. 120 is not limited to the first complaint made by a victim (eg, he may complain first to X and then, some time later (but still as soon as could reasonably be expected) to Y. If the second complaint has some relevance over and above that of the first, it may be right to admit it under s. 120.

The court nevertheless accepted that it may be necessary in some cases for a judge to restrict evidence of 'complaint upon complaint' which might be merely self-serving and unfair to the defendant.

F12 Character Evidence: Bad Character of Accused

F12.33 Attack on another Person's Character

As previously noted, in Hanson [2005] EWCA Crim 824 the Court of Appeal drew a distinction between evidence of dishonesty and evidence suggesting a propensity to untruthfulness. Where propensity to untruthfulness is relied upon by reference to s. 101(1)(d) and s. 103(1)(b), said the Court, propensity to untruthfulness is not the same as propensity to dishonesty. Previous convictions, whether for offences of dishonesty or otherwise, are therefore likely to be capable of showing a propensity to be truthful only where truthfulness is in issue and, in the earlier case, either there was a plea of not guilty and the defendant gave an account (on arrest, in interview or in evidence) which the jury must have disbelieved, or the way in which the offence was committed shows a propensity for untruthfulness, for example by the making of false representations.

One may perhaps question whether it is possible to draw such a clear distinction. Is it really likely that a dishonest defendant (eg a habitual thief) would hesitate to lie in court if he thought he would get away with it? Whether that is true or not, the Court of Appeal in George [2006] EWCA Crim 1652 has adopted a different approach for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 101(1)(g).

The appellant in this case had attempted to blame his brother for the murder with which he was charged, and evidence of his (ie the appellant's) bad character had thus become admissible under s. 101(1)(g) (read in conjunction with s106). In summing up, the trial judge said:

. . . if, but only if, you think it right and fair you may take your knowledge of the character of the defendant into account when deciding whether or not his evidence to you was untruthful. It's trite to say, isn't it members of the jury, that a person with bad character may be less likely to tell the truth than a person of impeccably good character? But, of course, it doesn't mean or follow that he, the defendant, is incapable of telling the truth. . . . You will also want to bear in mind that the really serious offences of dishonesty, of burglary here, were committed by him a very long time ago when he was a youth, so you must decide to what extent, if at all, his character helps you when judging the truthfulness of his evidence.

It was argued that the judge had thereby erred by failing to distinguish between dishonesty and credibility. The court disagreed. Moses LJ said:

Hanson teaches that where evidence is adduced to establish a propensity, a distinction between offences of dishonesty and evidence of untruthfulness must be maintained. No such distinction arises where the evidence is adduced to show the character of the source of an accusation, pursuant to section 101(1)(g). The summing-up in our view was correct, but bearing in mind in any event the ample examples of this appellant's lack of credibility, in the repeated changes in his account, his credibility was shot in any event.

F17 Exceptions to the Rule against Hearsay: Confessions

F17.1 Definition

An admission made for the purpose of civil proceedings may be admissible as a confession in later criminal proceedings. See Morris [2006] EWCA Crim 1589.

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NEW LEGISLATION

Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Amendment of Section 61(1)) Order 2006 (SI 2006 No. 1629)

Section 61(1) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 lists the offences to which chapter 1 of part 2 of that Act applies (powers of the DPP, the Director of Revenue and Customs Prosecutions and the Lord Advocate in relation to the giving of disclosure notices in connection with the investigation of offences by the Serious Organised Crime Agency). This Order amends s. 61(1) so as to add the offence of bribery, any offence contrary to the public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, s. 1 and certain offences contrary to the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, s. 1.

Collection of Fines (Final Scheme) Order 2006 (SI 2006 No. 1737)

The provisions of the Courts Act 2003, sch. 5 (collection of fines) have been piloted in various forms and areas since February 2004. This Order gives effect to the final version of sch. 5 in all local justice areas from 3 July 2006 subject to amendments. It also amends other legislation in connection with the operation of that final scheme including the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 and the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.

Proceeds of Crime (Recovery of Cash in Summary Proceedings: minimum Amount) Order 2006 (SI 2006 No. 1699)

This Order reduces the minimum amount for the purposes of the exercise of the search powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s. 289, from '5,000 to '1,000.

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